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ABSTRACT 
Companies need to be more innovative to exist and sustain profitability in today’s competitive 
business environment. They try to increase innovation by increasing their internal knowledge 
through internal and external sources. One of the main external sources that may support firms in 
improving their capabilities is venture capital (VC). Venture capitalists not only provide 
financial support for new firms, but also provide value-added activities, such as leadership, 
administration, marketing and strategic directions. These activities may improve the competitive 
advantages, productivity, profitability, and innovation of businesses.  
This study, based on historical data of VC investment and patenting, explores the effects 
of VC investment on firms’ innovation in different intellectual property rights (IPR) 
environments and in many industries worldwide, utilizing large datasets and various empirical 
models. Our negative binomial as well as logistic regression models of the panel data present the 
significant and positive impacts of VC investment and IPR parameters on increasing business 
patenting rates under all legal systems, by controlling for cultural, regulatory, and economic and 
market conditions of the business environment. These rates vary by area. Details of our analysis 
show that British (Common) and French Civil legal systems, in order, are more effective than 
other legal platforms, followed by German and Scandinavian. These results can be extended to 
different world regions and countries, based on their legal system. These outcomes are also 
supported by detailed analyses on countries. Furthermore, VC investment positively influences 
most industries but the impact rates differ by industry.  
In order to adjust our estimations and taking into account any flows in the panel data, we 
apply robust regression methods and cluster standard errors in the models. In order to test and 
address endogeneity concerns about the relationship between VC investment and firms’ 
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patenting activities, three methods are applied: reverse causality, the Heckman Selection model, 
and instrumental variables. The Ease to Do Business index, as a starting business parameter, is 
our instrument for VC investment and it ranks world economies from the highest to the lowest 
level. Higher rankings (which translate to low numerical ranks) indicate that the regulatory 
environment is supportive and simpler for business operations.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Overview 
The venture capital industry has an essential role in fostering economic development through 
supporting new businesses. It supports innovative firms and is a major factor in the development 
of technology start-ups, being primarily aimed at the commercialization of innovative ideas or 
technologies, especially in the US, Canada, Europe and Asia. Venture capitalists go beyond 
financing, as they typically take roles as directors, advisors, or even managers of nascent firms.  
Venture Capital (VC) investors may support firms to increase innovation, by adding to their 
internal knowledge and learning capability (Schildt et al., 2003), thereby enhancing these firms’ 
probability of success in business growth, and by exiting through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
or private sale.  
The effectiveness of VCs in business improvement and learning capacity may vary across 
industries and countries. For example, in technology-intensive industries, the pace and 
complexity of technological change are different than those in other industries, and force 
companies to continuously innovate to be competitive. However, new companies often do not 
possess the knowledge required for innovation. Therefore, the role of external sources of 
knowledge, leadership, and financial support are critical for new firms. We thus examine the 
relationship between VC investments in firms’ innovative activities in larger scale, and more 
specifically, the effects of VC investment on nascent firms’ innovation in different intellectual 
2 
 
property support environments in all industries and locations. To do so, we consider and control 
for key country-based indices from cultural, legal, economic and market conditions perspectives.  
 
1.2. Venture Capital Investment  
VC raises money from individuals and investors to use in supporting entrepreneurial start-ups or 
high-risk firms that are either newly created or in their initial stages. Venture capitalists are not 
only providing financial support, but also providing value-added activities, such as leadership, 
administration, marketing and strategic directions for new businesses (e.g. Sapienza 1989a, 
1989b; Cumming et al. 2005). These value-added activities may improve business competitive 
advantages, productivity, profitability, and innovation.          
Fried and Hisrich (1994) divide the VC decision-making process into six stages: deal 
origination, VC firm-specific screening (e.g., size, industry and stage), generic screening (e.g., 
financial, market, management and deal criteria), first phase evaluation (e.g., due diligence, deal 
audit and risk evaluation), second phase evaluation (more extended evaluation), and closing 
(e.g., financial contract, incentives, closure). VC investors screen many business plans per year, 
but only a few are selected for investment (Groh, 2010; Goldfarb et al., 2005; Metrick, 2007; 
Kirsch et al., 2009). Of the many criteria that VC investors are considering during the decision-
making process, Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990) separate out three main categories: the concept, 
management and returns.  
In the concept category, four elements have been defined for investors: high potential for 
earnings and business growth; a good business idea that is currently in use or with the potential 
to be developed and released to the target market within two to three years; a business with a 
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strong competitive advantage or in a non-competitive market; and finally, reasonable financial 
needs (Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990; and Fried and Hisrich, 1994). 
In terms of the management criteria, VCs are looking for many characteristics in the 
business managers, including personal and professional integrity and great performance at prior 
jobs as well as the current job. In later-stage investments, the concentration will be more on 
management performance in the current venture (Fried and Hisrich, 1994).   
In the returns category, three elements are critical. The first is the chance to exit smoothly 
after investment. VC investors generally gain their investment returns by IPO, private sale, or 
buyback by themselves. VC investors expect to exit in a three- to ten-year time period. The 
second component is a high potential rate of return after investment. The VC investors’ hurdle 
for Internal Rates of Return (IRR) is typically very high, in the 30-70% range. The third 
component of returns is a high potential of absolute return (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). VC 
investors are expecting high absolute returns, even if the IRR is high (Baden-Fuller, et al., 2006).  
VC investors typically invest at six different rounds in ventures after finalizing a VC deal. 
The main six rounds of investment are the seed round, start-up financing, growth or first stage, 
second round, business expansion or mezzanine funding, and exit or bridge financing (Ross et. 
al, 2008). These funds may go to different sections of the business, including construction, sales 
and marketing, Research and Development (R&D). VC activities in a new firm improve internal 
knowledge and people’s capability to be more innovative (Schildt et al., 2003).  
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1.3. Innovation and Patenting 
In a business environment, innovation is the catalyst for growth. According to the Oslo Manual 
definition (OECD and Eurostat, 2005), innovation is the successful commercialization of a new 
product, service, process, or marketing method or substantial improvement of these categories. 
Therefore, a new or significantly improved solution is the minimum requirement for an 
innovation. Joseph Schumpeter, who made great contributions in early research, defined 
innovation as the key aspect of economic growth. Based on his opinion, technological innovation 
causes temporary monopolies in the market and has high potential impacts for a firm to earn 
abnormal returns. This monopoly would be challenged soon by imitators and competitors (Pol 
and Carroll, 2006). These temporary monopolies provide enough motivation for the business to 
develop its new technology (Pol and Caroll, 2006). Firms continuously search to improve 
customer satisfaction with better quality, durability, service, and prices through innovation with 
new technologies and strong business strategies (Heyne, 2010) 
Innovations can be protected through patenting. A patent ensures exclusive rights and is 
granted by national or international organizations to the owner of a new innovation, providing 
them with legal authority for a limited time period to benefit from the new technological solution 
in the market and prevent others reproducing and selling the innovation. Essentially, a patent is a 
contract between the innovator and the public (Thomson Corp, 2007). Therefore, firms try to 
register their innovations through patent applications to protect them and reap economic rents. In 
the US, for example, patents can be granted to the inventors or discoverers of novel devices, 
products, processes, equipment, or materials, or those who substantially improve them (USPTO, 
2011). Due to a lack of quantitative data for innovations, patent counts have been used as the 
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standard measure of innovation by many researchers (for example, Griliches, 1990; Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Moser and Voena, 2012; and Moser, 2013).  
Nations have different policies and procedures for patenting. It is critical for societies to 
establish robust intellectual property rights so as to promote innovation and improve their 
economy (Moser, 2013). Empirical studies confirm the effects of strong patent protection rules in 
promoting innovation and improving economic growth (for example, Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; 
Moser 2005; Park, 2008; and Moser, 2013).   
 
1.4. Patent Registration 
To help innovators in obtaining patent protection and rights in foreign countries, the Paris 
Convention was established in 1883 for the Protection of Industrial Property. The number of 
Contracting States is 174 as of spring 2013, and it is still growing (WIPO, 2013). This 
convention expands the geographical scope of individual patents, enabling innovators to benefit 
from a global market for their innovations. In addition, this union establishes a worldwide patent 
network in which economic infrastructures are inter-connected (WIPO, 2013).  
The provisions of the union can be categorized into three main segments: ―national 
treatment‖, ―common rules‖, and ―right of priority‖. In terms of national treatment provisions, 
each country must provide the same rights and protection to other contracting state citizens that it 
provides to its own citizens. The union provides some common rules for contracting countries  
regarding patent legislation, countries interactions for patenting, etc. (Thomson Corp, 2007). 
Right of priority is another category of the convention, in which an applicant who has 
submitted her first patent application in one of the contracting states may apply for patent 
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protection in all the other contracting states within 12 months. Later applications for the same 
patent will be considered as the first application. Priority number and priority date are two main 
parameters in this regard (Thomson Corp, 2007). These two parameters are critical in the data 
collection and verification process for finding all unique patents and removing all duplicated 
application files that applicants opened in different states. 
 
1.5. The Problem/Objective 
Companies must be more innovative if they wish to exist and sustain profitability in today’s 
competitive business environment. Consequently, they try to increase innovation by increasing 
their internal knowledge through internal and external sources. An extensive body of literature 
explores internal and external R&D expenditures and their effects on firms’ innovation 
(Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, 1987; Griliches, 1990; Cozzarin, 2006; and Cozzarin 2008).  Some 
studies examine the relationship between alternative—mainly external—sources of knowledge 
and firms’ innovation rates for US and European industries (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
Ahuja, 2000; and Stuart, 2000).  
VC is one of the main external sources that fill the financing needs of young firms with 
strong growth potential but no assets that can be collateralized. VC investors also receive 
important rights to sit on the firm’s board of directors, which allows them to influence the 
management team even if the investors hold a minority share (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1990, Kaplan, 
2001). These active roles improve the learning capabilities and internal knowledge of new firms, 
which may impact their innovation output. Due to the significant roles and responsibilities of 
VCs in business development, this dissertation analyzes the effects of VC investment on 
innovation output (patents) in different industries and regions. 
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The literature on VC investment impact on innovation is rather thin. Researchers 
normally focus on a single industry in one region, and the results are not directly extendable to 
other regions due to different employment practices, regulatory policies, or public market 
conditions (Lerner, 2000). In addition, the results are not easily extendable to other industries, 
because innovation in some industries such as high technology fields is more critical than that in 
other industries. Finally, the research is hindered by small sample size. For instance, Caselli et al. 
(2009) use just 37 VC-backed firms and 112 non VC-backed firms in their sample in Italy, while 
Engel and Keilbach (2007) have 142 VC-backed firms and 21,375 non VC-backed firms (all 
firms are German). In contrast, we use a global data source for this study, which covers all 
regions and all industries. Our datasets are constructed using four main data sources: firm-level 
data on global firms’ directories, investment-level data on VC investments, assignment-level 
data on patent applications, and country-level data on the World Bank and other global 
macroeconomic databases. We provide comprehensive global research, across industries, 
examining the effect of VC investment on innovation in different cultural, legal, economic and 
market conditions, and use a very large sample. The results of this study can support researchers, 
entrepreneurs, and policy makers in developed and developing countries by clarifying the 
effective level of VC investment in innovation based on industry and location, and considering 
intellectual property rights and controlling for socio-economic parameters.  
This study proceeds as follows. First, we review literature pertaining to innovation 
(patenting) and external venturing. Second, we introduce the data elements, sources and 
collection process to construct datasets and present summary statistics of the data. Third, we 
develop several hypotheses and empirical models to examine the relationship between VC and 
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patenting rates in different intellectual property environments. Finally, we discuss results and 
draws conclusions. A glossary of commonly used terms is provided in page xii. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
 
This review of the literature considers three main bodies of research pertaining to the 
relationship between VC and innovation: the source of innovation, VC investment attraction and 
impacts, and socioeconomic effects on innovation. At the end of the chapter, we summarize the 
motivation and contributions of this research. 
 
2.1. Sources of Innovation 
2.1.1. Sources of Innovation in Business Environments 
Innovation can emerge from various sources. Drucker (1988) classified opportunities of 
innovation in seven categories: unpredicted innovation, due to unanticipated achievements, 
issues, failures or activities out of the boundaries; inconsistencies in business values, needs, or 
functions; gaps in processes, process improvement or redesign efforts; market or industry shifts 
and new opportunities arise for new products, services, methods; changes in demographic 
structures and living arrangements (e.g., population, education, income, employment); changes 
in social or personal attitudes and believes; new scientific and practical knowledge; and 
achievements that permit creation of new products, services and processes. Of these seven 
traditional sources, two of them exist outside a firm in a social and intellectual environment: 
changes in demographic and changes in human perceptions. New knowledge creation may occur 
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outside or inside a firm based on the structure and size of the firm, and it has been the key source 
of innovation in this decade (Drucker, 1988). We discuss this topic further in the next section (§ 
2.1.2). 
Some other key elements are involved in the emergence of innovation. Engelberger 
(1982) identifies three requirements for a firm’s innovations: an identified market need, 
availability of technology and knowledgeable resources, and financial sources to support. A 
market requirement for new product or services is the key motivation of innovation process 
(Kline, 1989). Based on the Kline Chain-Liked model of innovation, there is a complex and 
iterative cycle of sales and marketing, product design, manufacturing and R&D in innovation 
process (Kline, 1989).   
In terms of financial support, firms attract required financial needs from internal or 
external sources. VC investment is a key external source that may have a contribution in firm’s 
innovation process. We discuss more about the relationship between VC investment and firm’s 
innovation in the next part of this chapter.  
 
2.1.2. Increasing a Firm’s Internal Knowledge 
Firms try to increase their internal knowledge of new opportunities through internal or external 
sources of innovations (Schildt, Maula, and Keil, 2003). VCs, alliances, joint venture alliances, 
and acquisitions of entrepreneurial ventures are examples of external sources that support and 
enable firms to learn (Miles and Covin, 2002; Keil, 2002; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Schildt, 
Maula and Keil (2003) review and analyze the backgrounds of explorative and exploitative 
learning supported by these external corporate ventures. Based on their results, external 
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venturing can be a good driver for supporting small firms to become more innovative and to 
grow faster through monitoring and tracking markets and technological developments. The 
authors analyze the interorganizational knowledge flows, by using patent citations between the 
largest ICT corporations and their external ventures from 1992-2000. However, they find a weak 
relationship between corporate VC investment, and explorative and exploitative learning 
outcomes. Based on their final result, learning through corporate VC investments is not focused 
on patented technology of the partner (Schildt, Maula and Keil, 2003). Dushnitsky and Lenox 
(2005), however, argue that investment activities, such as VC investment, facilitate a firm’s 
learning and improve its innovative performance. Wadhwa and Kota (2006) continue this 
discussion of external knowledge sources from a different perspective. Based on their discussion, 
new information can help investing firms to address existing problems utilizing a different 
approach and to use it to enhance the firms’ internal R&D capabilities. These capabilities support 
firms to develop and release new products in new markets earlier than rivals who do not have 
access to external sources of knowledge (Chesbrough and Tucci, 2003; Maula et al., 2003). 
According to Wadhwa and Kota (2006), new learning capability of a firm is based on its 
current knowledge level. Prior discussions show that companies looking to restructure their 
knowledge stocks must go beyond their current technological and organizational frameworks and 
local search (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001).  Access to new sources of knowledge significantly 
increases the learning capacity of a target firm (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). In addition, post-
investment activities by investors, such as leadership, monitoring, tracking and cultivating are 
effective and beneficial for improving a firm’s learning.  However, gaining and utilizing new 
technological knowledge entails further costs for the required resources. Resource limitations 
and information overload prevent investors from effectively managing a large portfolio of target 
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firms (Keil et al., 2004). Based on this discussion and despite previous researchers’ findings 
discussed above, Wadhwa and Kota (2006) focus on one single study. They use non-linear 
methods and find an inverted U-shaped (non-linear) relationship between corporate VC 
investment and a firm’s internal knowledge increase through innovation. This might be a more 
complex relationship between corporate VC investment and firms than previous researchers 
found. Other researchers, such as Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005), did not examine this nonlinear 
relationship, and their sample was selected from a cross-section of industries. Finally, as 
Wadhwa and Kota (2006) indicated, their findings regarding the relationship between corporate 
VC investments and knowledge creation may raise the issue of the relationship between the 
potential innovation costs and VC investment, due to ultimate diminishing returns of knowledge 
creation by the investment. 
 
2.1.3. Country and Industry Variation in Innovation 
Innovation is a key element in the economic growth, due to its considerable influences on 
business efficiency and quality of life. Policymakers and regulators around the world are 
continuously working to develop socioeconomic environments to foster innovation. For instance, 
the US government launched a National Infrastructure Foundation that houses innovation 
programs, strengthens industry-university partnerships, and supports innovative economic 
development initiatives, especially to strengthen regional clusters (NSF, 2013). In 2010, the 
Federal Government of Canada increased the investment in research through general research 
funding for grant councils and regional innovation clusters (Dufour, 2010). In China, the national 
expenditure on basic research doubled between 2004 and 2008, and the government provided tax 
incentives for R&D and financial support for indigenous innovation (Rongpin, 2010). Several 
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Latin American countries, in particular Argentina, Brazil and Chile, have implemented an array 
of policies to foster innovation (Albornoz, 2010). The European Union has provided several 
plans to increase innovation, including raising the R&D expenditure to 3% of the GDP in 2010 
(Tindemans, 2010). Furthermore, Russia established the Medvedev modernization program in 
order to create a diversified economy based on high technology and innovation (Russia Profile, 
2009). The Government of Western Australia has also provided a number of innovation 
incentives, such as the Tropical Innovation Awards in 2010, which is open to all businesses in 
Australia and intended to promote innovation and technological change (Queensland 
government, 2013). 
Due to the crucial roles of innovation on countries’ economic growth and governments’ 
efforts to promote innovation, it is necessary to know what factors determine a country’s 
capacity to innovate and what elements must be in place to enable a country or a company to 
transform ideas into commercially successful goods and services for economic and social 
development. Policymakers and regulators continuously measure innovative performance and 
endeavor to improve policies and regulations. Dutta (2012), through the Global Innovation Index 
(GII) program, provides a model for evaluating innovation-related policy performance and 
improving innovation policies for optimal growth. He completed an extensive study on the 
global innovation index at a country level, based on 21 macroeconomic indices in seven different 
categories in the GII 2012 report. His model comprises 141 economies, which represent 94.9% 
of the world’s population and 99.4% of the world’s GDP (in current US dollars). He ranks all 
141 economies in terms of innovation efforts. The top ten countries in the GII 2012 edition are 
Switzerland, Singapore, Sweden, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hong Kong 
(China), Ireland, and the US. The details of this ranking are provided in Table 2.1. 
14 
 
Table 2.1: The global innovation index 2012 (Dutta, 2012) 
  
Country 2012 Score Rank Country 2012 Score Rank
Switzerland 68.24 1 Georgia 34.27 71
Sweden 64.77 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 34.17 72
Singapore 63.47 3 Namibia 34.14 73
Finland 61.78 4 Turkey 34.14 74
United Kingdom 61.25 5 Peru 34.07 75
Netherlands 60.55 6 Viet Nam 33.92 76
Denmark 59.93 7 Guyana 33.67 77
Hong Kong (China) 58.72 8 Belarus 32.93 78
Ireland 58.68 9 Mexico 32.86 79
USA 57.69 10 Belize 32.52 80
Luxembourg 57.68 11 Trinidad and Tobago 32.47 81
Canada 56.94 12 Swaziland 32.03 82
New Zealand 56.63 13 Kazakhstan 31.94 83
Norway 56.42 14 Paraguay 31.62 84
Germany 56.25 15 Botswana 31.38 85
Malta 56.13 16 Dominican Republic 30.94 86
Israel 55.99 17 Panama 30.92 87
Iceland 55.73 18 Morocco 30.65 88
Estonia 55.34 19 Azerbaijan 30.41 89
Belgium 54.29 20 Albania 30.38 90
Korea, Rep. 53.86 21 Jamaica 30.16 91
Austria 53.1 22 Ghana 29.61 92
Australia 51.91 23 El Salvador 29.51 93
France 51.75 24 Sri Lanka 29.12 94
Japan 51.67 25 Philippines 29.02 95
Slovenia 49.92 26 Kenya 28.94 96
Czech Republic 49.72 27 Senegal 28.81 97
Cyprus 47.89 28 Ecuador 28.54 98
Spain 47.25 29 Guatemala 28.39 99
Latvia 46.97 30 Indonesia 28.07 100
Hungary 46.54 31 Fiji 27.92 101
Malaysia 45.93 32 Rwanda 27.9 102
Qatar 45.51 33 Egypt 27.88 103
China 45.41 34 Iran, Islamic Rep. 27.35 104
Portugal 45.29 35 Nicaragua 26.67 105
Italy 44.48 36 Gabon 26.46 106
United Arab Emirates 44.4 37 Zambia 26.45 107
Lithuania 44.02 38 Tajikistan 26.43 108
Chile 42.66 39 Kyrgyzstan 26.42 109
Slovakia 41.37 40 Mozambique 26.33 110
Bahrain 41.12 41 Honduras 26.33 111
Croatia 40.68 42 Bangladesh 26.09 112
Bulgaria 40.67 43 Nepal 26.01 113
Poland 40.36 44 Bolivia, Plurinational St. 25.84 114
Montenegro 40.15 45 Zimbabwe 25.74 115
Serbia 39.95 46 Lesotho 25.69 116
Oman 39.5 47 Uganda 25.56 117
Saudi Arabia 39.3 48 Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep.25.45 118
Mauritius 39.25 49 Mali 25.39 119
Moldova, Rep. 39.23 50 Malawi 25.36 120
Russian Federation 37.88 51 Cameroon 25 121
Romania 37.78 52 Burkina Faso 24.63 122
Brunei Darussalam 37.72 53 Nigeria 24.57 123
South Africa 37.45 54 Algeria 24.38 124
Kuwait 37.19 55 Benin 24.37 125
Jordan 37.13 56 Madagascar 24.23 126
Thailand 36.94 57 Uzbekistan 23.94 127
Brazil 36.58 58 Tanzania, United Rep. 23.86 128
Tunisia 36.51 59 Cambodia 23.39 129
Costa Rica 36.33 60 Gambia 23.29 130
Lebanon 36.21 61 Ethiopia 23.28 131
Macedonia, FYR 36.18 62 Syrian Arab Rep. 23.12 132
Ukraine 36.12 63 Pakistan 23.06 133
India 35.68 64 Côte d'Ivoire 22.62 134
Colombia 35.49 65 Angola 22.22 135
Greece 35.27 66 Togo 20.52 136
Uruguay 35.13 67 Burundi 20.52 137
Mongolia 34.99 68 Lao PDR 20.21 138
Armenia 34.49 69 Yemen 19.17 139
Argentina 34.43 70 Niger 18.63 140
Sudan 16.81 141
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Since the pace and complexity of technological change is different across industries, we 
do not expect to see the same innovation rates. Innovation can happen in all industries, including, 
for example hospitals (Salge and Vera, 2009), universities and local governments. 
In the industry-level context, there is a close connection between innovation and various 
positive changes in quality, productivity, competitiveness, market needs, market share, and other 
aspects, based on the product or service type (Salge and Vera, 2012). Therefore, these impacts 
may be greater in high-technology industries than others. Some scholars have found that in high-
technology industries, where rapid technological change is the norm, few organizations are able 
to build capabilities without access to external knowledge sources (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
 
2.2. VC Attraction and Impacts 
2.2.1. VC Investment in Different Industries and Locations 
VC investment attraction in different countries and industries is varied. Groh et al. (2013) 
provide combined metrics for benchmarking the attractiveness of 116 economies to absorb 
Venture Capital and Private Equity (VCPE) investments. Based on their research, the country’s 
economic conditions; capital markets; tax rates and incentives; investment rights, support and 
corporate governance; society; and entrepreneurial environment and supports are the main 
categories of measures involved in VC investment attraction. Based on the Global VCPE 
Attractiveness Index for 2012 measured by Groh et al. (2013), the US, Canada, the UK, Japan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland are the top ten countries 
for VC and PE activities. As we would expect, countries with a stronger economy, more business 
protection and support and higher levels of business culture are more successful in VC 
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investment. Lerner and Schoar (2005), Hazaruka et al. (2009), Cumming et al. (2010) and others 
present data that is consistent with the view that a country’s legality level, even legality 
pertaining to public markets, is important for VC attraction.  
In terms of industrial types, according to Cumming and Knill (2009), VC investment 
rates may vary in different industries, because some industries are riskier than others and the 
types of opportunity available for each industry differ. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the VC 
investment in different industry sectors by dollar invested in the US in 2012 (NVCA, 2013). 
Based on this graph, Software was the first sector of VC investment in 2012, receiving 31% of 
the total this investment. Biotechnology is the second largest industry, with 15.4% of total VC 
investment. The Industry/Energy sector is the third one, with 10.5% of the total, due to the 
emerging markets and public interests of the clean technology. Finally, Medical Devices is the 
fourth position, at 9.4% (NVCA, 2013). 
In addition, Figure 2.2 shows the VC investment in different stages by dollar invested in 
the US in 2012 (NVCA, 2013). The growth and expansion stage, also called mezzanine 
financing, is the main target of VC investment by 35%. Late and Early stages are the second and 
third targets of investment, by 32% and 30%, respectively. The seed stage attracts only 3% of the 
VC investment, because low level financing is needed to complete the initial phases of business 
development, such as proving a new idea. Crowdfunding is also emerging as an option for seed 
funding (Ahlers et a., 2012).  
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Figure 2.1: VC investments in 2012- industry sectors by dollar invested (NVCA, 2013) 
 
Figure 2.2: VC investments in 2012- stage by dollar invested (NVCA, 2013) 
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2.2.2. Value-added Role of Venture Capital 
VC is theoretically and empirically a value-added source of finance for high-growth startup firms 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004; Sorensen, 2007; Fulghieri and 
Sevilir, 2009; Metrick and Yasuda, 2009; Cumming and Knill, 2010). In addition to the financial 
support, venture capitalists often have a key managerial role in entrepreneurial firms. This direct 
involvement creates value for the entrepreneurial firms in the form of comparative advantages 
and encourages these firms to select VCs (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Wright and Lockett, 2003; 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004; Jääskeläinen et al., 2006). Venture capitalists interact with 
their target firms through different channels, including board membership (Zahra et al., 2000; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). This role as active board members supports the target firms to be 
informed about the technological changes through internal communication channels (Pisano, 
1989). Having this leadership channel, the incoming knowledge is more efficiently taken and 
used by the target firms. Strong and stable relationships between VC and target firms enhance 
communication channels, interactions and effective transformation of tacit knowledge and skills 
to the target firms (Dhanaraj et al., 2004). 
From a human resources management perspective, previously documented discussions 
assert that VCs help their companies recruit managers and other key human resources (Hellman 
and Puri, 2002), execute corporate governance and administration programs (Hochberg et al., 
2007) and enable strategic collaborations (Lindsey, 2007). Since VC improves the firms’ internal 
knowledge transfer channels, they can improve the human resources efficiency and effectiveness 
and add value to their target firms (Hellman and Puri, 2002). 
The contribution of VC investment to the aforementioned activities is based on three 
main dimensions: the industry type of a target firm, stage of VC investment, and firm’s location 
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(Boue, 2002). In terms of the industry type, based on Timmons and Bygrave (1986), there is a 
positive relationship between the industry experience and the value-added quality. It is also clear 
that the value-added services that each industry needs are not the same. For example, a 
biotechnology firm has different expectation than a transportation firm, due to different product 
life-cycles, pace technological changes and market conditions.  
The investment stage can be divided to three main stages: early, growth and expansion, 
and divestment (Stedler 1987). A target firm’s needs, goals, and leadership styles change during 
the life cycle of the firm (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Flynn, 1991; Engel and Hofacker, 2001; 
and EVCA, 2002). According to Leitinger et al. (2000), in the early stage, the main attention and 
requirements are on operation management and marketing strategy. In the growth and expansion 
phase, the main attention and requirements are on business strategy, international business, and 
financing stages. Many authors believe that the highest VC value-added support happens in the 
early stage of investment (e.g., Landström, 1991: Elango et al., 1995; and Hellmann and Puri, 
2002). According to Hellmann and Puri (2002), the role of internal firm’s processes is critical in 
early stage, because VC is going to implement pre-defined reporting standards in the target firm. 
In summary, according to these discussions and the literature of VC value added 
activities (e.g., Boue, 2002; Sapienza, 1989a & 1989b; and Cumming et al. 2005), we can list all 
potential VC value-added activities in target firms in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: A list of value-added activities provided by VC for target firms  
ID Value Added Activities 
1 Act as a member of the board and a part of the leadership team 
2 Involve directly in the business strategic planning 
3 Assist in organizational structure design 
4 Assist in design, execution and improvement of internal processes  
5 Monitor and provide effective feedback for different business aspects 
6 Provide support and guidance regarding internationalization 
7 Provide advice on business/market expansion 
8 Involve directly in products/services design and development 
9 Participate/provide advice regarding sales and marketing 
10 Assist in budgeting/financial policies and planning 
11 Assist in acquiring additional equity/debt (capital structure) 
12 Assist in obtaining subsidies and external support 
13 Offer/provide interface functionality to a group of investors 
14 Assist in human resource management (planning, recruitment, training and motivation) 
15 Support the business in selecting other service partners (e.g., suppliers and distributors) 
16 Problem solving  
17 Communicate with portfolio companies of the investor, partners, and other stakeholders 
18 Participate in public and media affairs 
19 Engage in legal affairs 
20 Support the effective relationship between investors and the entrepreneur/venture 
21 Act as friend, mentor or coach 
  
Additionally, Figure 2.3 shows the VC value adding framework or process in regards to 
its target firm in three main sections. The value added content diagram demonstrates a list of 
potential value added items that can be accomplished by VC investors in both operational-level 
and strategic dimensions. The strategic items have a long term effects on the business. All 
business segments can be impacted by the strategic and operational activities. The value added 
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hierarchy in Figure 2.3 shows the importance of the value-added activities for the entrepreneur, 
and for the implementation phase of transferring and executing value-added elements into a 
venture (Boue, 2002). 
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Figure 2.3: Model of the value adding process by venture capitalists (Boue, 2002)
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2.2.3. Main Concerns in VC Relationship with Entrepreneur Firms 
In the discussion of VC value added activities towards entrepreneur firms, it is necessary to 
consider the main concerns raised by scholars in regards to the relationships between investors, 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. As Sahman (1990) asserts, the VC structure and its 
incentive model mechanism must address two-stage agency relationship concerns. The first 
agency problems emerge between outside investors (the limited partners) and venture capitalists 
(the general partners), because VC firms raise money from their limited partners before funds are 
allocated to target firms. The second agency problem is about the relationship between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs. The VC investors deal with high degree of uncertainty and strong 
information asymmetries when they make investment decisions (Kirsch et al., 2009). The strong 
information asymmetries that they face cause adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
(Dessi and Yin, 2010).  
These agency problems are much higher in target firms that focus on R&D investments 
and innovative projects. In order to mitigate these problems, venture capitalists screen more 
intensively to evaluate the most promising investment opportunities (Kirsch et al., 2009; Dessi 
and Yin, 2010). Besides, they provide required funds only in those stages that are related to the 
predefined achievable milestones. Therefore, VC firms create investment contracts based on this 
condition and become widely involve in information collection and monitoring processes to 
minimize moral hazard problems. Entrepreneurs also act more carefully than usual when 
employing VC funds (Dessi and Yin, 2010).  
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2.2.4. VC Investment Effects on Innovation 
In terms of direct effects of VC investment on technological innovation and patenting rates, 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) test and measure these effects across twenty US industries over 30 
years by industry and they find that VC activities significantly increase patenting rates. 
According to their results, VC investments are more effective than internal R&D activities in 
generating patents in the US. In their opinion, no evidence is available to suggest that their 
results can be extended globally, due to different employment practices, regulations and policies, 
or public market conditions. Lerner (2002) continues his previous study and analyzes the impact 
of VC on innovation during boom and bust periods in US industry. His study considers both a 
field-based and a statistical component, and shows that the effect of VC investment on 
innovation is not uniform. This situation decreases during rapid growth periods, or booms. VC 
industry is strongly cyclical and its effect on a firm’s patenting is likely to move with this 
cyclical movement (Lerner, 2002).  
Ueda and Hirukawa (2006) continue the study of Kortum and Lerner (2000) and confirm 
the result of a positive relationship between VC and patents in which VC investment is a highly 
effective driver of patent activities.  The authors use samples of an extended time period, from 
1965 to 2002 in the US. Unlike their positive results for the relationship between VC investment 
and patents, they do not find any significant and positive effect of VC investment on total 
productivity growth. However, they find a positive relation between VC investment and labor 
productivity growth because of technology substitution by VC-backed firms utilizing less human 
resources and more material, energy and technology. Mollica and Zingales (2007) find the 
positive results for the impacts of VC investment on innovation by exploiting cross sectional, 
cross industry, and time series variability of VC investments in the US. Dushnitsky and Lenox 
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(2005a) conduct this test again by using a sample of about 2300 US public firms over a 20-year 
period. Based on their result, the citation-weighted patenting output is positively correlated to the 
prior corporate VC investment.  These authors also find that the relation between corporate VC 
investment and firm innovation rates is greater when firms hold their capacity to leverage 
venture knowledge received from external sources. They provide evidence of a strong 
association between corporate VC investment and patenting quality in the area of weak 
intellectual property protection and support, and in industries with rapid technological change 
(Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a).  
In addition to the above research in the US, Popov and Roosenboom (2008) apply 
Kortum and Lerner’s (2000) empirical methodology to examine the effect of VC investment in 
Europe. The authors use data of 18 European countries for the period 1991-2004, and find 
positive and significant impacts of VC on innovation. In contrast, Engel and Keilbach (2007) 
find different results in German industry: VC-backed firms register more patents than 
comparable non-VC- backed firms before receiving the VC investment. Based on their 
discussion, after investment, the number of firms' patents does not differ significantly anymore, 
but their growth rates are larger. Their finding suggests that the higher innovation in VC-backed 
firms occurs because of the VC selection process prior to the funding rather than to the venture 
funding itself. It seems that VCs’ main focuses are on their target firms’ growth and 
commercialization of existing innovations. Caselli et al. (2009), in conducting this study for 
Italian firms, find similar results to those of Engel and Keilbach (2007). They test two 
hypotheses regarding VC investments effects on innovation and the growth of innovative VC-
backed firms in Italian industry. Using a sample of 37 Italian VC-backed IPOs on the Italian 
public market from 1995 to 2004, they select 37 twin but non VC-backed firms for the same 
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period, by a simple statistical matching method. Their results show that although innovation is 
important during the VC selection process, VC-backed firms mostly focus on improving 
economic and managerial aspects of their firms after VC investment rather than promoting 
innovations. Table 2.3 shows a summary of the literature on causality between VC investment 
and innovation discussed above. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of literature on causality between VC and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author (Year) Article/Book Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
Kortum and 
Lerner  
(2000)  
Assessing the 
contribution of 
venture capital to 
innovation 
 
RAND 
Journal of 
Economics 
Annual data for 20 
manufacturing industries 
between 1965 and 1992 (over 3 
decades) in the US 
From National Science 
Foundation (NSF)  
Cobb Douglas model, Ordinary least 
square (OLS) for patent generating 
rate), some limitations and it is the 
first cut of quantifying the VC impact 
on innovation. Utilized instrumental 
variables (regulation change in 1979)  
There is strong relation between VC and 
patenting.  Estimated 8% contribution of VC 
on business innovations prior to 1992. Due to 
sharp increase in VC investment since 1992, 
and assuming constant VC power, by 1998, VC 
contribution increase to about 14% of total US 
business innovation. 
Lerner  
(2002) 
Boom and Bust in the 
Venture Capital 
Industry and the 
Impact on Innovation 
Harvard 
NOM 
Research 
Paper 
 
Venture capital fund-raising in 
US from 1969 to 2001 and their 
return of investment (from 
Venture Economics database)  
Demand and supply curves of VC, 
agency problem, information 
asymmetry 
―VC is a cyclical industry, and the VC effect on 
innovation is most likely to differ with this 
cycle.‖  
Schildt, 
Maula, and 
Keil 
(2003) 
Explorative and 
Exploitative Learning 
from 
External Corporate 
Ventures 
Working 
Paper Series, 
Espoo, 
Finland 
Sample of external corporate 
ventures of the largest 110 
public U.S. corporations 
operating in four sectors of 
information and 
communications technology 
(ICT) industries. Financial 
measures for years 1989-2001 
from Compustat database. Data 
of the external ventures from 
Thompson Financial SDC 
Platinum database.  
Logistic regression model  
( a moving three-year window to 
construct patent class counts to 
reflect the focus of recent 
technological activities) 
 
Corporate venturing and technological 
dependency have significant impacts on the 
likelihood of explorative learning (and 
innovation) by firms 
Dushnitsky 
and Lenox  
(2005b) 
When do incumbents 
learn from 
entrepreneurial 
ventures? Corporate 
venture capital and 
investing ﬁrm 
innovation rates 
Research 
Policy 
Data includes 2289 ﬁrms and 
45,664 ﬁrm-year observations. 
The data collected from 
Venture Economic’s 
VentureXpert database, 
patenting activity from the Hall 
et al. (2001) dataset derived 
from the U.S. Patent Ofﬁce, and 
ﬁnancial data from Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat database. For 
annual patent output of each 
ﬁrm using the HJT dataset. 
They used unbalanced panel analysis 
(negative binomial regression) for 
US public ﬁrms during the period 
1969–1999. Their investigation 
builds on two theoretical pillars. 
First, the knowledge necessary to 
generate innovations may likely 
reside outside the boundary of 
incumbent ﬁrms. Second, 
entrepreneurial start-ups may be a 
valuable source of such knowledge. 
They used unbalanced panel data 
discrete random and fixed effect 
CVC investments positively impact ﬁrms’ 
patenting rates.  This impact is greater when 
―ﬁrms operate in an external context that 
permits capitalization on venture knowledge 
and possess the internal capabilities to leverage 
that knowledge.‖ ―The level of citation-
weighted patenting-output is positively related 
to the level of prior CVC investment.‖ They 
believe the relation between CVC investment 
and patents’ quality is strongest in weak IPR 
environments. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of literature on causality between VC and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author (Year) Article/Book Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
models (with 1-year lag between our 
regressors and dependent variables) 
Dushnitsky 
and Lenox  
(2005) 
When Do Firms 
Undertake R&D by 
Investing in New 
Ventures? 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
A sample of more than 1000 
U.S. public ﬁrms for the period 
1990–99. The VC data from 
Venture Economics’ 
VentureXpert database, 
patenting activity from the Hall 
et al. (2001) dataset derived 
from the U.S. Patent Ofﬁce, 
ﬁnancial data from Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat database, and 
appropriability data from the 
Carnegie Mellon Survey of 
R&D. The resulting dataset 
includes 1171 ﬁrms and 60,444 
ﬁrm-year-sector observations. 
They used unbalanced panel analysis 
for US public ﬁrms. 
―Firms invest more corporate VC in sectors that 
are characterized by weak patent effectiveness 
and where complementary assets are important. 
Firm-level factors drive the decision to pursue 
external CVC‖. ―A positive relationship exists 
between ﬁrm annual equity investments and 
internal cash ﬂow, and CVC investment is 
affected jointly by the absolute and relative 
absorptive capacity of the ﬁrm‖. 
Wadhwa and 
Kutha  
(2006) 
Knowledge Creation 
Through External 
Venturing: Evidence 
from the Telecom 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
 
Data of 36 firms in telecom 
equipment manufacturing 
industry during 1989-1999. The 
firms have VC funds at least 
once in start-ups. VC data from 
VentureXpert (NVCA source) 
Nonlinear regression method is also 
used. Negative binomial regression 
with both random and fixed effects 
models 
 
 
An inverted U-shape exists between CVC 
investment and innovation when investor 
involvement is low. This relationship will 
change positively when this involvement is 
high. 
. 
Engel and 
Keilbach 
 (2007) 
Firm-level 
implications of early 
stage venture capital 
investment -- An 
empirical 
investigation 
Journal of 
Empirical 
Finance 
They collect data of over 
21,000 new non VC-backed and 
146 new VC-backed firms in 
Germany from 1995 to 1998, 
through German Patent Office 
(DPA), firms high level data 
from ZEW and firms details 
from Credit reform  
Analysis based on twin companies 
Average Treatment  Effects method)  
VC-backed firms apply for more patents, but 
their innovation activities diminish after first 
VC investment.  VC-backed firms have more 
sales growth than non VC-backed firms  
Caselli et al.  Are Venture 
Capitalists a Catalyst 
for Innovation? 
European 
Financial 
Management 
They collected the data of 37 
VC-backed IPOs and 37 non 
VC-backed firms as control 
group from 1995 to 2004.They 
Matching for finding twin 
companies. They use average 
treatment effect method 
VC-backed firms are more innovative than non 
VC-backed firms. However, when a VC 
decides to deliver funds, VCs seem to block the 
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Table 2.3: Summary of literature on causality between VC and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author (Year) Article/Book Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
(2009) utilize SIMBA and EPO (for 
patents) and Italian association 
of VC investment 
innovation process. 
Popov and 
Roosenboom 
(2009) 
Does private equity 
investment spur 
innovation? 
European 
Central 
Bank (ECB) 
Working 
Paper 
Data of VC activities in 
different industries in 18 main 
European countries from 1991 
to 2004. VC data  from EVCA 
(European Venture Capital 
Association), USPTO, 
European Patent Office (EPO) 
OLS and instrumental variable 
regression analysis (similar to 
Kortum and Lerner, 2000)  
VC has positive impact on innovation. This 
impact is less in Europe than in US. The results 
hold only for granted patents  (VC does not 
impact number of patents) 
Cumming 
and Knill  
(2010) 
Disclosure, Venture 
Capital and 
Entrepreneurial 
Spawning 
Journal of 
International 
Business 
Studies 
Macroeconomic data for 34 
countries over the years 1999-
2008 
OLS regression model for security 
law, multinomial logit model is used 
for entrepreneurs, For robustness 
check, two-step Heckman regressions  
―Securities regulation facilitates VC-induced 
entrepreneurial spawning which means VC 
inspires new entrepreneurial ventures through 
mentoring and certification as an important 
value-added source of capital‖, and improves 
securities regulations increases the strength of 
this relationship.   
Lerner et al.  
(2011) 
Private Equity and 
Long-Run 
Investment: The Case 
of Innovation 
Journal of 
Finance 
Patent data of 495leveraged 
buyout (LBO) transactions in 
US from 1980 to 2005. Main 
source Capital IQ database, 
USPTO for patents 
OLS and Poisson Regression 
Analysis 
LBO firms become more focused concerning 
their innovation activity, and their patents show 
a higher quality. Thus LBO funds do not 
exploit the existing innovativeness of their 
portfolio firms to maximize short term profits.  
Ueda and  
Hirukawa  
(2011) 
Venture capital and 
innovation: which is 
first? 
  Pacific 
Economic 
Review 
 Data of US manufacturing 
industry from 1958 to 2001 
(extended period of Kortum & 
Lerner, 2000). Data sources are 
VentureXpert, Bertelsman, 
Becker, and Gray’s NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry 
Database (the NBER 
productivity database), the 
NBER patent database, and 
funds for industrial R&D 
performance for 1953—98 from 
National Science Foundation. 
They used panel autoregressive 
regressions, Granger causality tests, 
and instrumental variables method. 
―Total factor productivity growth of firms is 
often positively and signiﬁcantly related to 
future VC investment‖. Little evidence found to 
support both the innovation-first and the VC-
ﬁrst hypotheses. Causality runs from 
innovation to VC investment. 
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2.3. Socio-economic Factors and Innovation 
According to Cumming and Knill (2010), Groh et al. (2010), Dutta (2012) and other scholars, 
macroeconomic parameters are key drivers of innovation promotion.  Cumming and Knill (2010) 
use three different types of macroeconomic indices as control parameters to examine the effect of 
VC investment and certain elements of securities laws on innovation.  These indices are 1) New 
Businesses and New Businesses/GDP per capita for entrepreneurship and business startups, 2) 
Market Return, GDP per Capita, IPO Value and Domestic Credit are selected for the VC 
industry and the market of IPO and bank credit, and 3) Market Return and GDP per Capita 
indices for economic and market conditions.  
Groh et al. (2010) review the literature on VC and Private Equity (PE) and conduct a 
similar study to rank VC and PE attractiveness in different countries. The authors categorize all 
relevant country-based indices in the six segments of economic condition, capital market, tax, 
Investment rights and corporate governance, society, and entrepreneurial environment and 
opportunities. They select 23 indices in these six categories to measure and rank countries 
position and provide 42 data series to proxy these segments. They apply different calculation 
methods for normalization, weighting, and aggregation of these 23 indices (Groh et al., 2010). 
Figure 2.4 reproduces their results for European countries. According to their analyses, despite 
the fact that the European countries are similar in many criteria, two main variations influence a 
country's attractiveness for VC activities: its investment protection level and corporate 
governance, and the maturity level of its capital markets in terms of size and liquidity, as a good 
representative for the professionalism of financial markets. 
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Figure 2.4: The VC and PE ranking in European countries (Groh et al., 2010) 
 
Dutta (2012), in his recent GII Report, highlights the crucial roles of infrastructures for 
innovative environment. He measures and ranks every country’s position in terms of innovation 
by utilizing macroeconomic related indices. His study relies on two main categories of indices: 
the innovation input and the innovation output sub-indices. Sub-indices are established based on 
pillars. For the innovation input sub-indices, five input pillars cover enablers of innovation in an 
economy, including regulations and business environment, human resources and research, 
infrastructure, market conditions, and business complexity. Innovation outputs are the outcomes 
of innovative activities within the economy. Dutta (2012) identifies two output pillars: 
―knowledge and technology outputs‖, and ―creative outputs‖. He uses the simple average of the 
five input pillar results for input sub-index, and the simple average of the two output pillar 
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results for output sub-index. For measuring the country’s overall score, both input and output 
sub-indices have the same weight (Dutta, 2012). 
All country-based indices discussed in the literature of innovation and VC investment can 
be divided into three main categories: culture, regulation, and economic and market conditions. 
In terms of culture, Hofstede’s theory provides different dimensions for national cultures, which 
he terms the ―power of distance‖, ―individualism versus collectivism‖, ―uncertainty or 
ambiguity‖, ―masculinity versus feminity‖, and ―long-term versus short-term orientation‖ 
(Hofstede, 1991, 2001). In relation to Hofstede’s theory, Lazear (1990) and Blanchard (1997) 
discuss labor markets, and Gompers and Lerner (1998) analyze countries’ R&D expenditure and 
small business. In our analysis, to control the cultural perspective of a country, labor forces (with 
a secondary education), secondary school enrollment, and R&D expenditure indices are added.  
According to La Porta et al. (1998), a country’s legal system is a key driver of business 
activities. They apply different legal and economic variables, such as company’s origin and its 
legal system, integrity and efficiency of the current judicial system, corruption in government, 
expropriation risk score, GNP and GINI coefficient, type of shares’ ownership, and quality of the 
accounting system. They find that investor protection laws vary across countries, and these 
variations have significant influences on corporate finance (La Porta et al., 1998). The main 
criteria that are often used to define a country’s legal system are the following: historical 
background and growth of the legal system, theories and hierarchies of the foundation of law, the 
method and working process of jurists within the legal system, the characteristics of legal 
concepts utilized by the system, the legal institutions of the system, and the divisions of law 
employed within a system (Glendon et al., 1994). Legal systems are divided into Common law 
(British law) and Civil law (Roman law). Civil law has three families: French, German and 
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Scandinavian. Civil laws give investors weaker legal rights than common laws (La Porta, 1998). 
As part of this research, we are interested in determining the impact of VC investment on firms’ 
patenting in different legal systems. This analysis helps us to find the relationship between the 
right of investors, the quality of enforcement of legal rules and other countries’ legal system 
attributes. 
 
2.4. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
As many scholars assert, it is not easy to find the optimum solution for IPR (e.g., Moser 2005; 
Granstrand, 2005; Lerner, 2005; and Moser 2013). Empirical studies data confirm the effects of 
strong IPR in encouraging invention, promoting innovation and improving economic growth (for 
example, Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Moser 2005; Park, 2008; and Moser, 2013). On the 
theoretical side, while many researchers emphasize the positive role of IPR on promoting 
innovation and patenting (for example, Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Grossman and Lai, 2004; 
and Granstrand, 2005), others consider that no strong relationship exists between robust 
protection for intellectual properties and innovation growth (Lerner, 2009; Gangopadhyay and 
Mondal, 2012).  
As Schwab (2011) explains, the IPR parameter demonstrates two major forms of 
intellectual property rights: patents and copyrights, and can be scored from weak to strong or 
enforced levels. For the IPR measurement and ranking, Ginarte and Park (1997) define five 
categories of parameters: coverage of patentability of products, membership in international 
intellectual support activities, mechanisms of enforcement, restrictions on patent rights, and 
duration of support. 
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According to Grossman and Lai (2004), providing stronger national intellectual property 
protection and support varies positively with the market conditions and innovation capacity of 
the country, because these two factors improve the marginal benefits and reduce deadweight 
losses or marginal costs of a more powerful patent protection and support system. Furthermore,  
Eicher and Penalosa (2006) show a positive correlation between the level of patent protection 
and economic development. Countries’ policymakers and agents try to establish stronger 
intellectual property rights and support systems as economies grow and more knowledge 
collects. Park (2008) illustrates that the level of national patent systems improvement varies by 
level of national economic development. This change is smaller for those top developed 
countries that have already established strong patent protection systems. He provides countries’ 
rankings from an IPR aspect based on Ginarte and Park’s (1997) parameters for the period 1965-
2005. According to his analysis of the distribution of patent strength across the world, this 
distribution is improved from a positively skewed shape prior to the late 1990s to a negatively 
skewed shape afterward. Based on this result, the patent protection index for most countries is 
above the mean, mostly after the arrival of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)
1
 agreement that sets down minimum requirements for intellectual property 
regulations, and the establishment of new patent laws in some countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Angola, 
Indonesia, Mozambique and New Guinea) with no previous patent systems (Park, 2008). Table 
2.4 provides a summary of the literature about intellectual property protection and 
innovation/patenting discussed above.
                                                          
1
 TRIPS is an international agreement that requires all World Trade Organization (WTO) members to provide 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
Chin and 
Grossman 
(1988) 
Intellectual Property 
Rights and North-
South Trade 
National 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Research 
No empirical data 
(theoretical discussion) 
Theoretical 
(mathematical models) 
IPR improve economic efficiency in case 
of considerable innovation (but  not in the 
case of small innovation) 
Scotchmer 
and Green 
(1990)  
Novelty and 
Disclosure in Patent 
Law 
RAND Journal 
of Economics 
No empirical data 
(theoretical discussion) 
Using mathematical/ 
statistical distribution 
models (Poisson, 
decision tree, economic 
equilibrium model 
Licensing is important in patenting, 
because it does not have negative impact 
on firm’s profit. It also promotes 
innovation, due to patenting and disclosure 
supports. 
Kortum and 
Lerner 
(1998) 
Stronger Protection 
or Technological 
Revolution: What is 
Behind the Recent 
Surge in Patenting? 
Carnegie-
Rochester 
Conference 
Series on Public 
Policy 
International patent data 
and industrial property 
statistics (from 
WIPO).Data from OECD 
and Federico 
Regression analysis The main reason of a jump in patenting in 
the US is because of changes in innovation 
management. Management focuses more 
on applied activities than before.  
Sakakibara 
and 
Branstetter  
(2001) 
Do Stronger Patents 
Induce More 
Innovation? Evidence 
from the 1988 
Japanese Patent Law  
Reforms 
RAND Journal 
of Economics 
Japanese and U.S. patent 
data on 307 Japanese 
firms 
Log-linear regression 
models 
No strong relation exists between 
innovation increases and IPR reforms.  
Chen and 
Puttitanun 
(2005) 
Intellectual Property 
Rights and 
Innovation in 
Developing Countries 
Journal of 
Development 
Economics 
panel data for 64 
developing countries 
during 1975–2000 
Theoretical and 
empirical (panel data-
regression) models 
IPR have positive impact on innovation in 
developing  countries 
Granstrand Innovation and 
intellectual property 
The Oxford 
handbook of 
Using the data of other 
studies in Japan, Sweden, 
Review of other relevant 
studies and IPR 
The IPR role in national, industrial and 
firm innovation rates was moderate before 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
(2005)  rights (a book 
chapter) 
innovation and US evolution in US and 
some other economies 
new era. Today, IPR has an extended role 
which strategically impacts firms, sectorial 
and national economic growth    
Lerner 
(2005) 
150 Years of Patent 
Office Practice: Law 
and Institutions  
American Law 
and Economics 
Review 
administrative practices 
of the patent offices in 60 
countries over a 150-year 
period 
Cross sectional and 
regression analysis 
In big and complex economies, there is a 
more options for patenting. In complex 
economies, ―patentees were more likely to 
have more options, delay payment, apply 
for alternative utility model patents and 
delay the examination of patent 
application‖. Under Civil legal system 
there is more options for filing.  
Moser 
(2005) 
How Do Patent Laws 
Influence Innovation? 
Evidence from 
Nineteenth Century 
World’s Fairs  
American 
Economic  
Review 
15000 innovations data at 
the Crystal Palace 
World's Fair in 1851 and 
at the Centennial 
Exhibition in 1876 
Tests for the equality of 
distributions, discrete-
choice regression 
Patenting law is critical for a society to 
find the right direction of technological 
change. ―Countries with no patent law may 
not benefit from innovation in various 
industries (focus is just on a few 
industries). Also mentioned, uniform 
patent laws across the world may decrease 
variation in the innovation direction 
between different countries‖. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
Branstetter, 
Fisman and 
Foley 
(2006) 
Do Stronger 
Intellectual Property 
Rights Increase 
International 
Technology 
Transfer? Empirical 
Evidence from US 
Firm-Level Panel 
Data 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
NBER for the US patent 
data, country-level data 
of IPR reform, U. S. 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) Survey 
for R&D and other data, 
Compustat 
Cross-sectional linear 
regression models 
―Limited evidence found that IPR 
reform spurs domestic innovation. 
Results also imply that U. S. 
multinationals respond to changes in 
IPR regimes abroad by significantly 
increasing technology transfer to 
reforming countries‖.  
Quan 
(2007) 
Do National Patent 
Laws Stimulate 
Domestic 
Innovation in a 
Global Patenting 
Environment? A 
Cross-Country 
Analysis  of 
Pharmaceutical 
Patent Protection, 
1978–2002  
Review of 
Economics 
and Statistics 
Data of pharmaceutical 
industry from 1978 to 
2002 for 26 countries, 
their patent and R&D 
data as well as country-
based indices for this 
time period 
Panel Data- Fixed 
Effects regression 
models  
―National patent protection alone does 
not stimulate domestic innovation, as 
estimated by changes in citation-
weighted U.S. patent awards, domestic 
R&D, and pharmaceutical industry 
exports. However, domestic innovation 
accelerates in countries with higher 
levels of economic development, 
educational attainment, and economic 
freedom. Additionally, there appears to 
be an optimal level of IPR regulation 
above which further enhancement 
reduces innovative activities‖ 
(confirming U-shape relationship). 
Park  
(2008) 
International patent 
protection: 1960-
2005 
Research 
Policy 
The country-based 
indices for patent 
protection for 122 
Simple statistical 
analysis for measuring, 
scoring and 
Countries’ IPR ranking based on 
Ginarte and Park’s (1997) parameters 
for the period 1965-2005, the patent 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
countries from 1960 to 
2005 
comparisons strength distribution across the world is 
improved from a positively skewed 
shape prior to the late 1990s to 
negatively skewed shape afterward, 
mostly because of TRIPS agreement 
and other initiatives.  
Lerner 
(2009) 
The Empirical 
Impact of 
Intellectual 
Property Rights on 
Innovation: Puzzles 
and Clues 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Selection 60 largest 
countries (by GDP in 
1997) listed in the 
International Monetary 
Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics and 
their policy change 
over the past 150 years, 
from 1850 to 1999. He 
found 177 events in 51 
out of 60 nations. 
Theoretical and 
empirical studies 
Expected positive effects of improving 
patent protection on innovation not 
found. This result is not same as that of 
the findings of ―law and finance‖ 
literature.  
Blind  
(2012) 
 
The influence of 
regulations on 
innovation: A 
quantitative 
assessment for 
OECD countries  
Research 
Policy 
Panel data of 21 OECD 
countries during the 
period 1998-2004 
Panel data- fixed 
effects model of a 
linear regression  
―Different types of regulations 
generate various impacts, and even a 
single type of regulation can inﬂuence 
innovation in various ways depending 
on how the regulation is implemented‖ 
(not completely confirmed  that the 
regulatory condition framework 
influences innovation) 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
Gangopadh
yay and 
Mondal 
(2012) 
Does stronger 
protection of 
intellectual 
property stimulate 
innovation? 
Economics 
Letters 
No empirical data Theoretical economic 
models 
IPR may hamper dissemination of 
―scientific knowledge from innovation 
in a standard endogenous growth 
model‖. Stronger IPR may decrease 
innovation rate. 
Moser 
(2013) 
Patents and 
Innovation: 
evidence from 
Economic History 
Journal of 
Economic 
Prospective 
No empirical data  High level discussion 
of economic trends 
Existing historical evidence propose 
that ―patent policies granting strong 
IPR to early generations of inventors, 
may discourage innovation. In contrast, 
policies that encouraging diffusion of 
ideas and modifying patent laws to 
facilitate entry and competition may 
prompt innovation‖. 
Yang 
(2013)  
 
Horizontal 
inventive step and 
international 
protection of 
intellectual 
property 
International 
Review of 
Economics & 
Finance 
No empirical data Theoretical economic 
models 
―When two countries with sufficiently 
different research efficiencies open 
trade with each other, they will both 
lower their patentability requirements 
from their respective autarky levels. 
The model suggests that these 
countries may want to strengthen their 
collaboration in patentability 
requirement‖. 
Boldrin and 
Levine 
What's Intellectual 
Property Good for? 
Revue 
économique 
No empirical data No model (general 
discussion) 
IPR is not a good solution in 
globalization of economy and trade, 
because of creating monopolies. ―To 
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Table 2.4: Summary of literature on intellectual property protection and innovation (in chronological order) 
Author 
(Year) 
Research Title Journal Data (Type & Source) Method/Model Summary of Findings 
(2013) become wealthy, a country must 
regulate trade and strive for trade 
surpluses‖. 
Chu and 
Pan  
(2013) 
 
The Escape-
Infringement Effect 
of Blocking Patents 
on Innovation and 
Economic Growth  
Macroeconom
ic Dynamics 
No empirical data Quality-ladder 
(Grossman–Helpman) 
model 
―Patent breadth has a positive effect on 
innovation; blocking patents negatively 
effects innovation under an exogenous 
step size of innovation‖. 
Hudson and 
Minea 
(2013)  
 
Innovation, 
Intellectual 
Property Rights, 
and Economic 
Development: A 
Unified Empirical 
Investigation 
World 
Development 
Macroeconomic data of 
different countries 
Theoretical model as 
well as linear and 
nonlinear regression 
analysis 
―The effect of IPR on innovation is 
more complex than previously thought 
(nonlinearities depending on the initial 
levels of both IPR and per capita 
GDP)‖. ―A single global level of IPR is 
in general sub-optimal‖. 
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2.5. Our Motivation and Contributions 
The literature on VC investment effects on innovation growth is relatively thin and is based on 
US data and that of a few Western European countries.  There is a lack of research to explore and 
compare the VC effects on innovation globally. As discussed earlier, the business environment in 
other developed and developing regions varies because of different economic policies and 
employment practices, cultures, patenting regulations, and public market conditions. In addition, 
the current literature covers only manufacturing and a few information technology industries. 
However, innovation has a crucial role in other industries as well.  
The extensive research detailed in this thesis adds to the literature by examining VC 
impacts in different intellectual property protection environments, legal systems, regulations, 
cultures, economic and market conditions across the world. Since the pace, complexity and role 
of technological change and innovation in different industries vary, industries experience 
different rates of innovation and patenting and even attraction of VC investment. Thus, it is 
necessary to test and measure the VC investment impacts (both tangible and intangible) on 
patenting rates across industries and regions utilizing large-scale data. Policymakers around the 
world are continuously working to develop socioeconomic environments for fostering innovation 
by establishing the necessary infrastructure, by revising rights, regulations, and protection, and 
by providing innovation awards and other strategic initiatives. The results of this study support 
researchers and policymakers in understanding the role of VC on innovation in various legal and 
protection environments, locations and industries, and the effect of countries’ socio-economic 
parameters.  
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CHAPTER 3: DATA 
 
 
3.1. Overview 
Data collection has been a major effort in this research process. Large amounts of data were 
collected from different sources for both VC-backed and non VC-backed firms. This iterative 
process took 13 months of collection, verification, matching and merging of data.  
Three large datasets comprise the study. The first dataset is the information of all global VC-
backed firms that have had at least one VC deal between January 2000 and January 2011. In this 
11-year timeframe, over 25000 VC deals occurred worldwide. Zephyr, as a part of BVD (Bureau 
Van Dijk Co.) is the main source of this data. Zephyr is a comprehensive global database of deal 
information which contains information on M&A, IPO, private equity and VC deals and rumors. 
All completed VC deals from January 01, 2000 until January 01, 2011 were retrieved from the 
Zephyr database for seven main parameters: acquirer (VC investor), target (sponsored) firms of 
VC deal, VC deal number, deal status, date and amount of completed deal, country, and industry 
type based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
1
. The list of two-digit SIC codes 
and industry types are provided in Appendix C.  The second dataset is the list of global non VC-
                                                          
1
 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were provided and assigned by the U.S. government in 1937 for 
industries classification. SIC codes are broadly classified into industry group, major group and division, based on the 
number of digits (from 1 to 4 digits) and used by other countries as well. This classification was developed for data 
collection, classification, presentation and analysis of data, and it is utilized by various agencies of the federal 
government, state agencies and private organizations. These codes cover all business categories, including fishing, 
hunting and trapping, agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communications, 
electric, gas and sanitary services, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance; insurance and real estate, personal, business, 
professional, repair, recreation and other services, and public administration (US Government, 2013). 
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backed firms and forms the reference (control) group for this study. The number of required non 
VC-backed firms is based on the number of VC-backed firms in each industry and location. We 
stratify the matching process by SIC code and country. The data is retrieved randomly from the 
LexisNexis system, which covers both private and public firms through Hoover’s and other 
global business directories. Hoover's, Inc., a subsidiary of Dun & Bradstreet, is a business 
research company that has provided information on U.S. and foreign companies and industries 
since 1990.  Hoover's maintains a database of 66 million public and private companies across the 
world. For the control group, we extracted similar parameters to Zephyr: company name, 
location, industry (US SIC Code), and company size (employees, annual sales, total assets). 
 The third dataset is global patent information. The patent data for all VC-backed and non 
VC-backed lists were retrieved and aggregated from the Thomson Innovation database between 
January 1995 and May 2012. Thomson Innovation, a part of Thomson Reuters, is a 
comprehensive and global source of full-text patents and published applications. This database 
was used to retrieve all patent information of all VC-backed and non VC-backed firms that we 
collected in the previous steps. The main parameters of our patent database are: 
assignee/applicant, location (address), application and publication number, application and 
publication date, application and publication country, number of assignee (for each), industry 
(IPC, ECLA, US Class), assignee (based on DWPI), priority number, priority date and inventors. 
Collecting and matching the datasets resulted in four main categories of firms for the 
research:  
1. Firms that receive VC and have no patents (i.e., never show up in the patent database) 
2. Firms that receive VC and have patents (patents could be pre- and post- VC) 
3. Firms that have patents and do not have VC 
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4. Firms that have no patent and do not have VC 
 
In addition to the aforementioned data elements, we collected three more datasets for 
country-level indices to control a firm’s socioeconomic environment from three different 
aspects: regulatory, cultural, and economic and market conditions. Based on Cumming and Knill 
(2010) and Groh et al. (2010), the indices Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence, Regulatory Quality, Business Extent of Disclosure, and Taxes can be 
added for regulation control. The cultural indices contain Labor Force (with Secondary 
Education), Secondary School Enrollment, and R&D Expenditure. 
For economic and market conditions, according to Cumming and Knill (2010), Groh et 
al. (2010), Dutta (2012), and MSCI (2013), Return on Equity, Market Capitalization, MSCI 
Return, GDP per capita (current US$), and Business Entry Rate indices are selected and added. 
Details of these indices are in Table 3.1. These indices were extracted from the World Bank 
database, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) system, Doing Business Project (led by 
International Finance Corporation and the World Bank) and the World Economic Forum data 
platform for the time period 2000 to 2012. Since these indices may not be independent of each 
other, it is necessary to test their pairwise correlations and reduce collinearity concerns. 
In this study, we include all industries and legal systems (and regions) to compare 
patenting rates, and to examine the effectiveness of VC investment on business innovation by 
area. The results of this study clarify for researchers, entrepreneurs, and policy makers in 
developed and developing countries the effectiveness of VC investment on innovation, based on 
industry and location.   
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Table 3.1: List of the country-based variables/indices (for 11 years from 2000 to 2011) 
 Variable Definition Source* 
Legal System Countries’ Legal System: Common or British Law, 
Civil Law (French, German and Scandinavian), and 
Muslim  
La Porta et al. 
(1998) +Univ 
of Ottawa 
Intellectual Property 
Protection/Rights (IPR) 
Shows two major forms of intellectual property 
protection/rights: patents and copyrights, and scored 
from weakest (1) to strongest (7) levels 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
Evaluates government stability, tensions, violations 
and security (from -2.5: weak to 2.5: strong) 
World Bank 
Regulatory Quality Government ability to define and establish 
comprehensive policies and regulations that support 
private sectors   
World Bank 
Business Extent of 
Disclosure 
Level of investors’ protection for disclosure of 
business ownership and financial information (0=less 
disclosure to 10=more disclosure) 
World Bank 
Taxes on Income, 
Profits and Capital 
Gains(% of revenue) 
Tax rates based on net income, corporate profits and 
capital gain 
World Bank 
Return on Equity (%) The annual rate of return on shareholders’ equity and 
is equal to net income divided by total equity in a 
fiscal year 
World Bank 
Market Capitalization 
of Listed Companies 
(current US$) 
Market value of all shares outstanding 
World Bank 
MSCI Return 
Established by Morgan Stanley Capital International 
to measure stock market performance 
Morgan 
Stanley 
Capital 
International  
GDP per Capita 
(current US$) 
Measures the annual national GDP per capita based on 
the US$ currency  
World Bank 
New Businesses 
Registered 
The number of newly registered limited liability 
corporation 
World Bank 
Labor Force with 
Secondary Education 
(% of total) 
The percentage of the labor forces that has completed 
secondary education level. 
World Bank 
School Enrollment, 
Secondary (% net) 
Net school enrolment rate in secondary level in all 
programs 
World Bank 
Research and 
Development 
Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
The proportion of R&D expenditure (for basic and 
applied research as well as experimental development) 
out of total GDP 
World Bank 
* Screenshots of the data sources are provided in Appendix A. 
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3.2. Data Collection, Cleansing and Merging Process 
Collecting large-scale datasets for this research was a complicated, iterative and time-consuming 
process. All three databases have different access restrictions, and search and data-extraction 
limitations. This section provides a brief overview of the high-level process of data collection, 
processing and merging through different sources.  
The first step is retrieving the required data from the Zephyr database and finalizing the 
VC dataset, including defining parameters based on analysis requirements and Zephyr’s own 
limitations; retrieving outputs from Zephyr and exporting to other usable formats (i.e., Ms-
Excel); rationalizing the VC dataset (i.e., sorting, cleaning, reorganizing the dataset prior to 
merging). 
The second step is defining requirements and retrieving the required data from 
LexisNexis. Since the non VC-backed firms list is the control group in the study, for stratifying 
data, it was necessary to estimate the number of control firms (non VC-backed) for each industry 
and location based on the treatment group (the VC-backed firms list). According to the VC-
backed list, a matrix was created to define the minimum requirements for each industry and 
region. After that, active firms were retrieved randomly from LexisNexis based on the defined 
parameters.  The non VC-backed data also had to be rationalized (sort, clean, reorder, and 
remove any VC-backed firms erroneously included).  
In the third step, we retrieved required patent data from Thomson Innovation, first 
defining our parameters, retrieving the data and then exporting it to usable formats. Due to the 
system’s limitations, 40 firms were entered in each run. We completed over 2,200 data entry and 
query runs. All 2,200 Excel files (over 1600 megabytes of data) were aggregated and the patent 
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dataset was rationalized by sorting, cleaning, reorganizing the data. At the end, we had over 600 
megabyte of data. 
The fourth step was matching and merging firms and patent datasets, including the 
creation of a new parameter for firm names by removing all inconsistencies (suffixes, spaces, 
and additional characters) using VBA codes. VBA codes were created to remove duplicate firm 
names and country, so that VC-backed, non VC-backed, and patent datasets could be merged. 
For example, if we have ―1366TECHNOLOGIES INC.‖ as a US company in the VC dataset and 
―1366 TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED‖ as a US company in the patent dataset, we 
consider them to be the same company and automatically bring all VC deals and patent data of 
this company together.  
In the final stage, we verified, completed quality assurance, and merged all datasets. 
Merging included converting the matched datasets to the proper format for merging (generating a 
pivot table) and then merging through the common field. This process of data collection, 
cleansing and merging is demonstrated in Figure 3.3. The main results of the process are two 
comprehensive lists of all VC-backed and non VC-backed firms with their patent data (from 
1995 to May 2012); the total number of these firms in each industry/location and the proportion 
of patent owners are demonstrated in Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
3.3. Major Limitations, Issues and Assumptions in Data Collection Process 
Many limitations and issues arise during data collection using the data sources/databases 
indicated above. We highlight some of the key limitations and issues here. In the Zephyr 
database, target firm naming conventions are not consistent or standardized. There is no location 
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(country code) information for some target firms, and there is not enough VC deal information 
for some world regions. In the LexisNexis application, the system does not show a firm’s data 
for a few industries/locations. In addition, a limitation is placed on the number of queries/runs 
that be viewed to extract data. 
The Thomson Innovation database imposes more limitations than others. The key name 
of firms must be entered manually in order to extract their patent data (we entered up to 40 firms 
in each run). Since the assignee/applicant naming convention is not consistent and standardized, 
we just entered the key word of every firm’s name. The main issue here is that we retrieve the 
patent data of all firms that have the same key word. In addition, in this database, we can only 
extract/export up to 30,000 patents in each run (for up to 40 firms). Therefore, sometimes, we 
need to reduce the number of firms in each run to ensure that we collect all firms’ patents.     
Other limitations of Thomson Innovation include its data-retrieved speed, lack of 
standard company code for assignees/applicants in the system, lack of country code for 
firm/applicant (it has application and publication countries), and lack of address for many firms. 
Moreover, the system does not accept any non-letter characters (e.g., &,@,(),{,[,;,:, ",…) in a 
firm's name and these characters must be removed manually during data entry. SIC codes do not 
exist in the system. Instead, they use International Patent Classification (IPC), the European 
Classification System (ECLA), and US Class. Some patent record data is also lacking.  
In addition to the aforementioned problems, some other restrictions arise in the data 
collection process. Both the Access and Excel applications used to aggregate and merge exported 
files of other databases have limited capacity for large-scale datasets, due to their limited number 
of rows and columns. Therefore, our files are split into different files or sheets for data 
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processing. These MS-Office tools also have only a limited capacity and capability for data 
cleansing, calculation and processing our large main files (over 100MB), even though we 
employed two different servers for these purposes. We applied Visual Basic and advanced Excel 
functions to improve this process and reduce the cycle time. The main issues and limitations in 
the process of data collection, cleansing and merging are also demonstrated in Figure 3.4. 
In macroeconomics databases, such as the World Bank, MSCI and Doing Business 
programs, there are some gaps and limitations as well. The datasets do not cover all countries 
and/or years, and for some key indices, data does not exist for 2011 and 2012.  For the missing 
data points, we apply the three simple methods proposed by Nardo et al. (2005a). The methods 
were 1) trying to find missing data in other databases or via the Internet, 2) interpolating between 
adjacent data records, and 3) using the latest available data before 2011. For the second item, we 
use the median of that variable for the same legal system for the missing data point.  
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Table 3.2: Number of VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total in the list*)
COUNTRY 20 28 30 32 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes Grand Total
Australia (1) 6(10) (1) (1) 4(8) 2(3) (3) 1(2) 2(13) 8(15) 0(5) 23(62)
Bermuda (2) 0(6) (8)
Canada (3) 11(30) (3) (1) (2) 5(8) 30(66) 7(19) 2(11) (2) (3) 1(2) 56(198) 35(84) 1(20) 148(452)
Great Britain (UK) 2(18) 35(73) 1(6) 2(2) 3(7) 11(42) 70(146) (9) 57(118) 6(71) 5(20) 1(14) (8) 167(861) 161(321) 25(381) 546(2097)
Hong Kong (1) (2) (9) (1) 0(2) (15)
Ireland 1(6) 2(4) 3(13) 3(12) (8) (1) 14(111) 5(13) 1(12) 29(180)
Israel 13(23) 1(1) 13(22) 37(77) 1(2) 34(67) 2(7) (4) 1(1) 78(186) 36(66) 8(24) 224(480)
India (2) 2(7) (1) (1) (3) (2) (2) (4) (6) (2) (1) 1(69) 1(14) 0(54) 4(168)
Cayman Islands (1) (5) (1) (10) (1) 0(5) (23)
Malaysia (2) (6) 0(1) (9)
New Zealand (4) (1) 1(7) (6) 1(18)
Singapore 1(2) (1) (3) (2) 2(4) (11) (2) 0(3) 3(28)
United States 5(28) 183(375) 2(10) 4(11) 5(15) 93(169) 459(896) 12(30) 306(541) 52(221) 9(40) 12(39) 2(17) 1589(4515) 594(1119) 135(730) 3462(8756)
South Africa (1) (2) (1) (1) (6) (3) 0(2) (16)
Others in British law 0(1) 0(2) 0(1) 1(6) 0(1) 0(1) 1(12)
British law 7(52) 252(535) 3(20) 7(15) 8(26) 124(251) 603(1218) 13(43) 409(767) 64(336) 15(70) 14(60) 3(29) 1909(6010) 840(1646) 170(1246) 4441(12324)
China 1(4) 5(16) (1) (2) (2) 1(5) 6(23) (2) (1) (8) 1(3) (2) (2) 8(152) (16) 3(75) 25(314)
Czech Republic (1) 1(1) (6) 0(1) 1(9)
Iceland (1) (1) (2)
Liechtenstein (1) (1)
Lithuania 0(1) (1)
Poland (1) (1) (13) 0(7) (22)
Romania (1) (3) (4)
Russian Federation (3) (6) 0(6) (15)
Others in Civil law 0(2) 0(1) 0(2) 0(1) 0(1) 0(2) 0(4) 0(1) 0(1) 0(36) 1(4) 0(17) 1(72)
Civil law 1(6) 5(18) (1) (4) (2) 1(7) 6(24) (5) 1(2) (16) 1(5) (4) (2) 8(217) 1(20) 3(107) 27(440)
*Numbers in the bracket show the total number of VC-backed firms for that country/industry in the main dataset
2-DIGIT SIC CODE
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Table 3.2: Number of VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total in the list*)- continued
COUNTRY 20 28 30 32 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes Grand Total
Belgium (2) 4(6) 1(1) (2) 1(4) 2(7) (1) 6(8) (5) (1) (1) 10(73) 11(21) 3(17) 38(149)
Brazil (1) (2) (1) (1) (10) (2) 0(1) (18)
Chile (1) (1) (1) (3)
Spain (8) 2(14) (2) 1(2) 5(13) 2(9) (1) 5(11) 1(19) (5) (3) (3) 7(123) 9(53) 1(79) 33(345)
France (8) 8(24) 2(4) 1(2) 1(3) 11(21) 34(67) 1(4) 22(44) 4(35) 1(10) (8) (3) 91(480) 53(107) 10(144) 239(964)
Italy 2(3) 3(4) (1) (1) 1(4) 2(6) 1(2) 2(5) (13) (1) (3) (1) 5(39) 9(12) 4(20) 29(115)
Luxembourg 1(1) 1(9) 0(3) 2(13)
Netherlands (1) 5(16) 1(2) (1) 1(4) 6(19) (3) 3(9) 1(12) 1(2) (4) (4) 13(90) 10(29) 3(31) 44(227)
Others in French Civil law 0(1) 0(1) 0(3) 0(2) 0(1) 0(13) 0(1) 0(9) 0(31)
Civil law- French 2(24) 23(66) 4(10) 1(4) 2(7) 19(46) 46(113) 2(11) 38(79) 6(88) 2(19) (19) (12) 127(838) 92(225) 21(304) 385(1865)
Austria 2(10) (2) 1(3) 1(9) 3(6) (5) (1) 2(40) 7(18) 0(7) 16(101)
Switzerland 10(13) 3(5) 7(13) 8(16) (1) 10(42) 17(35) 0(15) 55(140)
Germany (2) 34(47) 1(4) (3) 2(3) 10(33) 29(62) 2(4) 37(73) 3(27) 2(7) (4) (2) 80(451) 89(165) 8(116) 297(1003)
Croatia (Hrvatska) (1) 1(1) (1) (4) 1(7)
Hungary (1) (1) 1(7) (1) 0(2) 1(12)
Japan (2) 2(3) 3(5) 1(1) 1(2) 20(69) 3(8) 1(17) 31(107)
Korea (South) 1(2) 2(7) (3) 1(1) 2(2) 6(15)
Taiwan 2(2) (3) 1(1) 1(3) (3) 4(12)
Others in German Civil law 0(6) 0(6)
Civil law- German (3) 46(73) 2(6) (3) 2(5) 18(46) 42(100) 3(5) 49(96) 4(35) 3(10) (4) (2) 114(619) 117(231) 11(165) 411(1403)
Denmark (1) 3(6) 1(2) 8(8) 3(8) (6) (1) 1(3) 12(53) 27(37) 1(7) 56(132)
Finland (2) 1(1) (1) 5(7) 7(13) 5(9) 1(1) (1) 23(87) 9(17) 3(15) 54(154)
Norway 4(4) 2(6) 4(10) (1) 2(2) 1(1) 3(19) 5(9) 1(7) 22(59)
Sweden 1(1) 10(17) 1(1) 1(2) 2(6) 17(34) 2(3) 13(25) 1(11) (3) (1) 32(147) 28(45) 7(37) 115(333)
Others in Scandinavian Civil law
Civil law- Scandinavian 1(2) 17(29) 2(2) 1(3) 10(21) 36(65) 2(4) 23(44) 2(18) 1(2) 1(7) (1) 70(306) 69(108) 12(66) 247(678)
Country Data Not Exist (1) (1) 3(9) (1) 2(3) (1) (1) (2) (1) (28) 1(6) 1(10) 7(64)
Saudi Arabia (1) (1) 3(9) (1) 2(3) (1) (1) (2) (1) (28) 1(6) 1(10) 7(64)
Grand Total 11(87) 343(722) 11(39) 8(26) 13(44) 172(371) 736(1529) 20(69) 522(991) 76(494) 22(107) 15(96) 3(47) 2228(8018) 1120(2236) 218(1898) 5518(16774)
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 Table 3.3: The proportion of VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total VC-backed firms)
COUNTRY 20 28 30 32 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand Total
Australia 0% 60% 0% 0% 50% 67% 0% 50% 15% 53% 0% 37%
Bermuda 0% 0% 0%
Canada 0% 37% 0% 0% 0% 63% 45% 37% 18% 0% 0% 50% 28% 42% 5% 33%
Great Britain (UK) 11% 48% 17% 100% 43% 26% 48% 0% 48% 8% 25% 7% 0% 19% 50% 7% 26%
Hong Kong 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ireland 17% 50% 23% 25% 0% 0% 13% 38% 8% 16%
Israel 57% 100% 59% 48% 50% 51% 29% 0% 100% 42% 55% 33% 47%
India 0% 29% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 7% 0% 2%
Cayman Islands 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 0% 0% 0% 0%
New Zealand 0% 0% 14% 0% 6%
Singapore 50% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 11%
United States 18% 49% 20% 36% 33% 55% 51% 40% 57% 24% 23% 31% 12% 35% 53% 18% 40%
South Africa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Others in British law 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 8%
British law 13% 47% 15% 47% 31% 49% 50% 30% 53% 19% 21% 23% 10% 32% 51% 14% 36%
China 25% 31% 0% 0% 0% 20% 26% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 5% 0% 4% 8%
Czech Republic 0% 100% 0% 0% 11%
Iceland 0% 0% 0%
Liechtenstein 0% 0%
Lithuania 0% 0%
Poland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Romania 0% 0% 0%
Russian Federation 0% 0% 0% 0%
Others in Civil law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 1%
Civil law 17% 28% 0% 0% 0% 14% 25% 0% 50% 0% 20% 0% 0% 4% 5% 3% 6%
2-DIGIT SIC CODE
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 Table 3.3: The proportion of VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total VC-backed firms)- continued
COUNTRY 20 28 30 32 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand      
Total
Belgium 0% 67% 100% 0% 25% 29% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0% 14% 52% 18% 26%
Brazil 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Chile 0% 0% 0% 0%
Spain 0% 14% 0% 50% 38% 22% 0% 45% 5% 0% 0% 0% 6% 17% 1% 10%
France 0% 33% 50% 50% 33% 52% 51% 25% 50% 11% 10% 0% 0% 19% 50% 7% 25%
Italy 67% 75% 0% 0% 25% 33% 50% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 75% 20% 25%
Luxembourg 100% 11% 0% 15%
Netherlands 0% 31% 50% 0% 25% 32% 0% 33% 8% 50% 0% 0% 14% 34% 10% 19%
Others in French Civil law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Civil law- French 8% 35% 40% 25% 29% 41% 41% 18% 48% 7% 11% 0% 0% 15% 41% 7% 21%
Austria 20% 0% 33% 11% 50% 0% 0% 5% 39% 0% 16%
Switzerland 77% 60% 54% 50% 0% 24% 49% 0% 39%
Germany 0% 72% 25% 0% 67% 30% 47% 50% 51% 11% 29% 0% 0% 18% 54% 7% 30%
Croatia (Hrvatska) 0% 100% 0% 0% 14%
Hungary 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 8%
Japan 0% 67% 60% 100% 50% 29% 38% 6% 29%
Korea (South) 50% 29% 0% 100% 100% 40%
Taiwan 100% 0% 100% 33% 0% 33%
Others in German Civil law 0% 0%
Civil law- German 0% 63% 33% 0% 40% 39% 42% 60% 51% 11% 30% 0% 0% 18% 51% 7% 29%
Denmark 0% 50% 50% 100% 38% 0% 0% 33% 23% 73% 14% 42%
Finland 0% 100% 0% 71% 54% 56% 100% 0% 26% 53% 20% 35%
Norway 100% 33% 40% 0% 100% 100% 16% 56% 14% 37%
Sweden 100% 59% 100% 50% 33% 50% 67% 52% 9% 0% 0% 22% 62% 19% 35%
Others in Scandinavian Civil law
Civil law- Scandinavian 50% 59% 100% 33% 48% 55% 50% 52% 11% 50% 14% 0% 23% 64% 18% 36%
Country Data Not Exist 0% 0% 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 10% 11%
Saudi Arabia 0% 0% 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 10% 11%
Grand Total 12.6% 47.5% 28.2% 30.8% 29.5% 46.4% 48.1% 29.0% 52.7% 15.4% 20.6% 15.6% 6.4% 27.8% 50.1% 11.5% 32.9%
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Table 3.4: Number of non VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total in the list*)
COUNTRY 20 28 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand    
Total
Australia 1(4) 1(13) 2(4) 0(5) 3(12) 2(5) 0(7) 0(4) 0(2) 1(5) 0(3) 0(1) 7(74) 17(139)
Bermuda 0(1) 1(3) 0(1) 0(10) 1(15)
Canada 0(6) 11(36) 1(5) 0(1) 1(3) 0(9) 33(72) 1(2) 15(23) 3(14) 1(3) 0(20) 1(11) 39(215) 13(95) 8(213) 127(728)
Great Britain (UK) 2(29) 19(84) 6(9) 0(5) 2(12) 2(51) 25(176) 4(17) 20(138) 3(83) 1(25) 5(21) 1(12) 34(919) 12(351) 42(619) 178(2551)
Hong Kong 0(1) 0(2) 0(3) 1(4) 0(2) 0(12) 0(2) 0(10) 1(36)
Ireland 0(1) 2(8) 1(6) 1(16) 2(17) 1(11) 0(1) 2(123) 1(18) 1(30) 11(231)
Israel 8(28) 0(1) 0(2) 9(25) 18(85) 2(4) 26(73) 1(10) 2(4) 0(2) 17(202) 1(75) 2(50) 86(561)
India 0(4) 2(9) 0(1) 0(4) 0(2) 1(5) 1(2) 1(3) 2(6) 1(9) 0(2) 0(2) 0(1) 5(84) 1(19) 5(88) 19(241)
Cayman Islands 0(1) 0(2) 1(12) 0(2) 0(10) 1(27)
Malaysia 0(1) 0(2) 0(2) 0(1) 0(1) 0(2) 0(2) 0(1) 0(4) 0(1) 0(9) 1(24) 1(50)
New Zealand 0(1) 3(4) 0(2) 0(10) 2(6) 1(2) 6(25)
Singapore 1(4) 1(2) 1(5) 0(4) 2(6) 0(1) 0(4) 1(3) 2(13) 0(3) 0(13) 8(58)
United States 11(120) 115(375) 19(85) 9(73) 18(166) 43(237) 253(896) 12(72) 201(541) 25(230) 8(86) 34(755) 24(488) 325(4533) 129(1125) 184(8224) 1410(18006)
South Africa 1(1) 0(1) 0(2) 0(2) 0(3) 0(2) 0(2) 0(9) 1(5) 0(14) 2(41)
Others in British law 0(1) 0(3) 0(1) 0(2) 0(3) 0(3) 0(2) 0(7) 0(22)
British law 14(168) 163(569) 26(101) 9(86) 23(190) 57(343) 335(1270) 20(103) 268(809) 36(378) 12(126) 40(819) 28(526) 426(6150) 160(1705) 251(9388) 1868(22731)
China 0(6) 0(20) 1(1) 1(6) 3(7) 5(27) 0(4) 0(2) 3(10) 0(5) 2(7) 0(4) 7(171) 4(16) 10(305) 36(591)
Czech Republic 0(1) 0(3) 0(1) 1(2) 1(2) 0(6) 0(8) 0(6) 2(29)
Estonia 0(2) 0(6) 2(4) 0(4) 2(16)
Liechtenstein 1(2) 1(2)
Morocco 1(1) 0(1) 1(2)
Poland 0(1) 0(1) 0(2) 0(1) 0(2) 0(3) 2(17) 2(23) 4(50)
Russian Federation 0(2) 0(1) 0(2) 0(1) 0(1) 0(2) 0(5) 0(4) 0(5) 0(9) 1(54) 1(86)
Others in Civil law 0(7) 0(5) 0(4) 0(5) 0(1) 0(1) 0(5) 0(3) 0(8) 0(2) 0(9) 0(7) 0(45) 0(1) 0(144) 0(247)
Civil law 0(15) 1(28) 1(6) 0(8) 1(12) 3(13) 5(34) 1(11) 1(4) 4(24) 0(9) 2(26) 0(19) 9(256) 6(21) 13(537) 47(1023)
*Numbers in the bracket show the total number of non VC-backed firms for that country/industry in the main dataset
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Table 3.4: Number of non VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total in the list*)- continued
COUNTRY 20 28 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand    
Total
Argentina 1(11) 0(4) 0(10) 0(5) 0(2) 0(4) 0(14) 0(22) 0(46) 1(118)
Belgium 0(4) 5(8) 1(3) 1(2) 1(6) 4(9) 0(2) 1(11) 0(10) 0(2) 0(2) 0(2) 0(81) 0(27) 0(41) 13(210)
Brazil 0(1) 1(2) 0(1) 0(1) 0(2) 1(3) 0(1) 0(2) 0(6) 0(1) 0(25) 2(45)
Spain 0(8) 5(17) 1(4) 0(1) 0(22) 3(17) 2(12) 1(3) 2(14) 3(25) 0(8) 0(14) 0(15) 5(123) 3(55) 2(307) 27(645)
France 1(35) 10(27) 2(8) 0(2) 2(12) 1(26) 14(73) 1(6) 15(54) 4(38) 1(14) 1(41) 1(30) 13(507) 4(123) 10(468) 80(1464)
Italy 4(25) 2(10) 1(7) 3(11) 0(34) 14(25) 4(13) 0(5) 1(7) 4(19) 1(5) 5(51) 1(46) 1(48) 1(17) 25(476) 67(799)
Netherlands 0(1) 5(14) 0(3) 3(6) 2(25) 0(5) 2(13) 0(16) 1(4) 0(4) 0(6) 3(103) 1(36) 0(59) 17(295)
Turkey 0(3) 1(3) 0(1) 0(1) 0(1) 0(5) 1(14)
Others in French Civil law 0(5) 0(4) 0(1) 0(2) 0(2) 0(3) 0(1) 0(2) 0(6) 0(1) 0(2) 0(2) 0(28) 0(2) 0(70) 0(131)
Civil law- French 5(82) 30(96) 5(27) 3(17) 3(77) 22(83) 27(149) 2(22) 21(106) 11(116) 3(39) 6(116) 2(107) 22(905) 9(282) 37(1497) 208(3721)
Austria 0(2) 3(11) 1(2) 1(1) 1(5) 3(13) 1(9) 0(8) 0(2) 0(2) 0(50) 0(24) 1(23) 11(152)
Switzerland 3(16) 0(1) 0(3) 3(8) 6(16) 7(19) 0(2) 0(1) 0(51) 5(40) 3(48) 27(205)
Germany 0(5) 17(51) 3(6) 1(2) 2(18) 12(42) 21(68) 5(6) 35(69) 4(25) 1(9) 0(24) 1(10) 14(483) 6(184) 11(306) 133(1308)
Croatia (Hrvatska) 1(2) 0(2) 0(1) 0(6) 0(3) 1(14)
Japan 7(12) 12(13) 6(7) 5(6) 8(8) 11(12) 2(3) 4(5) 0(2) 0(1) 5(11) 3(15) 25(75) 3(9) 40(129) 131(308)
Korea (South) 2(2) 2(4) 3(4) 1(1) 7(9) 0(1) 2(2) 1(1) 1(4) 1(1) 6(10) 26(39)
Taiwan 1(2) 0(1) 5(5) 9(13) 2(2) 0(2) 2(4) 1(1) 2(5) 4(5) 0(3) 26(43)
Others in German Civil law 0(3) 0(1) 0(2) 0(10) 0(2) 0(20) 0(38)
Civil law- German 9(24) 39(99) 6(10) 9(13) 8(29) 29(68) 57(132) 7(12) 49(104) 4(36) 3(18) 8(42) 5(29) 42(684) 19(265) 61(542) 355(2107)
Denmark 0(1) 5(9) 0(4) 1(2) 3(11) 6(8) 0(9) 0(2) 0(4) 1(2) 0(66) 5(46) 0(45) 21(209)
Finland 0(1) 3(4) 2(2) 0(1) 0(2) 5(10) 1(12) 4(16) 0(1) 0(3) 0(2) 15(97) 1(19) 3(39) 34(209)
Norway 0(1) 2(6) 4(9) 6(14) 0(2) 0(3) 0(2) 1(4) 0(1) 1(3) 6(64) 20(109)
Sweden 0(3) 5(15) 1(2) 1(3) 0(5) 3(9) 3(40) 0(3) 14(27) 3(11) 0(1) 0(3) 0(6) 6(205) 11(49) 5(108) 52(490)
Others in Scandinavian Civil law
Civil law- Scandinavian 0(6) 15(34) 3(4) 1(4) 0(11) 13(30) 13(77) 0(5) 24(54) 3(21) 0(5) 1(14) 1(10) 21(369) 18(117) 14(256) 127(1017)
Saudi Arabia (1)
Grand Total 28(295) 248(826) 41(148) 22(128) 35(319) 124(537) 437(1662) 30(153) 363(1077) 58(575) 18(197) 57(1018) 36(691) 520(8364) 212(2390) 376(12220) 2605(30600)
2-DIGIT SIC CODE
56 
 
 
 Table 3.5: The proportion of non VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total non VC-backed firms)
COUNTRY 20 28 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand 
Total
Australia 25% 8% 50% 0% 25% 40% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 9% 12%
Bermuda 0% 33% 0% 0% 7%
Canada 0% 31% 20% 0% 33% 0% 46% 50% 65% 21% 33% 0% 9% 18% 14% 4% 17%
Great Britain (UK) 7% 23% 67% 0% 17% 4% 14% 24% 14% 4% 4% 24% 8% 4% 3% 7% 7%
Hong Kong 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Ireland 0% 25% 17% 6% 12% 9% 0% 2% 6% 3% 5%
Israel 29% 0% 0% 36% 21% 50% 36% 10% 50% 0% 8% 1% 4% 15%
India 0% 22% 0% 0% 0% 20% 50% 33% 33% 11% 0% 0% 0% 6% 5% 6% 8%
Cayman Islands 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 4%
Malaysia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 2%
New Zealand 0% 75% 0% 0% 33% 50% 24%
Singapore 25% 50% 20% 0% 33% 0% 0% 33% 15% 0% 0% 14%
United States 9% 31% 22% 12% 11% 18% 28% 17% 37% 11% 9% 5% 5% 7% 11% 2% 8%
South Africa 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 5%
Others in British law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
British law 8% 29% 26% 10% 12% 17% 26% 19% 33% 10% 10% 5% 5% 7% 9% 3% 8%
China 0% 0% 100% 17% 43% 19% 0% 0% 30% 0% 29% 0% 4% 25% 3% 6%
Czech Republic 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 7%
Estonia 0% 0% 50% 0% 13%
Liechtenstein 50% 50%
Morocco 100% 0% 50%
Poland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 9% 8%
Russian Federation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1%
Others in Civil law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Civil law 0% 4% 17% 0% 8% 23% 15% 9% 25% 17% 0% 8% 0% 4% 29% 2% 5%
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 Table 3.5: The proportion of non VC-backed firms that own patents (out of total non VC-backed firms)- continued
COUNTRY 20 28 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 48 49 50 51 73 87
Other 
Codes
Grand 
Total
Argentina 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Belgium 0% 63% 33% 50% 17% 44% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6%
Brazil 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4%
Spain 0% 29% 25% 0% 0% 18% 17% 33% 14% 12% 0% 0% 0% 4% 5% 1% 4%
France 3% 37% 25% 0% 17% 4% 19% 17% 28% 11% 7% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 5%
Italy 16% 20% 14% 27% 0% 56% 31% 0% 14% 21% 20% 10% 2% 2% 6% 5% 8%
Netherlands 0% 36% 0% 50% 8% 0% 15% 0% 25% 0% 0% 3% 3% 0% 6%
Turkey 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7%
Others in French Civil law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Civil law- French 6% 31% 19% 18% 4% 27% 18% 9% 20% 9% 8% 5% 2% 2% 3% 2% 6%
Austria 0% 27% 50% 100% 20% 23% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 7%
Switzerland 19% 0% 0% 38% 38% 37% 0% 0% 0% 13% 6% 13%
Germany 0% 33% 50% 50% 11% 29% 31% 83% 51% 16% 11% 0% 10% 3% 3% 4% 10%
Croatia (Hrvatska) 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7%
Japan 58% 92% 86% 83% 100% 92% 67% 80% 0% 0% 45% 20% 33% 33% 31% 43%
Korea (South) 100% 50% 75% 100% 78% 0% 100% 100% 25% 100% 60% 67%
Taiwan 50% 0% 100% 69% 100% 0% 50% 100% 40% 80% 0% 60%
Others in German Civil law 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Civil law- German 38% 39% 60% 69% 28% 43% 43% 58% 47% 11% 17% 19% 17% 6% 7% 11% 17%
Denmark 0% 56% 0% 50% 27% 75% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 11% 0% 10%
Finland 0% 75% 100% 0% 0% 50% 8% 25% 0% 0% 0% 15% 5% 8% 16%
Norway 0% 33% 44% 43% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 33% 9% 18%
Sweden 0% 33% 50% 33% 0% 33% 8% 0% 52% 27% 0% 0% 0% 3% 22% 5% 11%
Others in Scandinavian Civil law
Civil law- Scandinavian 0% 44% 75% 25% 0% 43% 17% 0% 44% 14% 0% 7% 10% 6% 15% 5% 12%
Saudi Arabia 0%
Grand Total 9.5% 30.0% 27.7% 17.2% 11.0% 23.1% 26.3% 19.6% 33.7% 10.1% 9.1% 5.6% 5.2% 6.2% 8.9% 3.1% 8.5%
2-DIGIT SIC CODE
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3.4. Patent Family Issues 
A patent family is a group of various patent documents that essentially cover the same 
innovation in different countries. In each country, when an innovator opens a patent application 
file, he first receives a local/national application number and application date. In the next step, 
the patent document is published and the innovator receives a publication number and a 
publication date. The application number or publication number may show the same family of 
patents or duplications, based on their codes (ProQuest, 2010). For example, in the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), after application, users can amend the patent and get a new ―A‖ 
number.  For example, application numbers 20120609A1, 20120609A2 and 20120609A3 show a 
family of patents (duplication) which refers to a single innovation. Therefore, we have to remove 
the double counting of the patent in A2 and A3 (Thomson Corp, 2007). Figure 3.1 shows a 
generic international patenting process provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO, 2012) and demonstrates the main steps of filing an application, patent publication and 
granting steps in international and local offices.   
As discussed in Chapter 1 (§ 1.3- Patent Registration), right of priority was a key 
discussion in the Paris convention, under which the priority number and priority date are 
assigned to those applications that are submitted first in one of the contracting states and need 
protection in all the other contracting states within 12 months. The later applications will then be 
regarded as if they had been filed on the same day as the first application (Thomson Corp, 2007). 
In complex families, multiple priority numbers and dates occur. In a patent family, the first 
publication is denoted as the basic publication. Patent families may cover more than one patent 
from the same country. In this case, the later patent files are usually additions or improvements 
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to the previous files. The application numbers and priority numbers are critical for identifying 
patent families or duplicates (ProQuest, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.1: Generic patenting process (WIPO, 2012) 
Finding and removing patent duplications is one of the main efforts in the cleaning and 
finalizing of our large datasets, due to double counting and patent family concerns. To remove 
duplication, we can use and compare different parameters, including the assignee name, 
applicant name, inventor name, priority date, priority number, country (first two digits). In the 
first step, if two patents have the same application number, application date, application country, 
priority number and priority date, then duplication is considered to exist, regardless of different 
publication numbers. 
In the second step, if the application numbers of two patents differ, but their priority 
numbers agree, duplication is again said to exist (ProQuest, 2012). All duplications are removed 
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before matching and merging datasets. Figure 3.2 shows our process of merging patent data and 
removing duplications. 
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Figure 3.2: Main steps of merging patent data and removing duplications 
 
  
VC- BACKED DATASET      +      NON VC-BACKED DATASET 
Enter firms’ name into patent 
database (Thomson 
Innovation) for 2,200 times 
47,374 VC and non VC-backed firms 
Result 1: 1,250 files of patent data 
Merge files, clean, re-org. to 
one firm-patent combination 
and use VBA codes to match 
Result 2: Over 5 million raw or 
firm-patent combinations 
Result 3: Over 930,000 patents for 
47,374 VC & non VC firms 
 Find and remove patent 
duplications-1st round (based 
on inventor-country) 
Find and remove patent 
duplications-2nd round (based on 
priority name, number & date 
Result 4: 263,455 unique patents 
for all 47,374 firms 
Over 8 months work effort for 2,200 
times data entry and run for over 47,000 
firms (40 firms/run-two iterative process) 
About one month for aggregating, 
cleansing, matching and merging all 
datasets 
Two month work effort for retrieving over 
30,000 non-VC firms through LexisNexis 
(Over 2500 query runs) 
Two months for searching, finding, and 
removing all duplications in dataset  
(From over 5 million records to 263,455) 
records) 
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3.5. Summary of Data Collection Process 
The process of data collection, cleansing, matching, merging of all VC-backed and non VC-
backed firms is shown in Figure 3.3. This process is divided into eight main stages starting from 
retrieving VC data toward merging with the final patent dataset. The next two paragraphs 
provide a summary of data for both VC-backed and non VC-backed firms in which we try to 
demonstrate the number of firms (and their patents) in the main locations and industries for both 
lists in four separate tables. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the main VC-backed firms’ countries and industries in the list. 
About 52% of VC-backed firms are located in the US and 12% in Great Britain. Other active 
countries are Germany (6%), France (6%), Canada (3%), Israel (2%), Spain (2%), Sweden (2%) 
and China (2%). According to this data, 40% of VC-backed firms in US hold patents, while only 
26% of British firms hold patents. This number is 30%, 25%, 33%, 47%, 10%, 39% and 8% for 
German, French, Canadian, Israelis, Spanish, Swedish and Chinese companies, respectively.  
In terms of industry, SIC codes SIC-73 (Business Services), 87 (Engineering, 
Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services), 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical 
Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment), 38 (Measuring, Analyzing, and 
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks), 28 
(Chemicals and Allied Products) and 48 (Communications) are, in order, the most active 
industries for VC deals during the 2000-2011 period. In the VC-backed list, industry codes 38, 
87, 36 and 28 are the most active industries in innovation and patenting. In these four industries, 
the patent owners are 53%, 50%, 48% and 47% out of the total firms in that specific industry, 
respectively.  
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Similarly, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the number of non VC-backed firms in the main 
countries/locations and main industries. In our analysis, this list is the control group for each 
location and industry. In order to stratify the matching process by SIC and location, the number 
of non VC-backed firms collected for each SIC/country combination is at least equal to or more 
than that of the corresponding VC-backed firms.  
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Figure 3.3: Process of data collection, cleansing, and merging all VC-backed and non VC-backed firms 
Main Steps: Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 Column6 Column7 Column8
Define fields/ 
variables based on 
the requirements and 
Zephyr database 
limitations
Change the order and 
sort the table based 
on target (VC-backed) 
firm
Create a matrix of 
country/industry for 
VC-backed list to 
define required non 
VC list
Export outputs to 
Excel and rationalize 
the non VC dataset 
(sorting, cleansing, 
reordering,..)
Define fields/ variables 
based on our 
requirements and 
patent database  
limitations
Combine Excel files 
extracted from patent 
database (over 1200 
Excel files) 
Use firms' table as the 
baseline and search if 
VC firms are in patent 
dataset
Clean the table 
Enter input 
parameters in the 
Zephyr system and 
run the query
Change the table 
from one firm/deal to 
one firm with its all 
deals 
Define fields/ 
variables based on 
our requirements and 
LexisNexis limitations
Remove those firms 
that exist in VC-
backed list
Select 40 firm names 
from firm dataset and 
enter into Thomson 
manually  (by typing)
Change the table 
(from many co. to one 
patent in each row to 
one co./patent) first
Match (initial match) 
of two datasets 
(combine common 
firms and their VC and 
Patent data) 
Create the final 
table and fix the 
format
Retrieve and verify 
results
Check and remove 
duplications and sort
Enter input 
parameters in 
LexisNexis, run the 
query and verify 
outcomes
Check and remove 
duplications and sort 
the list
Retrive their patent data Remove all 
duplications and sort
Match (final match) of 
two datasets 
Final check of the 
result
Export the output 
data of VC deals to Ms-
Excel 
Create a new field for 
name and remove 
suffix and additional 
characters (to use for 
final merge)
Create a new field for 
name, remove suffix, 
and additional 
characters (to use for 
final merge)
Export the output data 
of each 40 firms to Excel
Create a new field for 
firm name, remove 
suffix and additional 
characters 
Check the results of 
match (manually)
Verify the VC table in 
terms of accuracy of 
the process (Q/A)
Verify the non VC 
table in terms of 
accuracy of the 
process (Q/A)
Repeat 3 last steps for 
over 47000 firms maually 
(around 1200 times)
Convert the table 
from one firm/patent 
row to one firm with 
its all patents in that 
row
Define VC required 
fields and retrieve 
data from Zephyr
Clean and
rationalize the 
VC dataset
(based on target 
firm) 
Define patent 
required field and 
Retrieve data from 
Thomson 
Innovation 
Clean and 
rationalize the 
patent dataset 
(based on
applicant) 
Merge VC 
and Patent 
datasets
Finalize the 
table
Retrieve non VC-
backed firms 
from LexisNexis 
(based on VC list 
for each SIC/ 
country)
Clean and 
rationalize the 
non VC-backed 
dataset
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Figure 3.4: The main issues/limitations in the process of data collection, cleansing, and merging all firms 
 
Main Issues:
Target firms naming 
convention is not 
consistant and 
standard in Zephyr
Lack of data for some 
industries/locations
Low speed of Excel 
and servers
Assignee/applicant firms 
naming conventions not 
consistant and standard 
in patent database
Both Access and Excel 
have limitations for 
the number of rows 
and columns 
(impacted the process 
time) 
Hard to merge 
datasets due to 
inconsitent and non-
standard firms' 
naming convention in 
databases (especially 
the patent one) Lack of country code 
for some companies 
Limitation per 
query/run to view or 
extract firms data
Manual entry needed for 
all companies
Low speed of data 
cleansing, due to very 
large size of the files 
(over 100MB)
limitation of MS-
Office capacity to 
merge data in a more 
effective way
Not enough VC deal 
info for some world 
regions
Limitation of each 
view/report (up to 
30,000 records/run)
Limitation of systems 
(computers) speed
Low spead to generating 
reports
No consistant and 
standard company code
No country data for 
companies' origion
Not accepted non-letter 
characters in the firms' 
name (e.g., &,@,… )
No application date or 
industry code for some 
patents
Define VC required 
fields and retrieve 
data from Zephyr
Clean and
rationalize the 
VC dataset
(based on target 
firm) 
Define patent 
required field and 
Retrieve data from 
Thomson 
Innovation 
Clean and 
rationalize the 
patent dataset 
(based on
applicant) 
Merge VC 
and Patent 
datasets
Finalize the 
table
Retrieve non VC-
backed firms 
from LexisNexis 
(based on VC list 
for each SIC/ 
country)
Clean and 
rationalize the 
non VC-backed 
dataset
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
 
4.1. Hypotheses 
Our main target is to examine the impact of VC investment on a firm’s innovation in general and 
in different industries and regions, considering the IPR parameter and controlling for other 
country-level factors. Therefore, in this section, we frame three theoretical hypotheses, starting 
with a broadly framed hypothesis in Section 4.1.1 to examine the effects of VC investment on a 
firm’s patenting in different intellectual property support environments. Section 4.1.2 covers the 
second hypothesis concerning VC effects in various legal systems and countries. Section 4.1.3 
extends the previous hypothesis and addresses VC investment impacts in different industries.  
 
4.1.1. Broadly Framed Hypothesis 
Venture capitalists play a key role in target firms, by providing considerable value-added support 
in leadership, administration and operations services. Testing and measuring the impact of VC 
investment in increasing a firm’s internal knowledge and innovative activities in different 
environments is the main objective of the first hypothesis (1a). We are also interested in testing 
and measuring VC investment and IPR parameters together to investigate in detail how VC 
investors affect start-up firms when they are located in different protection rights and support 
areas across the world (hypothesis 1b). As many scholars explain, economic development 
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improves the level of patent protection in society (Park, 2008; Eicher and Penalosa, 2006), and 
increasing innovative capacity and market size encourages regulators and policymakers to 
provide stronger patent regulations (Grossman and Lai, 2004); however, this level of support is 
not necessarily equal in similar economies. All countries have recently started developing their 
regulations to support innovative activities and intellectual property ownership, particularly after 
TRIPS and other international enforcements were implemented. Hence, the distribution of patent 
strength has significantly changed from a positively skewed shape prior to the late 1990s to a 
negatively skewed shape afterward, and the patent index score of most countries are above the 
mean (Park, 2008). Based on this discussion, our hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1a: VC investment effects are significant on a firm‟s patenting rate in different 
intellectual property support environments, when other cultural, regulatory and 
macroeconomics factors are controlled for. 
Hypothesis 1b: Stronger intellectual property protection and support environments improve the 
effectiveness of VC investment on a firm‟s patenting rate.  
 
The IPR index ranks 186 economies and shows the protection rate of two major forms of 
intellectual property rights: patents and copyrights, scoring it from ―weak and not enforced‖ to 
―strong and enforced‖ (Schwab, 2011).  
 
4.1.2. VC and Legal Systems Hypothesis 
The legal system is a foundation of a country and is one of the key distinguishing aspects for 
investment attraction and business support. The study of legal rules in a business context focuses 
on the rights of investors and how these rules are executed. As mentioned earlier, countries can 
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be categorized under different legal systems: Common law (British law), Civil law (Roman law) 
and others. Civil law has three families: French, German and Scandinavian (La Porta et. al, 
1998). Common law provides investors with stronger legal rights and protection than Civil law 
(La Porta et. al, 1998). According to the literature, key factors that determine a country’s legal 
system include processes and procedures of jurists, historical trends of legal system evolution 
and growth, concepts and structure of law, organizational structure and interrelationship between 
legal sectors (Glendon et al., 1994).  
By testing the impacts of VC investment on firm’s patenting in different legal systems 
and countries, we can find the relationship between the rights of investors, quality of 
enforcement of legal rules, and other national attributes. The hypothesis for this is: 
Hypothesis 2: VC investment impact is significant and varies by legal system and country. 
 
The key distinguishing factors between countries are the legal system, cultural, economic 
and market conditions, and other regulatory elements.  
    
4.1.3. VC and Industry Hypothesis 
According to a study by Groh et al. (2013), VC investment attraction in different locations and 
industries is varied. In addition to the legal infrastructure of a firm’s location, it is critical to 
consider a firm’s industry. As Cumming and Knill (2009) asserted, VC investment rates may 
vary in different industries, because of risk levels and available opportunities in different 
industries. In addition, some studies, such as those by Timmons and Bygrave (1986), and Boue 
(2002), show that the VC contribution to target firms is varied and related to three main 
dimensions: industry, stage of investment, and the country where the target firms are located 
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(Boue, 2002). The contribution of VC funds and value added activities to the firm’s internal 
sectors may not be the same across different industries. For example, R&D departments may 
receive more funds in high- technology industries than those in transportation services. In 
addition, the pace and complexity of technological change vary in different industries and is not 
expected to see the same innovation rates, but innovation can emerge in any industry (Salge and 
Vera, 2009). In the industry-level context, innovation may connect to many effective changes in 
an organization, including market growth, quality, productivity and cost reduction (Salge and 
Vera, 2012). We may face these impacts in higher proportion in biomedical and high-technology 
industries than others.  
Therefore, it is important to study how effective VC investment is on innovation in 
various industry sectors, due to the diversity of VC financial and non-financial contributions. 
This is a novel study to measure this effect and compare the results in many industries together. 
Below is the hypothesis for testing and measuring VC investment on a firm’s patenting 
applications by industry:  
Hypothesis 3: VC investment impact on a firm‟s patenting rate is significant and varies by 
industry. 
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, firms’ industry data are retrieved from the main data 
sources based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The list of all 88 SIC 
codes and their definitions are provided in Appendix C; however, only 83 SIC codes exist in our 
panel dataset.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of the theoretical hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description 
Econometric 
Model 
Other Econ. 
Techniques 
Hypo. 1 
1a. VC investment effects are significant on 
a firm’s patenting rate in different 
intellectual property support environments 
Panel Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
DWH test, 
robustness and 
clustering SE, 
endogeneity tests 
(reverse causality, 
instrumental 
variables and 
Heckman 
Selection) 
1b. Stronger intellectual property protection 
and support environments improve the 
effectiveness of VC investment on a firm’s 
patenting rate 
Panel Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
Hypo. 2 
VC investment impact is significant and 
varies by legal system and country 
Panel Negative 
Binomial 
Regression + 
Causality Test 
--- 
Hypo. 3 
VC investment impact is significant and 
varies by industry 
Panel Negative 
Binomial 
Regression + 
Causality Test 
--- 
 
4.2. Method 
Our data includes 47,374 firms from 99 countries and 83 industries, with their 263,455 patent 
applications taken out between January 1995 and May 2012. Between January 2000 and January 
2011, 25,112 VC deals took place. In addition to the IPR index, 14 socio-economic indices exist 
in the data and measure the cultural, regulatory, and economic and market conditions of firm 
environments annually from 2000 to 2011.  Therefore, a balanced panel data is established with 
568,488 firm-year observations. 
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In order to discuss econometric models, based on these datasets and the above 
hypotheses, first we need to list all variables of the study.  
 
4.2.1. Measures or Variables   
 Dependent (Response) Variable 
Our dependent variable is the rate of a firm’s patenting, operationalized by the annual 
number of successful patent applications for firm i in year t and it is dispersed from zero to 2025 
patents. This variable shows the number of unique patent applications filed by a firm in a given 
year (application date). The application date of filing a patent, more proximally shows the time 
of new innovation (Griliches, 1990; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006).    
 
 Independent (Explanatory) Variables 
The VC investment variable shows whether a firm received any VC investment. Since the VC 
investment value ($) for some VC deals are not available in the database, and we do not have 
enough information about the distribution of VC funds in each year after investment, we assign a 
dummy variable to the VC investment variable. VC investment effects reduce over time. The 
potential VC influences on target firms’ innovation are estimated from one to five years after 
investment (Schildt et al., 2003; and Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Therefore, by considering a 
one-year lag for VC initial effects; in the panel data, the VC variable is coded as 1 from 1 to 5 
years after investment and 0 for other times and for all non VC-backed firms.  
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IPR is considered as a continuous variable reflecting the score of intellectual property 
protection and support by a firm’s location. Industry is a dummy variable to show the primary 
industry of firms. We define 82 dummy variables for 83 two-digit SIC codes in the data. Five 
dummy variables reflect all the national legal systems. 
 
  Control Variables 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3 (§ 3.1), to control for country-level factors that might affect a 
firm’s rate of innovation and patenting, several control variables are included from three 
different aspects of a firm’s socioeconomic environment: cultural, regulatory, and economic and 
market conditions. These indices are listed in Table 3.1.  
 
4.2.2. Econometric Modeling 
Since we deal with a multi-dimensional dataset that contains observations on several parameters 
over multiple time periods for each firm, we utilize longitudinal or panel data analysis. Because 
each firm is observed over 12 years, this panel is a balanced dataset. There are two important 
panel data models: the random effects and fixed effects which help us to control and correct for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed effect model (also known as the within estimator) is useful 
to control this heterogeneity when it is constant over time and correlated with independent 
variables. We can remove this constant from the data through differencing; for instance, first 
difference eliminates any time-invariant elements of the data.  
The main assumption in the random effects model (also called a variance component 
model) is that there is no correlation between the random variable or the entity’s error term and 
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the predictors. This allows for time-invariant variables to act as explanatory variables (Torres-
Reyna, 2013). There are two common assumptions for fixed and random effects. In the fixed 
effects assumption, the individual specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables; 
however, in the random effects assumption, these individual specific effects are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables (Hausman, 1978). It is necessary to statistically test whether these 
effects are correlated with the independent variables, using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test.  
Defining an appropriate regression model for our analyses is based on the defined 
hypotheses, variables and panel data. The dependent variable (i.e., the number of patents in year 
t), is a count variable and takes a non-negative integer value. We use econometric methods to 
quantify statistical relationships that are believed to hold between our parameters and account for 
heterokedastic and non-normal residuals (Hausman et al., 1984). The value of this response 
variable in our large-scale dataset ranges from zero to 2,025 patents. This wide range of values 
with many zero values may indicate non-normality in residual distribution and overdispersion. A 
Poisson or negative binomial regression model, the latter being a general form of Poisson 
regression model, is a good candidate for our panel data analysis. The Poisson regression model 
has some limitations however. The model assumes that the variability of patent numbers within a 
covariate group is equal to the mean. If the variance is greater than the mean, it will cause 
underestimation of standard errors and overestimation of the significance of the regression 
parameters (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Therefore, we can apply a Poisson quasi-likelihood, 
with overdispersion parameter or a negative binomial regression model, but the latter is better, 
because the overdispersion parameter in a negative binomial regression has an unconditional 
distribution, while it has a conditional distribution (Poisson distribution) in the Poisson quasi-
likelihood model (Rodriguez, 2013). The negative binomial distribution has one additional 
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parameter, used to correct the variance independently of the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
We can write our negative binomial regression model in the following format: 
 
                        (1) 
t = 2000, 2001,…, 2011 (time) and i = 1, 2,…., 47374 (firm) 
 
Where     is the dependent variable observed for firm i at time t. As we know, in the negative 
binomial regression, a log-link function transforms the count response variables to continuous 
variables: 
 ( )    
   ( )                (2) 
or              
  is the average of patent count we are modeling.     is the time-variant regressors,   is the 
unobserved time-invariant individual fixed effect, and     is the main error term 
  
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
 
       
       
 
       
 
            
 
            )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
 
       
       
 
       
 
            
 
            )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     (3) 
75 
 
  
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
         
         
 
         
         
 
         
 
                     
 
              
         
         
         
 
         
         
 
         
 
             
   
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
           
           
 
           
           
 
           
 
                  
 
                   )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
Note: X is a 568,488×101 matrix, and   is 101×1 matrix.        
 
Matrix X columns show the explanatory variables, including: 1:VC investment, 2:IPR, 
3:business extend to disclosure, 4: political stability and absence of violence, 5: GDP per capita, 
6: labor force with secondary education, 7: business entry rate (new business registrations as % 
of total), 8: research and development expenditure (% of GDP), 9: return on equity (%), 10: 
school enrollment, secondary (% net), 11: market capitalization of listed companies (current 
USD), 12:  taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue), 13: MSCI return index 
(annual), 14:VC*IPR (interaction), 15 to 19: dummy variables of six legal systems, and 20 to 
101: cover 82 dummy variables of 83 existing SIC codes in the panel data.  
Since the response variable contains excess zero-counted values, a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model can be utilized here. This distribution allows for frequent zero-valued 
observations and reduces over dispersion of the data (Yau et al. 2003). Our zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression for the panel data is applied to examine all aforementioned hypotheses in 
Section 4.1 through many regression models, starting with the independent variables, adding 
control variables and other econometric techniques discussed below.  
 =
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In order to address multicollinearity and other robustness concerns, we statistically test 
the robustness of the model and cluster standard errors by firms and industry. Regarding 
endogeneity, three different methods are proposed to address any type of potential endogeneity 
in the main models: reverse causality, instrumental variables and Heckman Selection models. 
These methods are explained in the sections that follow. 
 
4.2.3. Durbin-Watson Test 
In order to select between a fixed or random effects model, based on Hausman (1978), we can 
run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) statistical test to check which assumption is valid in our 
panel data. The DWH test evaluates the significance of a model estimator versus that of an 
alternative estimator. It helps us evaluate whether a statistical model corresponds to the data. In 
this test, the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is the random effects one. If the random 
effects assumption holds (does not reject the null hypothesis), the random effects model is more 
consistent, but if this assumption does not hold (it rejects the null hypothesis or the DWH test 
fails), the fixed effects model is more efficient than the random effects model (Greene, 2008).  
We basically test whether the error terms are correlated with the regressors. The null hypothesis 
is that they are not correlated. It is necessary to run the fixed and random effects models 
separately first and perform the following statistical test based on both estimates.  
  : The main regression error terms in the panel data analysis are not correlated with the 
regressors 
 
According to Hausman (1978), and Davidson and Mackinnon (2004), this test is based on 
the idea that, under the null hypothesis (  ), the difference between the coefficient matrix of 
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both the fixed effects and random effects model ( ̂ 
    ̂ 
  ) is asymptotically zero. If the null is 
true, we have: 
       √n ( ̂ 
  
  ̂ 
  
)  
 
→  (     )         (4) 
 
Or by Continuous Mapping Theorem (CMT)
1
 in econometrics: 
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This equation (5), by Slutsky’s theorem2, implies: 
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 ̂ 
   is the coefﬁcient vector from the Random Effects (RE) model 
 ̂ 
   is the coefﬁcient vector from the Fixed Effects (FE) model 
 ̂  and  ̂  are the covariance matrices for the RE and FE models respectively. They are 
called Heteroskedasticity- Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimators (HCCMEs), and can 
be estimated by the following equations (their explanatory matrix, X, for ̂  and  ̂  are 
different): 
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 Continuous Mapping Theorem (CMT) indicates that continuous functions are limit-preserving and allow us to 
calculate asymptotically distribution of the parameter estimate ( ̂) (Hansen, 2012). It also applies to vectors of 
random sequences, i.e., if    (           )   (        )   (       )  and    
     be a continuous 
function, we have:   
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 Slutsky’s Theorem is a special case of CMT which provides some algebraic equations on convergent sequences of 
real and random numbers (Hansen, 2012):  
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  is the random vector of the explanatory variables matrix.  
  
The      statistic has asymptotically Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the rank of matrix   .  
 
4.2.4. Robustness and Clustering Standard Errors 
Classical estimation methods, such as OLS, rely heavily on assumptions that may not often exist 
in practice, such as normally or asymptotically normal distribution of error terms, and 
independence of variables. However, if heterokedasticity and correlation occur within the 
groups, OLS or other classical estimators often perform very poorly. Suppose our generic 
regression model is: 
                               (9) 
t=2000, 2001,…, 2011, and i=1,2,3,….47374 (firm) 
 
 Where t is the panel data index (year), with multiple observations on ﬁrms over time period 
2000-2011 and     can be explained as individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects or errors.     is the main 
error terms and generally assumed that is iid (independently and identically distributed) but 
sometimes this assumption is not valid. We can relax this assumption and consider clustered 
errors. That means in the panel data, there is correlation between observations within group i in 
some unknown way, causing correlation in      within i, but that groups i and j do not have 
correlated errors.  
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If clustered errors do exist, OLS results will still be unbiased, but standard errors may not 
be accurate, causing an incorrect conclusion in our panel data analysis (Nicols and Schaffer, 
2007).  Therefore, to ensure that the results are robust and unbiased, we apply robust regression 
methods and cluster standard errors for two main variables in the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model. As Nicols and Schaffer (2007) indicate, the robust regression methods help to adjust our 
estimations, by taking into account some of the flaws in the panel data.  
 
4.2.5. Tests of Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is about correlations between explanatory variables and error term. The main 
reasons of endogeneity can be measurement error, omitted variables, autoregression with 
autocorrelated errors and simultaneity in the regression model (Miller et. al, 2010). To address 
any endogeneity concern between the dependent and independent variables, all scenarios of 
potential endogeneity are tested through three powerful methods: the reverse causality test, 
instrumental variables and Heckman Selection models. 
 
4.2.5.1. Reverse Causality 
For reverse causality, the Granger Causality approach is adopted to measure and test the 
difference in VC-backed firms' patenting rates before and after VC investment for a five-year 
window of investment. This test supports our main regression analysis to ensure that causality 
runs mainly from X to Y, not vice versa (McLeod, 2009).  In other words, venture capitalists are 
attracted to firms with patents (the selection effect) and VC causes firms to undertake more 
patenting (the treatment effect). For this test, two main parameters are defined, the first concerns 
the rate of patenting for VC-backed firms before VC investment and the second concerns the rate 
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of patenting for these firms after investment during a five-year window. The pre-VC patent count 
is divided by five to create an annual patent rate variable before investment. Likewise, the 
number of patents occurring in the five-year window subsequent to VC investment is also 
divided by five to produce a post-VC patent rate variable, as shown in Figure 4.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Reverse causality effects 
 
Our null hypothesis for this test is:  
  : The patenting rates before and after VC investment are not significantly different. 
 
Our key parameter for this test is the difference in the patenting rate before and after 
investment ( ̅). This analytical model proceeds as follows. Denote   
( )
 as the outcome of the 
target variable after VC investment in firm i, that is, the total registered patents in a five-year 
window after investment, and   
( )
 as the total registered patents in a five-year window before 
VC investment in the firm i. The evaluation task is then expressed formally as measuring the 
average treatment effect (adopted from Engel and Keilbach, 2007), 
 
Patents Before VC Patents After VC
Time
Business 
Founding
Date of VC 
Investment
T0: 5 years
 ( ): Patents after VC
   : Rate of patenting  before
1yr
T1: 5 years
 ( ): Patents after VC
   : Rate of patenting after
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 ̅   (   
( )
    
( )
|     )   ((   
( )
|     )   (   
( )|     )  (10) 
 
In equation (10),  (   
( )
|     ) is the average yearly patenting rate (annual rate) 
before investment for all VC-backed firms, and  (   
( )
|     )  is the average patenting rate 
after investment.  ̅ is the average difference in patenting rates before and after investment. The 
time period for counting patents and calculating patent rates is from January 1995 to May 2012. 
This method can be used to test the impact of VC investment at a country-level and industry-
level as well, and will be discussed later. 
In order to select the right approach/distribution function for this testing, it is necessary to 
check the normality of the dataset. If it has an asymptotically normal distribution, we can use a 
Z-statistic (Student’s t-test for small sample size): 
     ̅    (The average of patenting rate before and after VC investments is not 
significantly different) 
  ̅  
 ̅  
  ̅
            ̅    √              (11) 
For comparing average differences between two environments (group i and j): 
Test for  ̅   ̅  (in case of normality): 
  ̅   ̅  
( ̅   ̅ ) ( ̅ 
   ̅ 
 )
√
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
                     (12) 
Otherwise, we can utilize non-parametric models like the Kernel or bootstrapping method 
for this analysis. If we reject the null hypothesis, we can conclude that the patenting rate before 
and after investment is different. In the case of positive results, this rate is greater after 
investment, and in the case of a negative outcome, this rate is greater before investment.  
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4.2.5.2. Instrumental Variables 
The instrumental variables method is an effective solution to test the relationship between VC 
and innovation when a controlled experiment is not feasible and when there is a concern 
regarding endogeneity in the relationship between explanatory and response variables. This 
method allows consistent estimation when the explanatory variables (covariates) are correlated 
with the error terms of a regression relationship (Wooldridge, 2006). A valid instrument has to 
satisfy two restrictions. First, it has to be correlated with the endogenous variable or VC 
investment, conditional on the other covariates. Second, it should not be correlated with the main 
regression error terms (Wooldridge, 2006 and Vasco, 2011). Therefore, in order to estimate the 
effects of VC investment (x) on our response variable or patenting rate (y), an instrument (z), as 
the third variable, should be defined that affects y only through its effect on x. Basically this 
approach involves regressing the matrix X on some variables that are known to be exogenous 
and then using the predicted value of   (  ) from a regression of X on Z to replace    (a matrix 
element of X) in our main regression equation (1).  
In this study, since we feel that VC funding could be endogenous with patenting activity, 
we can find a good instrument for VC financing, denoted as V (in dollars).  The way to check for 
a proper instrument Z is (Wooldridge, 2006 and Vasco, 2011): 
Cov (Z, V) ≠ 0      
Cov (Z, ϵ) = 0       (13) 
Figure 4.2 simply shows the relationship between IV, the regressor (VC investment 
variable) and the main response variable (the patent variable). 
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Figure 4.2: IV relation with the regressor and main response variable 
 
In the above pair conditions (13), the first one shows that the covariance between the 
instrumental variable and the VC investment variable should be different than zero. The second 
condition shows the covariance between the instrumental variable and the error term of the main 
model. To check condition 2, we need to run the following discrete regression models. Based on 
our previous discussion, since the output of the main model is a counting (discrete) parameter 
with integer positive values, we can use Poisson or negative binomial regression: 
P (Negative Binomial of Patents) = a0 + a1V + ϵ 
Cov (Z, ϵ) = 0 (approximately) 
 
If Z is a good instrument, then (based on Guan, 2003): 
 Step 1 
Tobit(V) = b0 + b1Z + φ  (we use Tobit because V has many cases of zeros)            (14) 
The predicted values of VC investment ( ̂) from this equation (14) is collected and used 
in the Step 2 regression (15):  
 Step 2 
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Since the form of distribution that we get is unknown, we can use bootstrap standard 
errors for the ψ parameter. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric estimation method for a statistic 
distribution using random resampling. The simple assumption is that our current sample is a 
good representative of the main population. It allows us to avoid theoretical calculation, and it is 
a straightforward way for our model to obtain estimates of standard errors for complex 
estimators of unknown distribution (Guan, 2003). 
According to the above conditions and our extensive analyses around many IV 
candidates, the Ease to Do Business index, as a starting business parameter, is our instrument for 
VC investment. This variable is closely correlated with VC investment but not with the error 
term of the main regression model. The data for the Ease of Doing Business index is collected 
from the World Bank, Doing Business project for the time period 2000-2011. The Ease of Doing 
Business index ranks world economies from 1 to 185 (1 shows the highest and 185 shows the 
lowest rank). Higher rankings (translate to low numerical ranks) indicate that the regulatory 
environment is supportive and simpler for business operations. The Ease of Doing Business 
index averages the economic percentile rankings on the ten following criteria, made up of different 
indicators, giving equal weight to each criterion (World Bank, 2013) as shown in Table 4.2:  
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Table 4.2: Ease of Doing Business criteria 
ID Category Criteria 
1 Business 
Setup 
Procedures, expenditure and time for establishing a new business, 
obtaining any required legal permits 
2 Construction 
Permissions 
Procedures, expenditure and time to gain all necessary building permits 
3 Obtaining 
electricity 
Procedures, expenditure and time for receiving electricity for buildings 
4 Property 
registration 
Procedures, expenditure and time necessary to register new properties or 
transfer ownership 
5 Credit 
acquisition 
Procedures and time for getting credit, sharing credit data (depth of credit 
information index), and legal rights of borrowers and lenders 
6 Investors 
protection 
and support 
Procedure and time for shareholders to suit misconducts, responsibility and 
liability of business agents, clearness of related-party transactions 
7 Tax payment Expenditure, procedure and time spent for tax documentation and 
processing, number and rate of taxes and mandatory contributions 
8 Trading 
(import and 
export) 
Expenditure, procedures, time and number of required documents for 
import and export 
9 Contracts 
enforcement 
Expenditure, procedures and efficiency of judicial system in resolving a 
business dispute 
10 Resolution of 
business 
failure 
Expenditure, procedures, time and outcomes of filing bankruptcy and 
closing, and recovery rates (%) 
11 Employment 
(as additional 
criteria) 
Expenditure, process and time for hiring qualified workers, flexibility in 
regulations and working hours, and availability of required resources 
 
At the end of the IV method, we need to statistically test and compare our previous 
models (with no instrumental variable) versus the IV method, to select the most consistent 
method. The DWH test (Hausman, 1978) can be applied to conduct this test, and it is based on 
the idea that under the null hypothesis (  ), the difference of coefficients ( ̂ 
    ̂ 
  ) should 
not be zero only due to sampling error. The null hypothesis can be written as   : E(X'u)= 0 
(exogeneity condition), which means that there is no correlation between the X matrix and the 
error terms.  
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If the null is true, we have 
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Or by Continuous Mapping Theorem (CMT) in econometrics: 
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This equation, by Slutsky’s theorem, implies: 
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   is the coefﬁcient vector from the consistent estimator (IV model) 
 ̂ 
   is the coefﬁcient vector from the efﬁcient estimator(our general negative binomial 
model) 
 ̂  and  ̂   are the covariance matrices of the consistent and efficient estimators and can 
be written as (their explanatory matrix, X, for ̂  and  ̂  are different):  
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We test at a 95% confidence level using Chi-square distribution with k degrees of 
freedom (equal to the rank of matrix   ). 
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4.2.5.3. Heckman Selection Model 
Heckman (1976, 1979) proposed a two-step practical method to correct for selection bias and 
treat the sample selection problem as an omitted variable problem. This method helps to test for 
bias in sample selection and provides a two-step regression for our bias-corrected model based 
on a normality assumption. The Heckman procedure is an ex-ante correction method and it is an 
effective tool for our panel regression analysis. In this analysis, we need to follow two main 
steps. First, the selection equation predicts the probability that VC investors invest. This 
regression equation contains explanatory variables that are expected to determine the investment 
likelihood of VCs in their target firms.  
In the first stage, based on Heckman (1976, 1979), the probability of VC investment is a 
probit regression of the form: 
    (    | )   (  )                                                       (  ) 
 
Where VC indicates VC investment (VC = 1 if the firm received VC funds and VC = 0 
otherwise), Z is a vector of explanatory variables, γ is a vector of unknown parameters, and Φ is 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Estimation of the 
equation (in the first step) provides results that can be used to predict the VC investment 
probability for each firm. 
 Step 1: Selection Equation 
Zi* = latent variable, dependent variable (DV) of selection equation (VC Investment) 
Wi = vector of covariates for unit i for selection equation 
α = vector of coefficients for selection equation 
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  = random disturbance for unit i for selection equation 
                                                                                 (  ) 
 
The predicted value (predicted VC Investment) obtained from the first stage regression 
model is incorporated as an additional regressor in the second stage negative binomial log-linear 
regression to control for potential endogeneity (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2012).  
 Step 2: Outcome Equation 
  = DV of outcome equation (log-link function of patents) 
  = vector of covariates for unit i for outcome equation (including predicted VC Investment 
variable) 
β= vector of coefficients for outcome equation 
  = random disturbance for unit i for outcome equation 
                                                                           (  ) 
 
The results of Heckman Selection model will be compared with the main negative 
binomial regression results to determine whether any endogeneity exists in the NB regression. 
We can apply the DWH method again for this comparison.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
Further to the summary of the data in Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, we provide four additional 
sets of summary statistics: a quick summary of patent data and patent owners (Tables 5.1), patent 
numbers based on legal systems and countries (Table 5.2), a summary of the continuous 
variables (Table 5.3), and a correlation matrix (Table 5.4). 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the total number of firms in the dataset and their patents in 
various countries and legal systems. The total number of VC-backed and non VC-backed firms is 
47,374, taken from 99 countries and 83 industries, with 263,455 patents held between January 
1995 and May 2012. Of these firms, 17% own at least one patent, while 33% of the VC-backed 
firms have patents, only 8.5% of the non VC-backed firms do. The most active countries in both 
VC investment and patenting are the United States, Great Britain, West European countries, 
Canada, Israel and China. The most active legal system is British law in this regard. The most 
attractive industries for VC investors are SIC-73 (Business Services), 87 (Engineering, 
Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services), 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical 
Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment) 38 (Measuring, Analyzing, and 
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks), 28 
(Chemicals and Allied Products) and 48 (Communications) in that order, while industries SIC-38 
(Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; 
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Watches and Clocks), 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products) and 48 (Communications), 87 
(Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services) and 73 (Business 
Services) are more active industries in terms of patenting rates due to the critical roles of 
innovation in these industries and their rapid technological change. The two-digit SIC codes 
utilized in the research and their definitions are listed in Appendix C.  
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Table 5.1: A quick summary of patent data 
Firms Category 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Patent 
Owners (% 
of total) 
Total 
Patents 
Average 
Patents/ 
Firm 
Average 
Patents/ 
Patent 
Owners 
Most Active 
Country in 
patenting (% 
of all patents)* 
Most 
Active 
Industry in 
Patenting 
Most Active Firms 
 Name            
(Country) 
Patents          
(% of all) 
All Firms 47374 
8123 
(17%) 
263455 5.6 32.4 
US (51%), 
DE (12%),  
JP (8%) 
36 (32%), 
38 (16%), 
28 (12%) 
 
VC-Backed Firms 16774 
5518 
(33%) 
52646 3.1 9.5 
US (62%), 
GB (15%), 
DE (5%)  
87 (31%), 
36 (22%), 
73 (19%)  
QINETIQ LTD (GB) 1111 (2%) 
Non VC-Backed 
Firms 
30600 
2605 
(8.5%) 
210809 6.9 80.9 
US (49%), 
DE (14%),  
JP (10%) 
36 (34%), 
38 (17%), 
28 (13%) 
Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft 
(DE) 
14390 (7%) 
 * US: United States, DE: Germany, JP: Japan, GB: Great Britain 
* Industry codes in the table: 36: Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment, 38: 
Transportation Equipment, 28: Chemicals and Allied Products, 87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related 
Services, 73: Business Services 
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Table 5.2: Patent numbers based on the country, country's legal system, and firm's category (VC-backed and non VC-backed) 
 
ALL FIRMS VC-BACKED FIRMS NON VC-BACKED FIRMS 
Country 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total) 
Total 
Patents 
Total 
Number 
of Firms   
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)  
Total 
Patents  
Total 
Number 
of Firms  
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)   
Total 
Patents   
Australia 201 40 358 62 23 227 139 17 131 
Barbados 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Bermuda 23 1 3 8 
  
15 1 3 
Bahamas 1 
     
1 
 
  
Canada 1180 275 3042 452 148 1077 728 127 1965 
Cyprus 2 
     
2 
 
  
Great Britain (UK) 4648 724 10380 2097 546 7741 2551 178 2639 
Hong Kong 51 1 2 15 
  
36 1 2 
Ireland 411 40 343 180 29 136 231 11 207 
Israel 1041 310 3011 480 224 1536 561 86 1475 
India 409 23 270 168 4 52 241 19 218 
Cayman Islands 50 1 122 23 
  
27 1 122 
Liberia 1 
  
1 
    
  
Malaysia 59 1 3 9 
  
50 1 3 
Nigeria 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
New Zealand 43 7 108 18 1 2 25 6 106 
Papua New Guinea 1 
     
1 
 
  
Pakistan 7 
  
1 
  
6 
 
  
Singapore 86 11 51 28 3 8 58 8 43 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Tanzania 1 
     
1 
 
  
Uganda 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
United States 26762 4872 135633 8756 3462 32510 18006 1410 103123 
British Virgin Islands 9 1 3 6 1 3 3 
 
  
South Africa 57 2 30 16 
  
41 2 30 
British Common law (Total) 35055 6309 (18%) 153359 12324 4441(36%) 43292 22731 1868 (8%) 110067 
British Common law (Mean) 1402.2 420.6 10223.9 586.9 444.1 4329.2 947.1 133.4 7861.9 
British Common law (Median) 43 11 122 16 26 181.5 26 9.5 126.5 
United Arab Emirates 21 
  
8 
  
13 
 
  
Armenia 1 
  
1 
    
  
Bulgaria 24 
  
7 
  
17 
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Table 5.2: Patent numbers based on the country, country's legal system, and firm's category (VC-backed and non VC-backed) 
 
ALL FIRMS VC-BACKED FIRMS NON VC-BACKED FIRMS 
Country 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total) 
Total 
Patents 
Total 
Number 
of Firms   
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)  
Total 
Patents  
Total 
Number 
of Firms  
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)   
Total 
Patents   
Bahrain 1 
     
1 
 
  
China 905 61 5624 314 25 302 591 36 5322 
Colombia 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Costa Rica 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Czech Republic 38 3 225 9 1 1 29 2 224 
Algeria 6 
  
2 
  
4 
 
  
Ecuador 1 
     
1 
 
  
Estonia 28 3 23 12 1 6 16 2 17 
Egypt 2 
     
2 
 
  
Ethiopia 1 
     
1 
 
  
Gabon 1 
     
1 
 
  
Iran 2 
     
2 
 
  
Iceland 7 
  
2 
  
5 
 
  
Jordan 8 
  
3 
  
5 
 
  
Kazakhstan 1 
     
1 
 
  
Lebanon 4 
  
1 
  
3 
 
  
Liechtenstein 3 1 1 1 
  
2 1 1 
Sri Lanka 1 
     
1 
 
  
Lithuania 6 
  
1 
  
5 
 
  
Latvia 17 
  
4 
  
13 
 
  
Morocco 2 1 3 
   
2 1 3 
Monaco 1 
     
1 
 
  
Moldova 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Malta 1 
     
1 
 
  
Mauritius 4 
  
1 
  
3 
 
  
Mexico 26 
  
2 
  
24 
 
  
Peru 5 
     
5 
 
  
Poland 72 4 5 22 
  
50 4 5 
Qatar 1 
     
1 
 
  
Romania 40 
  
4 
  
36 
 
  
Russian Federation 101 1 29 15 
  
86 1 29 
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Table 5.2: Patent numbers based on the country, country's legal system, and firm's category (VC-backed and non VC-backed) 
 
ALL FIRMS VC-BACKED FIRMS NON VC-BACKED FIRMS 
Country 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total) 
Total 
Patents 
Total 
Number 
of Firms   
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)  
Total 
Patents  
Total 
Number 
of Firms  
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)   
Total 
Patents   
Rwanda 1 
  
1 
    
  
Slovenia 7 
     
7 
 
  
Senegal 2 
  
1 
  
1 
 
  
Thailand 13 
  
2 
  
11 
 
  
Tunisia 3 
  
1 
  
2 
 
  
Ukraine 43 
  
1 
  
42 
 
  
Uruguay 10 
  
4 
  
6 
 
  
Venezuela 5 
  
1 
  
4 
 
  
Viet Nam 39 
  
17 
  
22 
 
  
Civil law (Total) 1463 74 (5%) 5910 440 27 (6%) 309 1023 47 (5%) 5601 
Civil law (Mean) 34.0 10.6 844.3 15.2 9.0 103.0 25.0 6.7 800.1 
Civil law (Median) 4 3 23 2 1 6 4 2 17 
Argentina 124 1 1 6 
  
118 1 1 
Belgium 359 51 1761 149 38 323 210 13 1438 
Brazil 63 2 3 18 
  
45 2 3 
Chile 17 
  
3 
  
14 
 
  
Spain 990 60 876 345 33 210 645 27 666 
France 2428 319 9214 964 239 1583 1464 80 7631 
Guadeloupe 2 
     
2 
 
  
Greece 21 
  
4 
  
17 
 
  
Indonesia 15 
  
2 
  
13 
 
  
Italy 914 96 1521 115 29 125 799 67 1396 
Luxembourg 33 2 6 13 2 6 20 
 
  
Martinique 1 
     
1 
 
  
Netherlands 522 61 1355 227 44 194 295 17 1161 
Philippines 12 
  
2 
  
10 
 
  
Portugal 68 
  
16 
  
52 
 
  
Reunion 2 
     
2 
 
  
Turkey 15 1 1 1 
  
14 1 1 
Civil law- French (Total) 5586 593 (11%) 14738 1865 385 (21%) 2441 3721 208 (6%) 12297 
Civil law- French (Mean) 328.6 65.9 1637.6 133.2 64.2 406.8 218.9 26.0 1537.1 
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Table 5.2: Patent numbers based on the country, country's legal system, and firm's category (VC-backed and non VC-backed) 
 
ALL FIRMS VC-BACKED FIRMS NON VC-BACKED FIRMS 
Country 
Total 
Number 
of Firms 
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total) 
Total 
Patents 
Total 
Number 
of Firms   
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)  
Total 
Patents  
Total 
Number 
of Firms  
Patent 
Owners     
(% of total)   
Total 
Patents   
Civil law- French (Median) 33 51 876 14.5 35.5 202 20 15 913.5 
Austria 253 27 804 101 16 149 152 11 655 
Switzerland 345 82 1835 140 55 491 205 27 1344 
Germany 2311 430 31474 1003 297 2720 1308 133 28754 
Croatia (Hrvatska) 21 2 35 7 1 1 14 1 34 
Hungary 40 1 1 12 1 1 28 
 
  
Japan 415 162 21074 107 31 285 308 131 20789 
Korea (South) 54 32 19351 15 6 252 39 26 19099 
Slovak Republic 16 
  
6 
  
10 
 
  
Taiwan 55 30 7248 12 4 96 43 26 7152 
Civil law- German (total) 3510 766 (22%) 81822 1403 411 (29%) 3995 2107 355 (17%) 77827 
Civil law- German (Mean) 390.0 95.8 10227.8 155.9 51.4 499.4 234.1 50.7 11118.1 
Civil law- German (Median) 55 31 4541.5 15 11 200.5 43 26 7152 
Denmark 341 77 3131 132 56 414 209 21 2717 
Finland 363 88 1277 154 54 453 209 34 824 
Norway 168 42 314 59 22 122 109 20 192 
Sweden 823 167 2894 333 115 1610 490 52 1284 
Civil law- Scandinavian (Total) 1695 374 (22%) 7616 678 247 (36%) 2599 1017 127 (12%) 5017 
Civil law- Scandinavian (Mean) 423.8 93.5 1904.0 169.5 61.8 649.8 254.3 31.8 1254.3 
Civil law- Scandinavian 
(Median) 352 82.5 2085.5 143 55 433.5 209 27.5 1054 
0 64 7 10 64 7 10 
  
  
Country Data Not Exist 64 7 10 64 7 10 0 0 0 
SA 1 
     
1 
 
  
Muslim law 1           1     
All Legal Systems (Total) 47374 8123 (17%) 263455 16774 5518 (33%) 52646 30600 2605 (8.5%) 210809 
All Legal Systems (Mean) 473.7 184.6 5987.6 215.1 172.4 1645.2 318.8 65.1 5270.2 
All Legal Systems (Median) 16.5 25 292 8.5 27 202 13.5 15 221 
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Table 5.3 provides summary statistics for the continuous variables, their samples, and 
observations that have been made for our longitudinal study. The firms’ patent numbers 
dispersed from 0 to 2025, with an average 0.37 patent per firm-year. The amount of VC invested 
in the sample varies from zero to $893 million. We also observe that the range of IPR variable is 
from 0 to 6.48, with mean and median equal to 4.05 and 4.13 (out of 7), thanks to WIPO and 
other international initiatives, such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) agreement that sets down minimum requirements for intellectual property support and 
regulations, and the establishment of new patent laws in many countries with no previous patent 
granting and protection systems (Park, 2008).  As discussed earlier in Chapter 2 (§ 2.4), the 
distribution of patent strength across the world has improved from a positively skewed shape 
prior to the late 1990s to a negatively skewed shape afterward. Thus, the patent protection index 
for most countries is above the mean (Park, 2008).  The definition of other socio-economic 
parameters is provided in Chapter 3, Table 3.1. Details of the instrumental variable are also 
provided in Chapter 4, Table 4.2. 
It is worthwhile comparing the historical trend of patent volumes, VC deals, and other 
country-based indices in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The slight patent volumes increase during 
2000-2008 and sharp decrease after 2008 are consistent with the IPR index trend as well as the 
economic and market conditions indices changes, including in the GDP per Capita, Market 
Capitalization, Business Entry Rate, and Regulatory Quality. The patent trend is also correlated 
to some extent with R&D Expenditure, Tax, and MSCI indices after 2008. The main reason for 
this sharp reduction is the global economic recession, which started at the end of 2008 and 
affected the entire world economy, with greater impacts to some countries than others.  The VC 
deal volume drop in 2001 and 2002 and increase afterward is consistent with the trends in the 
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Regulatory Quality, Market Capitalization and Business Entry Rate indices. In most of these 
graphs, we see a slight reduction in 2008 as well. 
As a check on collinearity between explanatory variables, pairwise correlations are 
calculated and shown in Table 5.4. For the country-based indices that change over the years 
2000-2011, we use the average value of those indices. If a country’s index for a specific data 
point is blank, as mentioned earlier, we apply the simple method of Nardo et al. (2005a) by 
order: searching other databases or via Internet, interpolating between the adjacent data records 
(e.g., using median of that variable of the same legal system), and using the latest available data 
before 2011. For any missing data in 2011, we forecast the data based on the historical trend of 
the index for the corresponding country. 
Since IPR is one of the key variables of interest, we focus on pairwise correlations 
between control variables (listed from 1 to 14 in Table 5.4, except IPR). Based on the results in 
Table 5.4, a strong correlation exists between Political Stability and Regulatory Quality indices. 
The Regulatory Quality index also has strong correlations with the key elements of the legal 
system variable, as another variable of interest. Therefore, we can exclude the Regulatory 
Quality index from the model and keep the Political Stability index in our analyses.
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics for the continuous variables 
Variable Observ. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patent 568,488* 0 0.372 9.879 0 2025 
VC Investment 568,488 0 0.464 4.572 0 893.34 
Socio-Economic Parameters (Country-Based Indices) 
Intellectual Property 
Protection/Rights (IPR) 
1,188** 4.05 4.13 1.136 0.00 6.48 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence 
1,188 0.40 0.16 0.94 -2.73 1.67 
Regulatory Quality 1,188 0.67 0.56 0.86 -1.88 2.00 
Business Extent of Disclosure 1,188 6 5.71 2.875 0 10 
Taxes on Income, Profits and 
Capital Gains(% of revenue) 
1,188 23.910 25.317 12.608 0.014 66.715 
Return on Equity (%) 1,188 12.206 13.562 35.744 -143.95 1001.163 
Market Capitalization of Listed 
Companies (current US$) 
1,188 4.67E+10 4.22E+11 1.66E+12 2147314 1.20E+13 
MSCI Return 1,188 10.89% 9.91% 0.348 -83.87% 184.15% 
GDP per Capita (current US$) 1,188 9242 18321 22891 113 186243 
Business Entry Rate (new 
registration as % of total) 
1,188 8.758 9.262 2.849 1.725 19.442 
Labor Force with Secondary 
Education (% of total) 
1,188 42.650 45.062 13.104 6.400 80.200 
School Enrollment, Secondary 
(% net) 
1,188 84.449 82.623 11.988 13.321 99.939 
Research and Development 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
1,188 0.846 1.071 0.860 0.037 4.804 
Instrumental Variable 
Ease of Doing Business 1,188 52 64.51 46.063 1 179 
Details of the Legal System Variables (not included in the main regression models) 
Limited Gov. Powers 1,188 0 0.07 0.256 0 1 
Absence of Corruption 1,188 0.614 0.602 0.164 0 0.927 
Order and Security 1,188 0.549 0.566 0.195 0 0.956 
Fundamental Rights 1,188 0.721 0.710 0.158 0 0.928 
Open Government 1,188 0.599 0.625 0.161 0 0.929 
Regulatory Enforcement 1,188 0.512 0.540 0.162 0 0.935 
Civil Justice 1,188 0.533 0.552 0.157 0 0.893 
Criminal Justice 1,188 0.560 0.567 0.136 0 0.816 
* 568,488 firm-year observations for 47,374 firms between 2000 and 2011 
** 1,188 country-year observations for 99 countries between 2000 and 2011 
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Figure 5.1: Historical trend of the firms’ annual patents 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Historical trend of the total VC deals (volume) 
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Figure 5.3: Historical trends of the country-based indices 
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Figure 5.3: Historical trends of the country-based indices (continued)
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Table 5.4: Pairwise correlation between all country-based variables  
ID Index (Variable) 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 Business extent of disclosure index 1
2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence -0.138 1
3 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Index 0.1217 0.7292 1
4 Regularity Quality 0.06 0.8014 0.8327 1
5 GDP per capita (current US$) -0.155 0.6202 0.5956 0.6129 1
6
Labor force with secondary education (% of 
total)
-0.111 0.1832 0.0064 0.0605 0.0311 1
7
Business entry rate (new registrations as % 
of total)
0.1699 0.0958 0.3079 0.2601 0.1673 -0.203 1
8
Research and development expenditure (% 
of GDP)
0.0739 0.3606 0.6494 0.5384 0.4275 0.0334 0.1925 1
9 Return on equity (%) -0.028 -0.152 -0.149 -0.234 -0.182 -0.039 0.124 -0.183 1
10 School enrollment, secondary (% net) 0.1165 0.5384 0.5831 0.5264 0.3283 0.2214 0.0832 0.5719 -0.145 1
11
Market capitalization of l isted companies 
(current US$)
0.1327 0.0594 0.2174 0.1932 0.1718 -0.076 0.1454 0.3086 -0.089 0.173 1
12
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
(% of revenue)
0.2167 0.1486 0.4238 0.3132 0.2067 -0.349 0.4494 0.2465 -0.05 0.1508 0.2863 1
13 MSCI Return Index (Annual) 0.1621 -0.446 -0.457 -0.387 -0.319 0.0015 -0.192 -0.359 0.1753 -0.424 -0.196 -0.128 1
14
New Legal Variables: Limited Government 
Powers
0.0461 0.517 0.6706 0.6726 0.4118 0.0577 0.1081 0.5547 -0.132 0.4679 0.1845 0.3191 -0.226 1
15 New Legal Variables: Absence of Corruption 0.0388 0.6155 0.7412 0.7015 0.4574 0.1161 0.193 0.6019 -0.122 0.5369 0.2167 0.2747 -0.334 0.881 1
16 New Legal Variables: Order and Security 0.0125 0.5782 0.479 0.503 0.3627 0.2291 0.0594 0.4277 -0.172 0.4539 0.1439 0.1016 -0.309 0.753 0.798 1
17 New Legal Variables: Fundamental Rights 0.001 0.5132 0.5428 0.6127 0.3569 0.1462 0.0438 0.5089 -0.139 0.4814 0.1327 0.1846 -0.219 0.92 0.83 0.751 1
18 New Legal Variables: Open Government 0.1132 0.5209 0.6791 0.6651 0.4246 0.0841 0.1265 0.6352 -0.165 0.5163 0.2606 0.3101 -0.242 0.926 0.9 0.748 0.886 1
19
New Legal Variables: Regulatory 
Enforcement
0.0792 0.5417 0.6504 0.6534 0.4304 0.1094 0.1179 0.5819 -0.094 0.4563 0.2128 0.234 -0.215 0.908 0.935 0.798 0.856 0.937 1
20 New Legal Variables: Civil  Justice -0.004 0.5189 0.5811 0.5868 0.3928 0.13 0.1335 0.5483 -0.066 0.4608 0.1556 0.1529 -0.256 0.876 0.905 0.829 0.844 0.897 0.95 1
21 New Legal Variables: Criminal Justice 0.0553 0.5646 0.6634 0.6521 0.4227 0.1767 0.1553 0.5686 -0.19 0.4942 0.1608 0.2197 -0.253 0.877 0.934 0.841 0.842 0.861 0.901 0.889 1
N
o
t 
in
cl
u
d
e
d
 in
 t
h
e
 m
ai
n
 li
st
M
ai
n
 li
st
 o
f 
M
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s
 103 
 
5.2. Regression/Hypotheses Testing Results  
5.2.1. VC and Firms’ Innovation 
The results of our regression analysis for testing the main theoretical hypotheses are provided in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7. In the first hypothesis, we test the effects of VC investment on a firms’ 
patenting in different intellectual property support environments. In the second part, we test 
whether VC investment impact is significant in different legal systems and countries. In the third 
part, this test is extended to different industries. Our variables of interest are VC investment, the 
Intellectual Property Right (IPR) index and their interaction term, controlling for other firm-level 
as well as country-level variables.  
Model selection is conducted using multiple negative binomial regression. As discussed 
earlier in Chapter 4 (§ 4.2.3), in order to select either Fixed Effects or Random Effects model in 
our panel data analysis, we complete the DWH test. As the results shown in Table 5.5, p-
value=0.000. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the Fixed Effects model 
is more consistent than the Random Effects model for our balanced panel data. 
The number of patents in each year is the response variable through a log-link function, 
and we examine potential explanatory variables. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate the key models 
of our analyses. All models in Table 5.6 are based on zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
(clustered and not clustered) for the panel data, but in Table 5.7, we demonstrate the results of 
using other applicable regression methods (i.e., logistic regression and a zero inflated Poisson for 
both clustered and not clustered panel data). 
Results of these analyses show that VC investment, IPR, and their interaction term have 
significant impacts on a firm’s patenting, with a 95% confidence level, controlling for other 
factors. Since the VC investment value ($) for some VC deals are not available in the database, 
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and we do not have enough information about the distribution of VC funds in each year after 
investment, we assign a dummy variable to the VC investment variable. This variable is 1 for 1 
to 5 years after investment, and 0 for other times and for all non VC-backed firms in the panel 
data. IPR is a continuous variable showing the score of intellectual protection.  
In Model 1 of Table 5.6, we illustrate the impacts of just VC investment and IPR 
variables with no interaction term and no control variables. This model shows that both VC 
investment and IPR have positive impacts on the patenting rate, with a 99% confidence level and 
regression coefficients 0.54 and 0.39, respectively. That means VC investment has greater 
impacts than IPR. If we add country-based or control variables to Model 1 to create Model 2, the 
results for VC investment and IPR are still valid, but with small changes in their regression 
coefficients. If, however, we add the interaction term of VC investment and IPR to Model 1 and 
establish Model 3, we can see a significant but negative impact of their interaction on firms’ 
patenting, with a regression coefficient of -0.34. The regression coefficients of both VC 
investment and IPR variables increase from 0.54 and 0.39 in Model 1 to 2.40 and 0.51 in Model 3, 
respectively. When we add country-based control variables to Model 3 and create Model 4, the 
results are still consistent, but there are a few reductions in the coefficients
1
. In Model 4, all three 
key parameters (the VC dummy, IPR and their interaction) are significant, at a 99% confidence 
level, but the coefficient of the interaction term (IPR*VC) is still negative, with a smaller 
absolute value (-0.33) than those of VC investment and IPR variables (2.40 and 0.47). Therefore, 
both VC investment and IPR have significant and positive impacts on a firm’s patenting rate, and 
in those areas where intellectual property rights are weaker; VC investment affects a firm’s 
                                                          
1
 We also changed the VC dummy variable to the VC value ($), distributed equally from 1 to 5 years after 
investment and we obtained a consistent result for VC, IPR and their interaction impacts. Additionally, we changed 
the VC dummy variable from a 5-year to 4-year and 1-year time period after investment. Again, we received 
consistent results that VC and IPR are positively significant (their interaction coefficient is still negative with an 
absolute value less than its two main variables).  
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innovation more. Measuring the effects of changes in these parameters can be done through the 
log-link function of the negative binomial model. 
Model 4 is the full model, in which we can see the impact of control variables on the 
model, including the legal systems parameter. In addition, this model has the highest log-
likelihood regression value than other nested models (models 1, 2, 3, and 5). In this model, Labor 
Force with Secondary Education, School Enrollment (Secondary), and MSCI Return indices do 
not have significant effects on a firm’s patenting, but all other country-based indices have an 
important role on a firm’s patenting. For these indices, positive coefficients mean positive 
impacts, and negative coefficients mean negative impacts on the patenting rate. In Model 5, we 
test only the effects of control variables, regardless of the VC and IPR variables. Model 6 is 
similar to Model 4, but instead of legal systems parameter, we add all 82 SIC codes dummy 
variables. The general results of VC investment, IPR and their interaction term is consistent with 
other models; however, there are a few changes in the list of significant control indices. The 
main issue in Model 6 is that the convergence is not achieved, due to the many dummies existing 
in this model.  
Another standard approach for obtaining an optimum regression model is stepwise 
regression, by applying forward selection and backward elimination to our negative binomial 
regression and testing the models in each step using F-test and the log-likelihood results. At each 
step, the least significant variable is removed and a new model is tested against the previous 
model using the LR test at α = .05. If the more complete model is not a better fit to the data, the 
reduced model is retained and the procedure is repeated, eliminating the next least significant 
variable. We continue this process until a model is obtained in which (a) all explanatory 
variables are significant, or (b) the reduced model is not a better fit to the data than a more 
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complete model. Our resulting model is retained and demonstrated in Appendix D. This final 
model is nested in Model 4, but its log-likelihood is lower than that of Model 4.  Therefore, our 
focus will be on Model 4, as the most consistent negative binomial model, with the best 
likelihood ratio.  
In Table 5.7, we use additional methods to verify the robustness of our outcomes. Based 
on these results, both VC investment and IPR have significant and positive impacts on the 
patenting rate in all logistic and Poisson regression models too. The interaction term also has a 
significant but negative impact on patenting, with a smaller coefficient than the VC investment 
and IPR ones in all of these models. These results are consistent with the results shown in Table 
5.6.  
Based on these initial results, p-value and log-likelihood estimations for the models in 
Table 5.6 and 5.7, we can simply reject the null hypotheses (hypotheses 1a and 1b in Chapter 4- 
§ 4.1.1) and conclude that both VC investment and IPR variables have significant impacts on a 
firm’s innovation. VC investment impact is greater in the areas with weaker intellectual property 
protection and support. In order to provide a clear picture about the effects of VC investment in 
different IPR environments, we have measured and demonstrated the effects of VC investment 
change versus IPR score change on the explanatory variable simultaneously in Figure 5.4 for 12 
countries with the highest sample size in the dataset through the following equations: 
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Based on our results which is demonstrated in Figure 5.4, the impact of VC investment 
on the total patent numbers (through the log-link function) is higher in weaker intellectual 
property protection environments.  
It is also necessary to complete our regression analyses by checking robustness by 
clustering standard errors of time (year) and legal systems, as the key components of the 
constructed panel data. In addition, if there is any endogeneity concern, we need to use 
appropriate methods to address this concern and finalize our results.  
The following section discusses other hypothesis tests mentioned in Chapter 4 (§ 4.1.2), 
regarding the effects of VC investment on different legal systems and industries.  
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Table 5.5: DWH Test for Random Effects vs. Fixed Effects Models  
Step 1: Negative Binomial Regression for Panel Data- Random Effects (Using Key Variables) 
Response 
Variable- Patent 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vc1 2.580 0.177 14.61 0 2.234 2.927 
new_ipr 0.559 0.022 24.97 0 0.515 0.603 
vc1_ipr -0.353 0.032 -11.01 0 -0.416 -0.290 
_cons -3.533 0.122 -28.89 0 -3.772 -3.293 
Observations = 567720 
   
  Wald chi2(1) = 2815 
     Log pseudolikelihood=-121045  & Prob > chi2 = 0.000     
 
 
 
Step 2: Negative Binomial Regression for Panel Data- Fixed Effects (Using Key Variables)      
Response 
Variable- Patent 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vc1 2.406 0.181 13.27 0 2.050 2.761 
new_ipr 0.515 0.024 21.58 0 0.468 0.562 
vc1_ipr -0.340 0.033 -10.31 0 -0.404 -0.275 
_cons -3.265 0.130 -25.1 0 -3.520 -3.010 
Observations = 92628 (475092 obs. dropped because of all zero outcomes) 
Wald chi2(1) = 2029 
     Log pseudolikelihood=-75857  & Prob > chi2 = 0.000     
 
 
Step 3: DWH Test (Random vs. Fixed Effects) 
Response Variable- 
Patent 
Random (b) Fixed (B) Difference (b-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))  
S.E. 
vc1 2.580 2.406 0.175 0 
new_ipr 0.559 0.515 0.044 0 
vc1_ipr -0.353 0.340 -0.014 0 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtnbreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtnbreg 
chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)= 11663.54 & Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
 
Prob>chi2=0.0000  Reject Ho  NB- Fixed Effects model is more consistent than NB- Random 
Effects
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Table 5.6: Regression analysis results using negative binomial for panel data- fixed effects 
 Regression Results    Clustering Standard Errors 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
VC Investment (dummy for 1-5 years) 0.5399*** 0.5939*** 2.4057*** 2.3981*** NO 2.5384*** 1.8096*** 1.5606*** 1.5606*** 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 0.3911*** 0.3410*** 0.5148*** 0.4704*** NO 0.4818*** 0.3632*** 0.2363*** 0.2363** 
IPR*VC Investment (interaction term) NO NO -0.339*** -0.328*** NO -0.3510** -0.1025* -0.0509 -0.0509 
Controls: NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Business Extent of Disclosure  --- -0.0278** --- -0.0320*** 0.0117 -0.0743*** --- -0.061*** -0.061* 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence --- -0.1457*** --- -0.1476*** -0.1449*** -0.0630*** --- 0.1082 0.1082 
GDP per Capita (current US$) --- -1.2E-05*** --- -1.1E-05*** -7.8E-07 -8.9E-06*** --- -9.8E-06*** -9.8E-06* 
Labor Force with Secondary Education (% of total) --- 0.0015 --- 0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0001 --- 0.0137** 0.0137** 
Business Entry Rate (new registrations as % of total) --- -0.0099*** --- -0.0129*** -0.0124*** -0.0189*** --- -0.0120* -0.0120 
Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) --- 0.0929*** --- 0.0911*** 0.1227*** 0.1024** --- 0.2961*** 0.2961*** 
Return on Equity (%) --- -0.0045*** --- -0.0045*** -0.0036*** -0.0044*** --- -0.0048** -0.0048 
School Enrollment, Secondary (% net) --- -0.0016 --- 0.00004 0.0036 0.0102*** --- -0.0304*** -0.0304 
Market Capitalization of Listed Co. (current US$) --- 6.3E-15** --- 5.7E-15** 7.6E-15*** -2.08E-15 --- -1.20E-15 -1.20E-15 
Taxes on Income, Profits & Capital Gains (% of rev) --- 0.0072*** --- 0.0073*** 0.0071*** 0.0049*** --- 0.0190*** 0.0190*** 
MSCI Return Index (annual)  --- -0.0217 --- -0.0140 0.0468 0.0257 --- 0.1602* 0.1602* 
Legal System (dummy) NO YES***(all) NO YES***(all) YES***(all) NO NO NO NO 
Industry (dummy) NO NO NO NO NO YES*(some) NO NO NO 
Clustering of Standard Errors NO NO NO NO NO NO YES(YEAR) YES (YEAR) YES (LEGAL) 
Wald Chi2 1976 -- 2029 --- --- --- 1984 -- -- 
Prob>Chi2 (p-value) 0.0000 -- 0.0000 --- --- --- 0.000 -- -- 
Log Likelihood (log pseudolikelihood for clustering) -75910 -75626  -75857                     -75578                    -76540                     -75308 -170904 -169831 -169831 
Number of Observations 92628 92628 92628 92628 92628 92628 567720 567720 567720 
 
*,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
In non-clustered analysis, 39649 groups (475788 observations) dropped because of all zero outcomes 
The Regulation Quality index removed because of its strong correlation with another index (Political Stability & Absence of Violence)  
The software does not run the model that includes all SIC and legal dummy variables together (message: convergence is not achieved) 
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Table 5.7: Result of regression analysis using logistic, negative binomial and Poisson regressions for panel data- Fixed Effects 
 Panel Logistic Regression Results Panel Data  
Parameter Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Clustering SE 
Model 5  
(Zero-Inf. NB) 
Model 6  
(Poisson) 
Model 7  
(Poisson) 
VC Investment (dummy  for 1-5 years) 3.5801*** 3.5396*** 3.5396*** 1.5446*** 2.4527*** 2.2746*** 2.3054*** 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 0.9480*** 0.8466*** 0.8466*** 0.2375** 0.5524*** 0.3721*** 0.3116*** 
IPR*VC Investment (interaction term) -0.5008*** -0.4783*** -0.4783*** -0.0324 -0.3471*** -0.3043*** -0.3054*** 
Controls: NO YES YES YES NO NO YES 
Business Extent of Disclosure  --- Omitted† Omitted† 0.0642*** --- --- Dropped† 
Political Stability & Absence of Violence --- -0.3095*** -0.3095*** 0.1144 --- --- -0.1812*** 
GDP per Capita (current US$) --- -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.00001***  --- --- -2.9E-06 
Labor Force with Secondary Educ. (% of total) --- 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0142** --- --- 0.0068*** 
Business Entry Rate (new registrations as % of total) --- -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0125* --- --- -0.0106*** 
R&D Expenditure (% of GDP) --- 0.1523*** 0.1523*** 0.3158*** --- --- 0.1867*** 
Return on Equity (%) --- -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0048** --- --- -0.0063*** 
School Enrollment, Secondary (% net) --- 0.0004 0.0004 0.3169*** --- --- -0.0146*** 
Market Capitalization of Listed Co. (current US$) --- 1.69E-14*** 1.69E-14*** -1.7E-15 --- --- 6.6E-15*** 
Taxes on Income, Profits & Capital Gains (% of reven) --- 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.1996 --- --- 0.0029*** 
MSCI Return Index (annual)  --- -0.0970** -0.0970** 0.1707** --- --- 0.1938*** 
Legal System Variables NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 Limited Government Powers --- --- Omitted† --- -2.93*** --- Dropped†  
 Absence of Corruption --- --- Omitted --- -2.188** --- Dropped  
 Order and Security --- --- Omitted --- 4.932*** --- Dropped  
 Fundamental Rights --- --- Omitted --- 10.316*** --- Dropped  
 Open Government --- --- Omitted --- -2.892*** --- Dropped  
 Regulatory Enforcement --- --- Omitted --- -0.539 --- Dropped  
 Civil Justice --- --- Omitted --- 1.452** --- Dropped  
 Criminal Justice --- --- Omitted --- -7.435*** --- Dropped  
Industry (dummy) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Clustering of Standard Errors NO NO NO YES (Year) NO NO NO 
LR Chi2 (for panel Wald Chi2) 2131 2435 2435 -- 2246 (Wald) 5343 __ 
Prob>Chi2 (p-value) 0.0000 0.000 0.000 -- 0.000 0.000 __ 
Log Likelihood -32205 -32053 -32053 -104767 -75722 -114437 -113453 
Number of Observations 89796 89796 89796 567720 92628 92628 92628 
*,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
† Dropped/omitted: variable is dropped because it is constant within the group. Omitted means no variance within the group. 
The Regulation Quality index removed because of its strong correlation with another index (Political Stability & Absence of Violence)  
The applications do not run models that include all SIC and legal dummy variables together (message: convergence is not achieved) 
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Figure 5.4: Changes in explanatory variable (log(μ)) by VC change versus IPR change
Country Italy China Israel Spain USA Japan Great Britain Canada Netherland Germany France Sweden
IPR Score 3.66 3.99 4.20 4.26 5.11 5.22 5.50 5.63 5.68 5.75 5.86 6.23
8.72 7.94 7.43 7.30 5.25 4.99 4.33 4.02 3.91 3.74 3.47 2.58
Change in log(μ) by VC change vs. IPR 
change
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 112 
 
5.2.2. Legal Systems and VC Outcomes  
As mentioned earlier, countries can be categorized under different legal systems: Common law 
(British law), Civil law (Roman law) and others. Civil law is comprised of three families: 
French, German and Scandinavian (La Porta et al., 1998). Civil law gives investors weaker legal 
rights and protection than Common law (La Porta et. al, 1998). 
As a part of this research, we test the impact of VC investment on a firm’s patenting 
under different legal systems. This analysis helps us to determine the effects of rights of 
investors, quality of enforcement of legal rules, and other countries’ legal system attributes. The 
hypothesis (asserted in § 4.1.2) is 
  : VC investment impact is not significant and does not vary by legal system or country. 
 
or on a more detailed level, we can say 
  : Patenting rates before and after VC investment in legal system i are not significantly 
different. 
  
Our analysis in Models 2, 4 and 5 in Table 5.6 show that the legal systems, including all 
British and Civil laws have significant impacts in the relationship between VC investment and a 
firm’s patenting at a 99.9% confidence level. The six legal systems are added to the models as 
five dummy variables.  
If we use the reverse causality effect method (discussed in Chapter 4- § 4.2.5.1), as a 
robust approach for examining this effect, we can see again that all legal systems are positively 
effective in firms’ patenting, and the British and French Civil legal systems, in that order, 
provide the most effective support for innovation and firms’ patenting, followed by the German 
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and Scandinavian. Details are provided in Table 5.8. In this method, we compare and test firms’ 
patenting rates before and after VC investment for patent owners in the VC-backed dataset. 
Based on the elements of the legal system parameter, these results illustrate that countries with 
stronger rights of investors and quality of enforcement of legal rules have higher rates of 
innovation. Since countries can be categorized under different legal systems (La Porta, 1998), 
this valuable achievement is extendable to different world regions and countries, based on their 
legal system. These outcomes are also supported by detailed analyses on countries in Table 5.9 
for all active countries that have a sample size of at least 10 firms in the treatment group and 
active in patenting (they held at least one patent during the 15 year period 1995-2012). The 
results show that the United States, France, Canada,  Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Israel, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and China, in that order, are the most effective countries for firms’ 
patenting after VC investment, followed by Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Spain and Finland. 
There is not enough evidence to show this effectiveness in four countries that have a very low 
sample size: Austria (with 16 VC-backed firms in the list), Australia (23 VC-backed firms), 
Japan (31 VC-backed firms), and Norway (22 VC-backed firms).  
     
5.2.3. Industry and VC Outcomes 
It is important to investigate and compare the impacts of VC investment on patenting in different 
industries. In order to test the influence of VC investment on a firm’s patenting in different 
industries (the hypothesis test of Chapter 4-§ 4.1.3), we utilize 83 two-digit SIC codes in our 
analysis to investigate this effect on different industries. These 83 codes and their definitions are 
listed in Appendix C. As indicated in section 4.1.3, our hypothesis is 
  : VC investment impact is not significant and does not vary by industry 
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or on a more detailed level, we can say 
  : The patenting rate before and after VC investment in industry i are not significantly different 
 
Based on 83 SIC codes, 82 dummy variables are defined and added to Model 6, as a zero-
inflated negative binomial regression model in Table 5.6. According to the results, some industry 
types have significant influences on firms’ patenting. In order to measure the details of industry 
impacts and achieve more reliable results, we can use causality effect method for each industry. 
Our focus is on those industries that have a sample size of at least 10 in the treatment group (VC-
backed firms) and active in patenting. Using this method, we are able to compare and test a 
firm’s patenting rate before and after VC investment for each industry (method described in 
Chapter 4-§ 4.2.5.1). In this test, we utilize a Student’s t-test for a sample size less than 30 firms 
and a Z-test statistic for a sample size of 30 or more.  The results of these tests are summarized in 
Table 5.10 (Panel 1) and show that the effects of VC investment are significant in most 
industries, consisting of 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 30 (Rubber and Miscellaneous 
Plastics Products), 34 (Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment), 35 (Industrial, Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment), 36 (Electronic 
and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment), 37 
(Transportation Equipment), 38 (Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks), 48 (Communications), 49 
(Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services), 50 (Wholesale Trade-durable Goods), 73 (Business 
Services), 87 (Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services), and 89 
(Miscellaneous Services). There is not enough evidence to show the effectiveness of VC on 
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patenting under industry codes 20 (Food and Kindred Products), 27 (Printing, Publishing, and 
Allied Industries), and 59 (Miscellaneous Retail). The same size of codes 20 and 59 are too small 
(i.e., 11 and 14, respectively). If we test the average differences in Table 5.10 (Panel 2), based on 
our existing data, we can see that the SIC codes 36, 37, 87, 35 and 28 are the most effective areas 
for VC investment effects on patent. According to Law of Large Numbers (LLN), when a sample 
size is significantly increased, the sample means converge to the true mean or expected value: 
 ̅  
 
 
(          )  
converges to the expected value: 
 ̅ 
 
→    for   →   
where X1, X2, ... is an infinite sequence of i.i.d random variables and their expected values and 
variances are: 
 (  )    for            
   (  )   
    
If our samples are heterokedastic (but independent), then: 
    (  )    
    and      → 
 
  
∑   
  
      
Therefore, we can see better results when the number of samples for each SIC code increases. 
Based on above results, patenting is understandably more critical in some industries like IT, 
electric, electronic and measurement systems, industrial materials and equipment, due to rapid 
technological changes in these areas It is also important to recognize that venture capitalists are 
effective in increasing patenting rate in the service industry as well as in trading, including 
business, engineering, management and accounting services, and durable good wholesale 
trading.     
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Table 5.8: Causality test for all (average treatment)  
Type of Test 
 VC-Backed Firms 
(patent owners) 
Average 
of θ * 
Std. Error  
of θ * 
Z or t-test 
Value** 
P-value 
Result (95% 
Conf. Level) 
Test for all VC-
backed firms 
16774 0.192 1.156 21.476 0.0000 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
All VC-backed firms 
with zero patent 
before VC invest 
13434 0.130 0.586 25.808 0.0000 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
British Legal System 4441 0.626 2.054 20.308 0.0000 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
French Legal System 385 0.444 1.126 7.738 <0.00001 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
German Legal 
System 
411 0.329 1.512 4.409 <0.00001 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
Scandinavian Legal 
System 
247 0.320 1.571 3.203 <0.00001 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant  
       is the average of θ in the main model 
** One-tail test. Student’s t-test for small sample sizes (<30) 
*** Testing average ϴ’s (μ1-μ2) by Z-test, British and French legal systems, in order, are the most 
effective environments than others.  
 
Table 5.9: Test for different legal systems (country effects)  
Test for 
Countries 
 VC-Backed Firms 
(patent owners) 
Average 
of θ  
Std. Error  
of θ  
Z or t-test 
Value 
P-value 
Result (95% Conf. 
Level) 
Austria (AT) 16 0.251 1.065 0.942 >0.1  
Australia (AU) 23 0.377 1.575 1.149 >0.1 
 
Belgium (BE) 38 0.630 1.022 3.798 <0.0001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Canada (CA) 148 0.450 0.968 5.654 <0.00001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Switzerland (CH) 55 0.461 0.756 4.519 <0.00001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
China (CN) 25 2.059 3.398 3.029 <0.005 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Germany (DE) 297 0.363 1.492 4.192 <0.00001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Denmark (DK) 56 0.342 1.072 2.387 <0.009 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Spain (ES) 33 0.308 1.185 1.492 <0.07 H0 Rejected (at 93%) 
Finland (FI) 54 0.411 2.169 1.392 <0.08 H0 Rejected (at 92%) 
France (FR) 239 0.478 1.227 6.022 <0.001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Great Britain (GB) 546 0.664 3.284 4.723 <0.001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Ireland (IE) 29 0.311 0.571 2.937 <0.03 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Israel (IL) 224 0.323 1.214 3.980 <0.002 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Italy (IT) 29 0.184 0.654 1.516 <0.07 H0 Rejected (at 93%) 
Japan (JP) 31 0.093 1.334 0.390 >0.1 
 
Netherlands (NL) 44 0.382 0.814 3.118 <0.005 H0 Rejected- Significant  
Norway (NO) 22 0.232 1.341 0.812 >0.1 
 
Sweden (SE) 115 0.284 1.499 2.031 <0.04 H0 Rejected- Significant  
United States (US) 3462 0.65192 1.882 20.366 <0.0001 H0 Rejected- Significant  
 
  
?̅?
117 
 
Table 5.10: Test for different industries or SIC codes (average effects)  
 
Panel 1: Z-test (t-test) for each SIC code   
Test for Industries  
Based on SIC 
VC-Backed Firms 
(patent owners) 
Avg. of 
θ  
Std. Error  
of θ  
Z or t-test 
Value 
P-value 
Result (95% 
Conf. Level) 
SIC- 20 11 0.216 0.989 0.724 >0.1  
SIC- 27 51 -0.092 1.445 -0.452 >0.1 
 
SIC- 28 343 0.671 2.123 5.850 <0.00001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 30 11 0.526 0.990 1.762 <0.06 
H0 Rejected  
(at 94%) 
SIC- 34 13 0.573 1.021 2.022 <0.03 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 35 172 1.082 2.381 5.959 <0.00001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 36 736 1.087 2.922 10.096 <0.00001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 37 20 1.721 3.116 2.470 <0.02 H0 Rejected-Sign 
SIC- 38 522 0.508 1.560 7.435 <0.00001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 48 76 0.357 0.767 4.055 <0.00001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 49 22 0.993 1.479 3.150 <0.005 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 50 15 0.366 1.038 1.367 <0.09 
H0 Rejected  
(at 91%) 
SIC- 59 14 0.384 1.312 1.096 >0.1  
SIC- 73 2228 0.269 0.878 14.483 0.0000 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 87 1120 0.852 2.655 10.746 <0.001 H0 Rejected-Sign. 
SIC- 89 15 1.551 4.066 1.478 <0.08 
H0 Rejected  
(at 92%) 
All SIC Codes 5518 0.583 1.958 22.104 0.0000 
H0 Rejected- 
Significant 
 
Panel 2: Z-value for testing average differences between 16 SIC codes 
  
SIC-20 SIC-27 SIC-28 SIC-30 SIC-34 SIC-35 SIC-36 SIC-37 SIC-38 SIC-48 SIC-49 SIC-50 SIC-59 SIC-73 SIC-87 SIC-89
SIC-20
SIC-27 0.85
SIC-28 -1.42 -9.52
SIC-30 -0.73 -3.00 0.45
SIC-34 -0.87 -3.20 0.32 -0.11
SIC-35 -2.48 -9.10 -1.91 -1.59 -1.51
SIC-36 -2.75 -13.15 -2.64 -1.77 -1.70 -0.02
SIC-37 -1.99 -4.42 -1.49 -1.58 -1.53 -0.89 -0.90
SIC-38 -0.95 -7.74 1.22 0.06 0.22 2.96 4.54 1.73
SIC-48 -0.45 -3.89 2.17 0.54 0.73 3.59 5.25 1.94 1.36
SIC-49 -1.79 -4.19 -0.96 -1.08 -0.99 0.24 0.28 0.95 -1.50 -1.94
SIC-50 -0.37 -3.36 1.05 0.40 0.53 2.21 2.50 1.82 0.51 -0.03 1.52
SIC-59 -0.36 -3.47 0.78 0.31 0.42 1.77 1.92 1.71 0.35 -0.07 1.29 -0.04
SIC-73 -0.18 -4.77 3.46 0.86 1.07 4.45 7.48 2.08 3.38 0.98 2.29 0.36 0.33
SIC-87 -2.06 -12.64 -1.30 -1.06 -0.95 1.16 1.76 1.24 -3.29 -4.18 0.43 -1.74 -1.30 -7.15
SIC-89 -1.22 -3.89 -0.83 -0.94 -0.90 -0.44 -0.44 0.13 -0.99 -1.13 -0.51 -1.09 -1.05 -1.22 -0.66
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5.3. Robustness Check 
To check for robustness, we utilize clustering standard error methods and run additional 
regression models, as reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  Along with the panel data analysis by 
negative binomial regression, standard errors of the time (year) and legal systems parameters are 
clustered and the results are shown in Models 7, 8 and 9 in Table 5.6, and Model 4 in Table 5.7. 
Based on these results, our initial models are valid and robust in general, in case of 
heterokedasticity and correlation within the groups. VC investment has positive and significant 
impacts in all clustered and non-clustered models. The regression coefficients of VC investment 
and IPR in Models 7, 8 and 9 are very close to their coefficients in the corresponding non-
clustered models (Models 3 and 4). The standard errors of these two variables, using both 
clustered and non-clustered methods are small. If we cluster standard errors by year, there is a 
small lift in the standard errors of the regression parameters (e.g. the standard errors are changed 
from 0.28 and 0.030 in Model 3 to 0.55 and 0.040 in Model 7 for VC and IPR variables). If we 
conduct an additional test and cluster standard errors by firms (ID), then all regression 
coefficients as well as standard errors of clustered models are very close to the non-cluster 
results (e.g. standard errors are changed from 0.28 and 0.030 in Model 3 to 0.29 and 0.033). 
Details of the new robustness and clustering analysis are provided in Appendix D.  
 
5.4. Test of Endogenity 
5.4.1. Reverse Causality Test 
In order to test for endogeneity between VC investment, as the key explanatory variable, and a 
firm’s patenting, as the response variable, first we utilize a reverse causality test. As explained in 
Chapter 4 (§ 4.4), the two key parameters for this test are the annual patenting rates of the VC-
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backed firms before and after VC investment in a five-year window. As a reminder, the null 
hypothesis for this test is 
  : The patenting rates before and after VC investments are not significantly different 
 
We measure and test the difference in the patenting rates before and after investment, 
using the aforementioned equation (10) in section 4.2.5: 
 ̅   (   
( )
    
( )
|     )   ((   
( )
|     )   (   
( )|     ) 
 
  Since the behavior of the  ̅ parameter is approximately normal (details in Appendix B); 
we can apply the Z-statistic method.  
According to the summary of the causality analysis provided in Table 5.8, the rate of patenting 
after VC investment is much larger than before the investment, with a 99.99% confidence level 
for all 16,774 VC-backed firms. If we focus only on those VC-backed firms that have zero 
patents before first VC investment (13,434 firms), we still see that VC investment has significant 
impacts on firms’ patenting with a 99.99% confidence level. As indicated earlier, if we continue 
this test for different legal systems, the results show that in all legal systems, the patenting rate 
after VC investment is much greater than before investment. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 summarize this 
analysis. Based on these results, we can conclude that the causality runs mainly from VC 
investment to a firm’s patenting, not vice versa. We extended this method to test the impact of VC 
investment in different industries and locations in previous sections (§ 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). 
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5.4.2. Instrumental Variables Method 
In order to address endogeneity concerns between VC investment (the explanatory variable) and 
patenting (the response variable) from a different perspective, the Ease to Do Business index is 
used as an instrumental variable. This index is created by the World Bank and is based on the 
comparative study of laws and regulations worldwide. The Ease of Doing Business index 
provides the ranking of 185 economies periodically based on the inputs and verification of more 
than 9,600 government officials, lawyers, accountants, business advisors, and other professionals 
in these economies who continuously provide consulting or legal and regulatory administration 
support (World Bank, 2013). A high ranking (e.g., 185) on this index means that a regulatory 
environment is more conducive and supportive to new business startups, a situation directly 
correlated with VC activities focusing on start-up businesses.  
The Ease of Doing Business index, IV, has zero correlation with the regression error 
terms, but negative (non-zero) correlation with VC investment. The results of two-step negative 
binomial regression and tobit analysis using the instrumental variable are presented in Table 
5.11. In the first step of this analysis, we apply the tobit model because of non-negative and 
many zero-valued observations in the VC investment variable in the panel data. We use the IV 
variable and compute the predicted values of VC from the tobit equation then apply it in the 
negative binomial regression-fixed effects model in the second step to complete the analysis.  
Since we do not know the form of error distribution in the second step, we use bootstrapping 
methods for standard errors of the negative binomial model to ensure our results are robust.  
The final results of this IV analysis support our previous outcomes for the VC investment 
variable that it has a significant impact on a firm’s patenting, but its coefficient is 22.15 with 
standard errors 3.72. This coefficient is about 10 times larger than its coefficient in our general 
negative binomial models (e.g.,    =1.76 in Model 4 in Table 5.6).  In this analysis, the 
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regression coefficient of IPR is -8.73 (with standard errors 1.38). Despite our previous 
discussions about IPR literature (in Chapter 2) and the fact that stronger property support 
increases firm’s innovation and patenting, this result shows that IPR has a negative impact on 
patenting, which means that patenting activities decreases in stronger property protection and 
support areas. The negative sign for the interaction (VC*IPR) coefficient is consistent with the 
previous regression models (-3.84 with standard error 0.58), and its absolute value is smaller 
than VC and IPR ones. In this IV analysis, both IPR and the interaction term have negative 
effects, which mean VC investment is more effective in weak property support environments. 
At the end of the IV analysis, we need to apply the DWH test (Hausman, 1978) discussed 
in section 4.4.2 to compare the general negative binomial (previous results) and IV methods and 
identify the most consistent solution. Using a proprietary software to complete this complicated 
test, we obtain DWH= 154.34. Since DWH has approximately Chi-square (  ) distribution, the 
corresponding p-value  . Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the current 
general negative binomial model (with no IV) is a more consistent estimator than the IV model 
for our panel data. In the next step, we use the Heckman Selection Model for the endogeneity 
test from different perspective.  
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Table 5.11: Instrumental variable method results- IV: Ease of Doing Business (start_bus) 
 
 Step 1: Tobit regression (for predicting VC investment variable)  
Response Variable- 
VC Investment (vc1) 
Regression 
Coefficient 
 Std. Error           Z-test P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
start_bus -0.003 0.0004 -6.42 0 -0.003 -0.002 
_cons -2.304 0.0149 -155.01 0 -2.332 -2.274 
Number of groups= 47310 
     
Obs per group: min=12, avg= 12.0, max= 12 
 
   Wald chi2(1) =41.21 
 
     Log likelihood  = -219530.61 & Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
    
 Observation summary:   497,640  left-censored observations 
  
 70080 uncensored  0 right-censored           
 
 
Step 2: Negative binomial regression (FE- final model- bootstrap replications (50) based on predicted 
VC variable) 
Response Variable- 
Patent 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error t-test P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vhat 22.148 3.719 5.96 0 14.859 29.438 
new_ipr -8.732 1.385 -6.3 0 -11.446 -6.017 
vhat_ipr -3.840 0.582 -6.6 0 -4.980 -2.700 
disclose -0.036 0.018 -1.95 0.052 -0.072 0.0003 
labor_educ -0.003 0.001 -3.58 0 -0.005 -0.002 
bus_entry -0.014 0.004 -3.42 0.001 -0.023 -0.006 
rd_country 0.147 0.021 7.01 0 0.106 0.189 
roe_mkt -0.003 0.001 -2.28 0.023 -0.005 -0.0004 
ss_enroll 0.015 0.003 4.16 0 0.008 0.022 
market_cap 3.39E-15 4.08E-15 0.83 0.406 -4.61E-15 1.14E-14 
tax 0.005 0.001 4.5 0 0.003 0.008 
msci 0.081 0.027 2.97 0.003 0.027 0.134 
_cons 48.281 9.130 5.29 0 30.385 66.177 
Observations = 92700,  Number of groups = 7725 
  Obs per group: min = 12, avg= 12.0, max=12 
    Wald chi2(1) =9.52 
      Log likelihood= -76872.793 & Prob > chi2 = 0.0020 
    
Step 3: DWH Test 
βiv = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtnbreg 
βnb = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtnbreg 
chi2(1) = (βiv-βnb)'[(V_iv-V_nb)^(-1)](βiv-βnb)= 154.34  Prob>chi2=0.0000   
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic       a  NB                        than IV 
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5.4.3. Heckman Selection Model 
We apply the two–step estimation of the Heckman Selection model in this study. This two-step 
method provides a correction for potential endogeneity and selection bias in our models. Table 
5.12 presents the results of the first and second stages of the Heckman Selection model in our 
study. The predicted value obtained from the first stage regression model is incorporated as an 
additional regressor in the second-stage negative binomial regression to control for potential 
endogeneity and to examine the effects of inflation-adjusted VC investment on patenting. Based 
on this result, both VC investment and IPR have significant and positive impacts on a firms’ 
patenting, with regression coefficients of 10.10 and 0.62, and standard errors of 1.79 and 0.04, 
respectively. Their interaction term (VC*IPR) is still significant, with a negative coefficient (-
1.77 with standard errors 0.33), but the absolute value of this coefficient is higher than the 
coefficient of IPR. Thus, VC investment is more effective in weak intellectual property support 
areas. This result is consistent with the previous regression outcomes provided in the main 
negative binomial regression models in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, and results of IV method, in which 
we found that VC investment is more effective in a climate of weak intellectual property 
protection and support. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no selection bias in the data and 
it rejects any criticism that VC only accepts specific firms with higher priori abilities to patent 
their innovations.  
Similar to the IV method, we need to apply a robust statistic test to compare the Heckman 
Selection model and the original negative binomial methods applied and discussed in section 5.2. 
The DWH test (Hausman, 1978) is used again here to complete this test. Based on the results 
demonstrated in Table 5.12 (Step 3), DWH= 14.82. Since DWH has approximately Chi-square 
(  ) distribution, the corresponding p-value  . Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and 
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conclude that the original negative binomial models are more consistent estimator than the 
Heckman Selection model for our panel data. Thus, we focus on the results of the previous 
models provided in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 (especially Model 4) moving forward. 
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Table 5.12: Heckman Selection model analysis  
Step 1: Selection Equation 
Fitting VC Investment variable (vc1=1 for 1-5th year of VC inv., zero otherwise)- Panel Logistic 
Response- VC 
Invest. (vc1) 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
disclose (omitted) 
     
stability -1.517 0.026 -57.85 0 -1.568 -1.466 
gdp 0.000 0.000 36.75 0 0.000 0.000 
labor_educ 0.016 0.001 13.57 0 0.013 0.018 
bus_entry 0.103 0.003 35.57 0 0.097 0.109 
rd_country -0.340 0.018 -18.7 0 -0.376 -0.304 
roe_mkt 0.008 0.001 10.84 0 0.006 0.009 
ss_enroll 0.022 0.002 9.12 0 0.017 0.026 
market_cap 0.000 0.000 -3.79 0 0.000 0.000 
tax 0.064 0.002 36.47 0 0.061 0.068 
msci 0.070 0.024 2.89 0.004 0.023 0.118 
Number of observation= 200,100 
     LR Chi2(10)= 19,778 
      Log likelihood= -93,699 
   Prob > Chi2 =0.000 (similar result if using NB in Step1)     
 
 
Step 2: Outcome Equation  
Using fitted value of VC Investment variable as a regressor (conditional FE negative binomial) 
Response 
Variable- Patent 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vhat 10.105 1.786 5.66 0 6.604 13.605 
new_ipr 0.616 0.035 17.35 0 0.546 0.685 
vhat_ipr -1.770 0.328 -5.4 0 -2.413 -1.127 
_cons -3.752 0.195 -19.24 0 -4.134 -3.370 
Number of observation= 92628 
     Wald chi2(3)=518 
Log likelihood  = -76615 & Prob > chi2  = 0.0000     
      
Step 3: DWH Test 
Using covariance matrix of step 2 (Heckman) and cov matrix with the same elements in NBl 
βheckman = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtnbreg 
βnb = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtnbreg 
chi2(1) = (βheckman-βnb)'[(V_heckman-V_nb)^(-1)](βheckman-βnb)=14.82 
Prob>chi2=0.0001  Reject Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic  general NB model is 
more consistent than Heckman  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings 
Given the emerging nature of research on VC investment, and this investment’s roles in enabling 
new start-up firms to increase their internal knowledge and innovation, this research has 
systematically examined some fundamental questions through different theoretical hypotheses 
and developed an extensive and holistic framework for this phenomenon that covers different 
industries and legal and socioeconomic patterns. This thesis contributes to the literature on VC 
and IPR by highlighting their critical roles in technological innovation in different cultural, legal 
and economic regimes, from weak to strong, or under enforced business support and protection. 
Our contribution also extends the literature by focusing on wider economic areas, including 
agriculture; manufacturing; mining; transportation; and retail, personal and business services, at 
firm level, using large datasets.  
This research empirically examines different hypotheses about the relationship between 
VC investment and portfolio firms’ innovation in various intellectual protection environments 
across all industries worldwide. We set up a large balanced panel data for the period 2000-2011, 
and started with zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. According to the first 
hypothesis analysis, the impacts of our key underlying parameters, including VC investment and 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), on business innovation, are strongly positive in all our 
regression models. In addition, based on the coefficient of their interaction term, VC investment 
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clearly has more influence on a firm’s patenting in areas with weaker intellectual support and 
protection.   
Using large panel data for VC-backed and non VC-backed firms for 99 countries and 83 
industries, we examined and measured the details of the VC investment and IPR influences on a 
firm’s patenting rate under different legal systems and industries. Our negative binomials as well 
as logistic regression models of the panel data present the significant impacts of VC investment 
and IPR parameters on increasing business patenting rates under all legal systems, by controlling 
for cultural, regulatory, and economic and market conditions of the business environment. These 
rates vary by area. Details of our analysis show that British law is more effective than other legal 
platform. French Civil law is the second most-effective legal platform, following by the German 
and Scandinavian varieties. This finding is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998), who state that 
the British legal system provides stronger business support and protection than others. Based on 
the elements of the legal system parameter, these results show that those countries that 
established stronger support for investors and quality of enforcement of legal rules can increase 
national rates of innovation. Since countries can be categorized under different legal systems (La 
Porta, 1998), this valuable achievement is extendable to different world regions and countries, 
based on their legal system. These outcomes are also supported by detailed analyses on 
countries. In those countries for which enough samples (more than 30 samples) exist, VC 
investment significantly and positively affects firms’ patenting increase.   
The magnitude of VC influence differs in response to the industry involved.  This effect 
is larger in those high-technology industries in which technological innovation is critical for 
success. Ultimately, VC investors have highly strategic roles and responsibilities in improving 
the internal knowledge and innovative activities of such firms.  
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In order to test and address endogeneity concerns about the relationship between 
dependent and key independent parameters, we use reverse causality, instrumental variables and 
the Heckman Selection model. In the reverse causality test, we adopt Granger causality to test 
the impact of VC investment before and after investment. This test supports our analysis to 
ensure that causality runs mainly from X (the explanatory variable) to Y (the response variable), 
or more specifically that VC investment causes a firm to be more innovative. This test is 
conducted for all VC-backed firms, and our findings show that the rate of a firm’s patenting is 
higher after VC investment than before, at a 97% level of confidence. The reverse causality 
method is applied at a more-detailed level to test VC investment effects in all legal systems, 
countries and industries. The summarized results are explained later in this section.   
The instrumental variables method is also used for testing the endogeneity between the 
key explanatory and response variables. Our instrument for VC investment is the Ease of Doing 
Business index. In the first step, the VC investment variable is predicted by the instrument and 
added as a regressor to the main regression model. The DWH test shows that the initial 
regression analysis is more consistent than the instrumental variables method.  
In addition, we applied a two-step Heckman Selection model as an additional 
endogeneity test for testing selection bias. There is a criticism that VC only focuses on those 
firms with higher priori abilities to innovate. The Heckman Selection model helps to conduct this 
analysis. In this model, the predicted value of VC investment obtained from the first step 
regression is incorporated as an additional regressor in the second step of negative binomial 
regression to control for selection bias and to examine the effects of inflation-adjusted VC 
investment on patenting. Based on this result, both VC investment and IPR have significant and 
positive impacts on firms’ patenting, and their interaction term (VC*IPR) is still significant, with 
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a negative coefficient. Thus, VC investment is more effective in weak intellectual property 
support areas. This result is consistent with the initial regression outcomes in which we found 
that VC investment is more effective in weak intellectual property protection environments and it 
rejects above criticism regarding the VC selection concerns. Using DWH testing method, we 
conclude again that the initial regression parameters are more consistent estimate than the 
Heckman Selection model. Finally, to test whether our results are robust and unbiased, robust 
regression and clustering standard errors are completed and show that the main results of the 
negative binomial regression are consistent.  
In the next part of our analysis, we use the reverse causality method at a more detailed 
level for testing VC investment effects in all legal systems and even for different countries across 
the world. As asserted earlier, VC investment impact is much stronger in British legal systems, 
such as in the US, Great Britain and Canada, than all Civil laws. French Civil law is the second 
most effective legal platform, following by the German and Scandinavian ones.  
In terms of country-level, the statistical test is completed for those countries that have a 
sample size of at least 10 to obtain unbiased estimates. Based on the test outcomes illustrated in 
Table 5.9, with a confidence level of around 95%, we can say that a firm’s patenting rate is 
greater after VC investment than before in 16 countries; thus VC investment is an effective 
factor for firms’ patenting in these locations: the United States, France, Canada, Great Britain, 
Switzerland, Germany, Israel, Belgium, the Netherlands, China, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, 
Italy, Spain and Finland. As indicated earlier, our results in ranking the legal systems’ impacts 
are extendable to different world regions and countries. 
This analysis is continued for those industries with a sample of at least 10 firms in the 
treatment group. Based on our analysis and our sample size, VC investment is very effective in 
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the following industries: SIC-73 (Business Services), 87 (Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
Management, and Related Services) and 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, Except Computer Equipment). Out of 16 industries in two-digit SIC categories, in 
13 of them, VC investment has significant impacts on firms’ patenting rates. These industries are 
SIC codes 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 30 (Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products), 34 (Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment), 35 
(Industrial, Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment), 36 (Electronic and Other 
Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment), 37 (Transportation 
Equipment), 38 (Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and 
Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks), 48 (Communications), 49 (Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 
Services), 50 (Wholesale Trade-durable Goods), 73 (Business Services), 87 (Engineering, 
Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services), and 89 (Miscellaneous Services). 
According to the detailed outcomes, innovation and patenting are understandably critical in most 
industries, however, VC investment impacts are more critical in some industries like information 
technology, communications, electric, electronic and measurement systems, industrial materials, 
and equipment, due to rapid technological changes in these areas. It is also important to 
recognize the effects of venture capitalists in patenting in the service industry as well as in 
trading, including business, engineering, management and accounting services, and durable good 
wholesale trading. Testing the average differences between SIC codes, we can find that the codes 
36, 37, 87, 35 and 28 are the most effective environments for VC investment impacts on 
patenting rates. 
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6.2. Future Work 
This research examines the relationship between an external source of knowledge-venture 
capital-and firms’ innovation worldwide. VC has significant impact on startup firms by 
providing different kinds of value-added support from the early stage to the exit stage.  
Some other external sources, such as private equity, alliances and joint ventures support 
and influence firms financially and non-financially. Therefore, an avenue of future research 
would be to examine the relationship between private equity, for example, and innovation.  
Similar to VCs, private equity firms provide working capital to their target firms to nurture 
expansion, new-product development, or restructuring of the firms’ operations, management, or 
ownership. In addition to VC, other common private equity strategies are leveraged buyouts, 
management buyouts, distressed investments, and mezzanine capital.  
Another avenue for future research would be to study, at a detailed level, other value-
added efforts of VC and private equity on target firms (e.g., productivity, quality, and business 
expansion) and measure their impacts in various industries worldwide. As discussed in Chapter 2 
(§ 2.2.2), VC contribution to firms’ activities is based on three main dimensions: the industry of 
target firms, the stage of VC investment, and firms’ geographic location (Boue, 2002). Any new 
study can consider this diversity and quantify results in each category.  
Finally, further research within the current dataset could be applied to industry-level 
innovative activities instead of firm-level, by using the country-based indices associated with 
industry/country behavior. In such a study, it would be worthwhile to measure and compare 
innovation efforts in different industries across countries/regions, while controlling for other 
socio-economic factors.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Main Databases 
A.1. Zephyr Database 
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A.2. LexisNexis Application 
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A.3. Thomson Innovation  
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A.4. World Bank Databank, World Economic Forum Data Platform, MSCI and Doing 
Business Project (for Country-Based Indices) 
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Appendix B: Test of Normality for Reverse Causality Parameter ( ̅)  
 
1. Summary of   ̅ parameter (for all VC-backed firms): 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean       Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rd_all   |     16797    .1908353   1.15873   -49.57284   23.98686 
 
 
2. Shapiro-Francia Test (for large sample size): 
 
    Variable |    Obs         W'            V'               z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
      rd_all   | 16797    0.40876    519.355     0.412    0.34031 
 
 
3. Histogram of  ̅ (16797 data points) 
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Appendix C- Two- digit SIC codes and Industry Types 
INDUSTRY 
CODE (2-
DIGIT SIC)
INDUSTRY TYPE
INDUSTRY 
CODE (2-
DIGIT SIC)
INDUSTRY TYPE
 Group 01  Agricultural Production Crops  Group 50  Wholesale Trade-durable Goods
 Group 02
 Agricultural Production Livestock And Animal 
Specialties
 Group 51  Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods
 Group 07  Agricultural Services  Group 52
 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 
And Mobile Home Dealers
 Group 08  Forestry  Group 53  General Merchandise Stores
 Group 09  Fishing, Hunting, And Trapping  Group 54  Food Stores
 Group 10  Metal Mining  Group 55
 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service 
Stations
 Group 12  Coal Mining  Group 56  Apparel And Accessory Stores
 Group 13  Oil And Gas Extraction  Group 57
 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment 
Stores
 Group 14
 Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, 
Except Fuels
 Group 58  Eating And Drinking Places
 Group 15
 Building Construction General Contractors And 
Operative Builders
 Group 59  Miscellaneous Retail
 Group 16
 Heavy Construction Other Than Building 
Construction Contractors
 Group 60  Depository Institutions
 Group 17  Construction Special Trade Contractors  Group 61  Non-depository Credit Institutions
 Group 20  Food And Kindred Products  Group 62
 Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, 
Exchanges, And Services
 Group 21  Tobacco Products  Group 63  Insurance Carriers
 Group 22  Textile Mill Products  Group 64  Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service
 Group 23  Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials Group 65  Rea  Estate
 Group 24  Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture  Group 67  Holding And Other Investment Offices
 Group 25  Furniture And Fixtures  Group 70
 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other 
Lodging Places
 Group 26  Paper And Allied Products  Group 72  Personal Services
 Group 27  Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries  Group 73  Business Services
 Group 28  Chemicals And Allied Products  Group 75  Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking
 Group 29  Petroleum Refining And Related Industries  Group 76  Miscellaneous Repair Services
 Group 30  Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products  Group 78  Motion Pictures
 Group 31  Leather And Leather Products  Group 79  Amusement And Recreation Services
 Group 32  Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products  Group 80  Health Services
 Group 33  Primary Metal Industries  Group 81  Legal Services
 Group 34
 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 
And Transportation Equipment
 Group 82  Educational Services
 Group 35
 Industrial And Commercial Machinery And 
Computer Equipment
 Group 83  Social Services
 Group 36  Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment Group 84
 Museums, Art Galleries, And Botanical And 
Zoological Gardens
 Group 37  Transportation Equipment  Group 86  Membership Organizations
 Group 38  Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks Group 87
 Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
Management, And Related Services
 Group 39  Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  Group 88  Private Households
 Group 40  Railroad Transportation  Group 89  Miscellaneous services
 Group 41  Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger Transportation Group 91
 Executive, Legislative, And General 
Government, Except Finance
 Group 42
 Motor Freight Transportation And 
Warehousing
 Group 92  Justice, Public Order, And Safety
 Group 43  United States Postal Service  Group 93
 Public Finance, Taxation, And Monetary 
Policy
 Group 44  Water Transportation  Group 94  Administration Of Human Resource Programs
 Group 45  Transportation By Air  Group 95
 Administration Of Environmental Quality And 
Housing Programs
 Group 46  Pipelines, Except Natural Gas  Group 96  Administration Of Economic Programs
 Group 47  Transportation Services  Group 97  National Security And International Affairs
 Group 48  Communications  Group 99  Nonclassifiable Establishments
 Group 49  Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services                     
Source: US Government, 2013 (http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html) 
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Appendix D: Additional Analysis for Negative Binomial Regression 
1. Stepwise Regression- Final Model for Negative Binomial Panel Data 
2. Additional Analysis for Clustering Standard Errors 
 
 Stepwise NB Regression Results-
Final Model of This Method 
Clustering Standard Errors 
Parameter  Model 10† Model 11 Model 12 
VC Investment (dummy for 1-5 years)  2.392*** 2.300*** 1.801***  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)  0.464*** 0.362*** 0.344***  
IPR*VC Investment (interaction term)  -0.327*** -0.139*** -0.063  
Controls:  YES NO YES  
Business Extent of Disclosure   -0.033*** --- -0.063***  
Political Stability & Absence of Violence  -0.123*** --- 0.006  
GDP per Capita (current US$)  -1.1E-05*** --- -1E-05***  
Labor Force with Secondary Education (% of total)  Not Sign. (Excluded) --- 0.015***  
Business Entry Rate (new registrations as % of total)  -0.013*** --- -0.019***  
Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)  0.096*** --- 0.259***  
Return on Equity (%)  -0.005*** --- -0.006***  
School Enrollment, Secondary (% net)  Not Sign. (Excluded) --- -0.032***  
Market Capitalization of Listed Co. (current US$)  5.7E-15* --- -1.20E-15  
Taxes on Income, Profits & Capital Gains (% of rev)  0.007*** --- 0.017***  
MSCI Return (Annual)   Not Sign. (Excluded) --- 0.110***  
Legal System (dummy)  YES***(all) NO NO  
Industry (dummy)  NO NO NO  
Clustering of Standard Errors  NO Firm:ID Firm:ID  
Wald Chi2  --- 3431 --  
Prob>Chi2 (p-value)  0.000 0.000 --  
Log Likelihood (log pseudolikelihood for clustering)  -75580                    -170917 -169807  
Number of Observations  92628 567720 567720  
*,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
†Three variables are eliminated during stepwise regression: Labor force with secondary education, School 
Enrollment-Secondary, and MSCI Return Indices. 
